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EXCERPT 1
The year, 2017, will focus on “Harnessing the Demographic Dividend through Investments 
in Youth”. There is thus a need for Africa to rely on the poten al of its youth through the 
implementa on of basic Human Rights such as quality educa on and the crea on of jobs. The 
African youth must remain a source of hope, and AU Member States must con nue engaging 
young people to help overcome poverty in Africa. Youth Engagement Strategies should be 
invested in to encourage youth par cipa on in a Pan African environment. The inclusion of 
African Youth in discussions on how to encourage Africa’s growth will not only create a se ng 
of acceptance but will also allow Africa’s sustainable development to be youth-driven. 
African Youth should also explore dates that celebrate them such as African Youth Day established 
in 2006 in Banjul to acknowledge that African youth have an important voice in Africa since they 
are significant stakeholders in the con nent. The African Youth Day celebrated on 01 November 
in recogni on of the African Youth Charter during the Summit in Banjul is, thus, an opportunity 
for young Africans to engage and contribute to the development of the con nent in each region by 
addressing key issues regarding economic growth, social problems, and sustainable development 
in African socie es. Ar cle 26 of the African Youth Charter urges youth to partake fully in 
ci zenship du es including, but not limited to vo ng, decision-making and governance. It also 
encourages youth to engage in peer-to-peer educa on in order to enhance the promo on of youth 
development in areas like literacy, use of informa on and communica on technology, disease 
and violence preven on, and peace building.
Investment in African Youth is an opportunity to inspire future genera ons to emulate innova ve 
and exci ng approaches to making a difference in the promo on and protec on of human 
and people’s rights in Africa. Youths (and YALF) should therefore make maximum use of the 
opportuni es given to them in order for Africa to achieve its goals as a collec ve en ty.
Dr. Salah Hammad 
Senior Human Rights Expert, 
Department of Poli cal Affairs, 
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EXCERPT 2
Two years ago, the Young African Leaders Forum embarked on the journey of mobilizing young 
people to support the African Union Agenda 2063. Agenda 2063 as a consensual document 
was borne out of a consulta ve process involving all segments of African society ranging from 
the Regional Economic Communi es, Member States, Women and Youths to civil society 
organisa ons, including youths of YALF.
The Young African Leaders Forum is a very strategic youth-led organisa on working systemically 
to foster the  mely realisa on of the African Union Agenda 2063 vision. The ini a ve and 
ambi on of this organisa on is to move African na ons to the First World status. In order to 
achieve their vision, they have counted it necessary to gather, share informa on and develop ideas 
from African youth leaders through their journal of development. The Young African Leaders 
Journal of Development (YALJOD) will host ideas and viewpoints about the development 
of Africa. The journal is not merely a theore cal one. It will rather form the founda on for 
numerous implementable projects which will be executed by YALF, other development focused 
organisa ons in Africa, and even the governments. 
There is no gainsaying that the a ainment of Africa’s long-term socio-economic development 
agenda is con ngent on building strong ins tu ons and strong current genera on. The youth 
should be equipped to tackle the root causes of conlict such as poverty, strong oversight over 
governments to establish accountable state ins tu ons that would provide the adequate and 
desired responses to the peace and security challenges that the con nent is faced with, which 
have diverse impact on all genera ons but more especially youth, children and women. The 
youth leader, like any one of us, have the responsibility to ensure that the AU and member 
states deliver on their mandate of silencing the guns by 2020. Doing so would pave the way for 
a prosperous Africa, which will occupy its righ ul place in the interna onal arena. YALJOD 
provides the pla orm to exchange ideas on how all these can be achieved.
Alice Buhinja Mutesi
Post Conlict Reconstruc on Oficer, 
Peace and Security Department, 
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EXCERPT 3
The future belongs to those who will inherit it. The responsibility for ensuring the future 
we want rests on all who have a stake in the future. Theore cally, we are all historical 
stakeholders in the future, whether as those who will inherit, or as those who create it as 
legacy. However, more meaningfully, the irst fron er stakeholders are the youth, whose 
decisions and ac ons on the most part are currently subject to decisions and ac ons of the 
older genera on. For the youth to play their role as the irst fron er, they must begin to take 
up strategic posi ons as par cipants in the current decision making, ac on planning and 
implementa on. If they wait for formal installa on as leaders, it will be too late.
This par cipa on begins with the young people acquiring the necessary knowledge, 
iden fying the challenges and opportuni es, determining the future they want, recognizing 
what needs to be done and making deliberate decisions to curve niches for their interven ons 
at every level, in every sector, as far as is possible.
Fortunately, the future we all want as Africans has been well ar culated in the AU Vision 
framework: Agenda 2063, the AU having made tremendous effort to capture the voices 
and perspec ves of all cons tuencies of the African peoples, including youth and women. 
Furthermore, the AU also makes conscious effort to include young people in decision making 
processes whether the young people are already in formal leadership posi ons or not.
It therefore behooves every African youth as far as is possible, to ‘make a commi ee of one’ 
and decide to be a leader in this ma er. Leadership involves recogni on of the challenge 
and opportunity, whether in part or in whole, and se ng out to do something about it, and 
seeking to inluence others posi vely towards the common desired end.  
It is with this in mind that the ini a ve undertaken by young people under YALF is 
par cularly encouraging. There is hope for Africa when young people embrace their 
responsibility for Africa’s future by seeking to appreciate the causa ve and incidental 
factors of why and where we are today, and recognize the implica ons of our collec ve 
vision, in order to understand and iden fy their roles for today and tomorrow.
The YALJOD ini a ve shi s the erstwhile pervasive charge of the ages against youth who 
may prefer to while away their crea ve talent and energy on rabble rousing in iden fying 
faults in the system for the sole purpose of making demands on government and other 
structures. Rather, youth under YALF are taking the responsibility for shaping the future 
from wherever they are. They are calling on themselves to be part of the Africa-led solu on, 
through scholarly discourse, nurturing crea ve intellectual tensions through which the most 
fer le ideas will emerge to influence ac on at various levels in society.
I therefore highly commend and recommend YALJOD for every possible encouragement, 
support and resourcing, that the effort may reach the widest par cipa on and audience and 
have the greatest possible impact.
Beatrice Khama  Njenga
Head, Educa on Division, Department of Human Resources, Science and Technology, 
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FOREWORD
Gree ngs and welcome as we celebrate the launch of the irst youth-led pan-African journal 
of development, Young African Leaders Journal of Development (YALJOD). YALF’s vision is 
that this new African journal dedicated to youth “will serve as a pla orm for sugges ng and 
implemen ng community development ideas that will promote the living standards of Africans.”
As the  tle indicates, the journal will publish original research, scholarly analysis and viewpoints 
about the con nent’s development. Submissions for this first issue focused on challenges 
confron ng various countries, with an emphasis on the impact on youth. 
This inaugural publica on comprises 22 original research and diverse review ar cles from 
authors based in Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. It relects the voices of African youths who are confron ng concerns from several 
vantage points as students, workers and ac vists.
Original research comprises a small but broad spectrum of topics: natural resources (oil sector) 
governance; the role of entrepreneurship; the impact of conflict on the availability of selected 
 mber forest products; and understanding and addressing the “democracy-development” nexus.
The other ar cles examine a myriad of signfiicant issues namely: curbing terrorism among youth; 
democracy and development; illicit financial lows; integra ng mental health interven ons; 
developmental na onalism; educa on as a pathway to development; a Black theology response 
to sexual violence; the impact of culture, patriarchy and the law; workplace violence; ethnicity as 
a deterrent to development; mul lingual radio as a communica on tool in agriculture; an inter-
railway system: a development and uniica on mechanism for Africa; promo ng and solidifying 
African unity through Pan-Africanism, and “Black” colonialism.  
My wish, consistent with YALF’s goals, is that this journal becomes an important resource for all 
youths as well as policy makers. The intent is that future issues, in addi on to the publica on of 
ar cles and original research, will also publish expert opinions, book reviews and le ers to the 
editor.
I would like to personally congratulate the members of YALF and the youth editors of YALJOD 
for taking such a bold step in preparing this cri cal and  mely publica on. Much success at the 
launching of this first edi on at the African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa scheduled for 
October 21, 2016.
Dr. Patricia Rodney
(Widow of Pan-African Historian, Walter Rodney)
CEO, The Walter Rodney Founda on, Inc.
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PREFACE
“One Day, Africa will write its own story … and it will be a story of glory and dignity ”,
-  Patrice Lumumba
The Young African Leaders Journal of Development (YALJOD) has been conceptualised with the 
aim of highligh ng ideas and issues that would help realise the aspira ons of the African Union's 
Agenda 2063 and the United Na ons Global Goals for Sustainable Development (SDGs), as well 
as other con nental, regional and na onal development ini a ves in Africa.
This Journal brings together some of Africa’s top young minds and thought leaders, from 
different parts of the Con nent, who have come together to highlight and share their views, 
perspec ves and proposed solu ons on some of the pressing developmental issues facing Africa 
today, from the threats of terrorism and conflict; to democracy and good governance; gender 
equality; educa on and healthcare provision; entrepreneurship; science and technology; and all 
other spheres of life.
 
As we proceed in the 21st Century, we need to recognise that Africa is at a new transi on in its 
development, needing a new type of leadership in the poli cal, economic, social and all other 
sectors of the global agenda. Indeed, Africa is rising, and at the centre of this growing Con nent 
are Africa’s youth, who are ready to make a difference. With Africa’s youth popula on pegged 
at approximately 70%, and the Con nent’s popula on poised to double to two billion in the next 
genera on, it is clear that the Con nent’s future lies in the hands of its youth.
What then are Africa’s hopes for the next 50 years, and the next one hundred years and beyond? 
What are our hopes of realising the United Na ons Global Goals for Sustainable Development? 
And indeed, what are Africa’s hopes of realising our very ambi ous Agenda 2063, if we cannot 
adequately embrace the vision, knowledge and crea vity of our youth? And if we cannot inspire 
them to confidently and asser vely face a globalised and compe  ve world? 
I believe that taking into account the perspec ve of young people is cri cal to social change, 
poli cal and economic progress. It is also important to include the perspec ve of our youth in the 
poli cal and economic decision-making process in Africa. This is because young people hold the 
key to change, innova on, and ac on in all areas of development. It therefore, falls upon us that 
for Africa’s poli cal, economic and social decisions and declara ons to result in effec ve ac on 
for sustainable development, the youths need to be effec vely engaged, because the concerns of 
young people top today’s global agenda - from educa on, to employment, access to healthcare 
facili es, as well as informa on and communica on technologies, and all other areas of life. If 
Africa does not integrate the knowledge, vision, crea vity and experience of its youth, Africa’s 
young people will remain an untapped powerful resource and Africa would be losing out on its 
major resource. 
The Indian philosopher, Mahatma Gandhi once said “First they ignore, then they laugh at you, 
then they ight you, then you win”. As expressed by Mahatma Gandhi, Africa was first ignored 
and considered a dark con nent. When the explorers from the western world came they laughed 
at us as being primi ve and laughed at everything we did from our cultural beliefs and our food, 
right through to our religious beliefs. Then they fought with us during coloniza on and during 
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of the world keeps coming back to Africa and are dependent on Africa’s wealth.
I believe that the future can be found in the past. Africa is the birthplace of mankind and is also 
the birthplace of civiliza on with great early empires, a great tradi on of trade; a great history; 
a wealth of diversity of peoples, tongues, and tradi ons; and a full spectrum of skin tones, hair 
textures, rich religions, rich cultures and a rich heritage. 
However, because we allow other people to write our history, Africa’s good and inspiring stories 
of our rich heritage are never told. Posi ve stories about Africa, such as those of strong wise men 
and women, rulers of great empires such as Shaka Zulu of South Africa, and strong asser ve 
women like Yaa Asaantwe of Ghana are never told. Even the founding fathers of modern Africa 
who have not been gone too long like Haile Selasie; Jomo Kenya a; Julius Nyerere; Kwame 
Nkrumah have already been pushed out of the history books of our children. Those who are s ll 
alive like Dr Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia are not given as much credit as is due to them. This is 
because we let other people write our stories. And because we let other people write our stories, 
all the great history of Africa is largely ignored and unknown, as most of it is not wri en at all.
I always get the impression that we underrate ourselves as Africans and underes mate Africa’s 
real poten al. From the history that I know, much of the modern world was built on Africa’s 
resources. From the history that I know, the modern western world was built on Africa’s labour, on 
Africa’s sweat and toil, using Africa’s manpower, Africa’s wealth and Africa’s intellect - ini ally 
as slaves, followed by coloniza on, right through to the pilferage of our wealth and resources via 
priva sa on, foreign investment and tax evasion, from raw materials right through to brain drain.
It is no secret that Africa is a con nent that is rich in natural resources from oil and gas, to gold, 
diamonds, copper, precious stones and virgin arable land. Africa is also rich in rare earths with 
bio-diversity and the enormous carbon-sink that are the rain forests, who play a major role in 
tackling global warming and climate change. Just like Africa gave birth to humanity and built 
the world in the past, Africa is s ll building the world in the present and the world is dependent 
on Africa to build and save its future and that of the en re planet. The rich natural resources 
of Africa have once again prompted a 21st century scramble for the Con nent, with the East 
and the West figh ng for a piece of Africa. Africa s ll has untapped resources such as mineral 
deposits and virgin arable land. All these blessings make Africa a con nent of opportunity and 
an emerging investment fron er. This posi ons Africa as a con nent that is signalling impending 
economic migra on from the East and the West in the name of foreign investment and interna onal 
development.
As the birthplace of civiliza on, there is every opportunity that Africa can now become the 
birthplace of a new form of poli cs that goes beyond the Western model of liberal democracy. 
As Africa inally emerges from the twin shadows of the Colonial Era and the Cold War, there is 
a new vibrancy to African poli cs and the true spread of democracy in the wake of globalisa on. 
Most African countries now have mul -party democracy, where compe  on among the poli cal 
par es is more spread out and fierce, giving the electorate a wider choice to select from, and 
pu ng the government of the day to be accountable and to uphold good governance. Africa’s 
new asser ve poli cs rejects the belief of the ‘one policy or one solu on its all’ as imposed in 
the past.
As is evident now, the Con nent has now risen above the ini al setbacks of HIV/AIDS with 
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some of our African countries being among the fastest growing economies in the world. Africa 
has survived slavery, colonialisa on, brain drain, resource and wealth pilferage. Surely, Africa 
can survive disease, poverty, corrup on and conflict!
Africa is a hub of professional and intellectual resource with its own intellectual, cultural, 
inancial, human, poli cal and social capital to rise to excellence. With the con nued increase in 
the number of African universi es, Africa is educa ng its young people to be future leaders with 
a higher percentage of Africa’s youth being educated in most African countries. In its pursuit 
for excellence, Africa requires a new development strategy that invests in the poten al of Africa 
by Africans to improve governance and to achieve sustainable, equitable economic growth in 
order to put Africa on a path to meet its developmental goals, to eradicate poverty and achieve 
prosperity.
Africa needs to believe in itself, in its power and its influence through its vibrant youth popula ons. 
Africa needs to reassert itself as the provider of the world’s resources and the custodian of the 
well-being of the planet. Africa is once again being seen as a con nent of opportunity, and the 
last emerging investment fron er. Africa needs to claim ownership of Africa’s des ny, take 
ownership of our con nent and our resources; ownership of our policies, poli cs, economic 
and social development. We also need to take ownership of our problems and ownership of our 
solu ons. While Interna onal Rela ons scholars talk about the "Asian Century”, I feel confident 
to claim the 21st Century as the African Century because of our vibrant youth popula on.
Africa has the poten al to be a major player in world affairs. But Africa cannot do this without 
its youth making a full contribu on. The development strategy for Africa must be premised 
on the youth as key and indispensable actors and leaders in accelera ng economic growth and 
in achieving poli cally, socially and environmentally sustainable development. The talents of 
Africa’s youth is exhibited in the way the various authors have ar culated the issues that they have 
chosen to highlight in this inaugural issue of the Young African Leaders Journal of Development. 
Her Excellency Ambassador Dr. Jus na Mutale,
Founder & CEO, Jus na Mutale Founda on for Leadership
Young African
Leaders Forum
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THE REVIVAL OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
IN NIGERIA AND ITS IMPACT ON SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT
Olanrewaju Ojo Emupenne
Poli cal Scien st and Independent Researcher,
Nigeria.
ABSTRACT
Nigeria was under military rule for near to 30 years out of her 55 years of existence a er 
independence. During this period, corrup on reached peak levels causing societal retrogression. 
The dawn of the Fourth Republic in 1999 heralded the revival of elec ons in the country. It is 
against this background that this study inves gates the extent to which democracy has advanced 
and improved the living standards of ci zens and increased per capita income among others. 
A total of 642 people, 393 males, 236 women and 13 respondents took part in the case study. 
The study underscores the need for a policy road-map while hin ng at a strategic framework 
for understanding and addressing the ‘democracy-development nexus’ in the Nigerian poli cal 
system.
Key Words:  Democracy, development, elec ons, military, socio-economic transforma on. 
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
Nigeria is a federal republic located at the eastern end of the Gulf of Guinea, with an es mated 
popula on of about 182,200,000  (UN, 2015), earning the country the  tle of the most populous 
na on in Africa and the seventh most populous na on in the world. Nigeria shares territorial 
boundaries with the Republic of Benin in the West, Chad and Cameroon in the East, the Niger 
Republic in the North and Atlan c Ocean in (Gulf of Guinea) the South. The country measures 
approximately 923,769 square kilometres, made up of 909,890 square kilometres of land and 
13,876 square kilometres of water (Na onal Bureau of Sta s cs, 2010).
1.1 STRUCTURE OF THE STATE AND GOVERNANCE
There is a consensus among scholars that Nigeria is a Federal State (Ijalaiye, 1979; Osuntokun, 
1979; Osadolor, 1998; Tanumo, 1998; Anifowose and Babawale, 2010; Idahosa and Aghahowa, 
2010). Nigeria, as a Federal State, is unofficially divided into six (6) geopoli cal zones which 
include North West, North East, North Central, South West, South East and South-South. The 
country is officially delineated into thirty-six (36) states and a federal capital territory. 
Nigeria’s federal system consists of three  ers of governance; federal, state and local governments. 
There is a clear-cut separa on of power between the arms of government. The execu ve head at 
the federal level is the president, governors head the states and chairpersons for local councils. 
With regard to the law making process, the state and local government prac ce unicameralism 
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A SYNOPSIS OF NIGERIA UNDER MILITARY REGIME
Nigeria became a republic in 1963, three years a er gaining independence from Great Britain.  
And no sooner had the colonialists le  the shore of the country than topsy-turvy of the poli cal 
scene, tomfoolery of the poli cal gladiators and entrenched regional disharmony became the 
order of the day (Ademoyega, 1981; Onovo, 1997; Iroanusi, 2000; Onah, 2000; Tonye, 2010).
On 15 January 1966, the military struck and overthrew a democra c government. There were 
seven successful military takeovers and four unsuccessful coups between 1966 and 1999 when 
the army handed over power to an elected government. The long spell of military rule was a great 
setback for Nigeria and its nega ve effects are s ll felt.
1.2 ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA SINCE 1999
One of the cardinal characteris cs of democracy is free, fair and credible elec ons. Olurode 
(1987) and Akinboye (2004) allude that democracy is the pivot around which elec on revolves. 
Elec ons have become an integral part of Nigeria's democra c governance. Anifowose (2004) 
notes that ‘a conten ous poli cal issue in Nigeria since independence on 1st October 1960, has 
been the poli cs of power shi ’. S ll, unlike earlier democra c experiments truncated through 
coup d’état due to succession crises, in the current dispensa on, Nigeria has had four successful 
poli cal transi ons.
2.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The Nigerian poli cal landscape reeks of unfulfilled electoral promises and the death of ‘dividends 
of democracy’. There is a primordial accumula on of the commonwealth of our beloved country 
depleted by poli cal office bearers and their allies to the detriment of the helpless poor masses. 
As a consequence, the nega ve effects of this are enormous and they include the shortage of 
infrastructural facili es, youth res veness, a high crime rate, brain drain, low life expectancy 
and irregular migra on through Sahara or Mediterranean routes among others. Thus, this study 
inves gates and illustrates the extent to which democracy has affected the quality of life of  
Nigerian ci zens.
3.0 THE RESEARCH QUESTION  
The main aim of this study was to collect enough data to help in examining the extent to which 
democra c ins tu ons speed up or decelerate developmental process in Sub-Saharan Africa with 
specific reference to Nigeria. It also seeks to inves gate why the Nigerian leadership at the federal, 
state and local levels has been incapable of addressing the problems connec ng corrup on, 
systemic failure, ins tu onal decay and poli cal iner a leading to the underdevelopment of the 
country.
Core research ques on:  Does democracy accelerate or decelerate the developmental stride of 
Nigeria?
Sub-ques ons:
1. Is every ethnic, religious or social group free and able to exercise their right to take part in 
na onal poli cs?
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2. Has any household gone without the life's necessi es including access to clean water, 
healthcare and energy since 1999?
3. Since the return of democra c governance, has corrup on declined, the condi on of social 
ameni es together with the security situa on improved? And has the condi on of the 
medium, and small-scale enterprises and the value of na onal currency improved since the 
return to democra c governance?
4. Do elected officials have the requisite qualifica ons to do their job in an effec ve and 
eficient manner?
5. To what extent are the elected officials accessible before and a er elec ons in Nigeria to 
guarantee poli cal accountability?
6. Do incumbent poli cians embark on projects on the eve of elec ons to enhance their 
chances of victory in the elec ons?
7. Are elec on results reflec ve of the wishes of the majority of the electorates?
8. Should Nigeria's electoral system prohibit poten al candidates with a shady character or 
previous/current involvement in corrupt prac ces from contes ng for federal, state or local 
government seats?
9. Are those elected officials able to improve the quality of service in government and ease the 
poor's suffering while in office?
10. Has the economic condi on of Nigeria improved or deteriorated since the return to civil 
rule?
11. Are Nigerians sa sfied with the way democracy works and the way elec ons in the country 
get conducted?
12. Do Nigerian ci zens have confidence in their elected leaders?
4.0 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
This study intends to provide a be er understanding of how viable democra c ins tu ons can 
help in fostering human development and the actualisa on of the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGS) in Nigeria as well as the African region.
5.0 METHODOLOGY
This study adopts a blend of data from both primary and secondary sources. 
5.1 RESEARCH DESIGN
The study employs a survey research design. 
5.2 STUDY POPULATION
The popula on includes a reasonable range of actors such as scholars, policy makers, opinion 
leaders, members of civil society, members of women groups, security sector personnel, youth 
groups and very importantly, the poor and near-poor individuals in rural areas. 
5.3 STUDY LOCATION AND SITE
The primary data was obtained from the six geo-poli cal zones of the federa on viz., Northeast 
(Yobe State), North West (Kebbi State), North Central (Abuja FCT and Niger State), South West 
(Lagos State), South East (Enugu State) and South-South (Edo State). 
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5.4 SAMPLE SIZE AND SAMPLING TECHNIQUE
Six hundred and forty-two individuals were selected to be part of the study using probability 
sampling with the intent that every Nigerian has a chance of taking part. The six geo-poli cal 
zones got just representa on in the study; from the North West 116 respondents, 137 from North 
East, 56 from North Central, 109 from South West, 122 from South East and 77 from South-
South. More so, an addi onal 25 respondents who did not state their geo-poli cal zones.
5.5 RESEARCH INSTRUMENT AND INSTRUMENTATION
Only one ques onnaire was used for this study, consis ng of six parts. The ques onnaire elicited 
relevant informa on from the respondents. Part A consisted of items on respondent’s socio-
demographic profile. Part B, C, D, E and F consisted of 40 items that sought for respondent’s 
percep ons on main concerns affec ng Nigerians on a daily basis using Rensis Likert ive-level 
scale Strongly Agree, Agree Somewhat, Disagree, Strongly Disagree and Have not Formed an 
Opinion.
5.6 DATA COLLECTION
The researcher sent out ques onnaires to Nigerians in the selected states of the federa on. Data 
was generated from the responses of 642 respondents. 
5.7 ANALYSIS OF DATA
Por ons of the data collected got further analysed in details using analy cal tools such as the 
Sta s cal Package for Social Scien sts (SPSS) and Microso  Excel.
6.0 RESULT AND DISCUSSION  
The results of the study are presented and discussed in order of the research ques ons.
7.0 A SYNTHESIS OF THE STUDY
Through the study it was discovered that:
1. Democracy has not engendered sustainable development in Nigeria. The quality of life of a 
larger percentage of the Nigerian popula on, in par cular, the rural poor has not improved 
as expected. Elec on winners have neither done much to improve the quality of government 
service nor helped to ease the poor's afflic on while in office.
2. Since the return to democracy, Nigeria's state of na onal security has been in shambles and 
misuse of office and corrup on has worsened.
3. The value of Naira (the Nigeria’s na onal currency) has con nued to depreciate despite 
assurances for its stabilisa on.
4. Although most people seeking for elec ve offices in Nigeria are academically qualified, the 
study showed that majority of them lack the integrity to handle public funds; and adequate 
knowledge with regards to the problems faced by their cons tuencies.
5. Most of the elected officials are accessible during elec oneering campaign. But once 
elec ons are over and they are sworn in, accessing them becomes nearly impossible.
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6. Poli cal Business Cycle (PBC) is a norm in Nigeria's poli cal system. Poli cians o en 
embark on projects on the eve of elec ons to boost their chances of victory and abandon 
them soon as elec on season comes to an end.
7. Nigeria's electoral system will be more transparent and apt if it restricts people with 
ques onable character vying for poli cal offices.
8. The Economic condi on of Nigeria has improved, though not significantly, since the return 
to civil rule.
9. The way democracy works and the way Nigeria conducts its elec ons is in general, 
acceptable.
10. While the majority of Nigerians have confidence in the current president to move the 
na on closer to the ‘promised land’ considering his antecedent; the confidence they have in 
their state governors, senators, members of House of Representa ve and State Houses of 
Assembly is at zero level.
8.0 CONCLUSION
Democracy is essen al to development if its fundamental principles are well ar culated and 
holis cally harnessed. The type of democracy prac sed in Nigeria for the past sixteen (16) years 
leaves nothing to be desired and is not at par with other na ons. This is the raison d’etre that, in 
spite of Nigeria’s diverse resources, democra c governance has failed to produce meaningful 
economic growth and sustainable development.  Results and the findings from the analysed data 
gathered have been jurispruden ally dissected to establish this fact. A erwards, panaceas on how 
democracy can s mulate sustainable development in Nigeria were proffered. It is envisioned 
that if the current government discards the terrible burden bequeathed on this country by past 
government and embraces a new policy roadmap as bu ressed below, the country will be the 
be er for it.
9.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
In the light of the above findings the following recommenda ons are made:
1. Nigerians should not go without the necessi es of life such as water, food, clothing, shelter 
and energy.
2. A conducive business environment should be created for both local entrepreneurs and 
foreign investors. Necessary start-up capital should be provided for genuine small and 
medium scale entrepreneurs at a reasonable interest rate.
3. A strategic framework for tackling corrup on should be developed. An -gra  agencies such 
as Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Independent Corrupt Prac ces 
and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) among others should be rejuvenated and 
empowered to ‘bark’ and ‘bite’.
4. En cing the electorates with infrastructural facili es and economic resurgence on the eve 
of elec ons intending to win their votes should be discouraged through an enabling law. 
Fulfilment of electoral promises should start from week one (1) when a poli cal office 
holder assumes office.
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5. Nigeria’s electoral system must take guidance from a legal framework that complies with 
global best prac ces.
6. Poli cal accountability should be encouraged. As such, any individual, regardless of how 
highly placed, that is implicated in electoral fraud should not only be disqualified but also 
prevented from vying for any elected office in the country.
7. Since elec ons are crucial for the future of Nigeria, the Independent Na onal Electoral 
Commission (INEC) must be an independent execu ve arm of government in the truest 
sense, with the funds for mee ng the financial needs of the body drawn from a consolidated 
account.
8. The major cause of the problems bedevilling Nigeria such as violence, terrorism, crime, 
illegal migra on, rural-urban dri  to men on a few, is poverty. Thus government at the 
federal, state and local government levels should adopt a prac cal and sustainable strategy 
to reduce abject poverty in Nigeria.
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PAN-AFRICANISM, LEADERSHIP PROSPECT AND THE 
AGENDA 2063
Prince Ifoh
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ABSTRACT
The idea of development has always been nurtured. It is as old as the history of Africa itself. Even 
though the con nent is believed to host the star ng point of development, man has struggled 
to con nue doing so there. Shying away from reality will not be the solu on, but facing reality 
with all its encumbrances. Perhaps, many people are ignorant of what pan-Africanism can offer; 
hence, they relegate pan-Africanism and the African development prospect to mere academic 
studies. Against this backdrop, the paper seeks to substan ate the signiicance and role of pan-
Africanism in the development of Africa.
INTRODUCTION
The African Union (AU) Agenda 2063 project is aimed at achieving a united and prosperous 
Africa. To realise our vision of a united and prosperous Africa, there is the need to adopt a 
paradigm – a prac cable theory about how things should be rightly said and done. Our people, 
especially the youth, must understand the importance of pan-Africanism and work sellessly 
towards promo ng it. Africa has found it difficult to evolve a consistent ideology. The cultural 
mul farious nature of African na ons occasioned by the arbitrary par  oning by their erstwhile 
colonial masters is not helping ma ers. Change is only possible when the people are united. 
Stalling a tudes have threatened the development of our con nent.  
African development has been stunted by crises of ideologies. The struggles by different ethnic 
groups indigenous to na ons for poli cal and social domina on of others have also created fear, 
emo onal a achment and resistance to ra onal synthesis of the diversity which could promote 
the na on’s development. The Biafran emancipa on struggle in Nigeria stemmed from this 
same perceived poli cal domina on; whereas this ethnic group would have held onto unity and 
contributed from a strategic posi on to the country’s development. This diversity has cost us so 
much. Nelson Mandela understood it and revealed his dream of an African con nent that is at 
peace with itself. For him, the realisa on of a united Africa where leaders work in synergy is 
the surest way to the con nent’s development. Perhaps, Kwame Nkrumah had be er words to 
pass the necessary message. He opined: “It is clear that we must ind an African solu on to our 
problems, and this can only be found in African unity. Divided we are weak; united, Africa could 
become one of the greatest forces for good in the world.”1 I beg to rephrase Nkrumah’s ‘could’ to 
‘would’. This is rather a statement of fact applicable to any part of the globe. How can a united 
and mul talented people not prove formidable? Even God had to dispel such threatening unity 
at the Tower of Babel. I wish to state the fact that it is the ideology and values of a people that 
direct their development. 
What has been the case before now? Africa’s underdevelopment has been largely blamed on 
colonialism. Walter Rodney’s "How Europe Underdeveloped Africa" also lent credence to the 
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truth of this claim. But whilst we may yet ponder, what has been the impact of our self-governance 
over the last ive decades? Professor Kwasi Agyeman tells us more: “ If we were to be honest with 
ourselves, we surely would not ind it too difficult to be convinced of the fact that Africans have 
been irresponsible and harmful to Africa in terms of self-governance. I would like to stake out the 
case that we have failed ourselves.” 2
Intently, anyone would agree with Professor Agyeman. Governance in Africa has suffered several 
hangovers. This governance, however, does not only refer to poli cal governance. Our ac ons 
as lead individuals at different levels of the African society have also contributed to this failure 
which Professor Agyeman emphasized. Now that we have go en to the point of introspec on, 
we realise that the con nent’s development can best be geared by its people. Ins nc vely and in 
a  mely fashion, the African Union (AU) took to its pedestal and ini ated a vision plan which 
provides a general pla orm for everyone to foster our collec ve development. Africa has now set 
a target for itself for 2063. Our aim is to propel an African con nent which will be rightly seated 
amongst other con nents in the First World status. This paper urges all Africans, especially the 
youth, to work more unitedly and exude utmost believe in themselves (and Africa) as having 
the ability to manage their problems and chart a course for their development using African 
resources. 
PAN-AFRICANISM: ITS TRUE MEANING
It is not surprising that the idea of pan-Africanism thrives mainly in the context of poli cal 
aliena on. But when we look at its etymology, the term “pan-Africanism” originally depicts an 
all-inclusive Africa. It is the idea that people of African descent have common interests and should 
be united. This unity, however, should not be limited to the poli cal space. It ought to reflect in 
other spheres of our society as Africans. The slogan ‘Africa for the Africans’, popularized by 
Marcus Garvey, lays more emphasis on the fact that pan-Africanism is rather a movement for 
coopera on between all people of the African descent. This coopera on aims at strengthening 
the bonds of solidarity and fostering the collec ve progress and development of the people. Pan-
Africanism is a shared posi ve feeling amongst Africans. It arouses the consciousness that one is 
an African and his allegiance lies with Africa. It is the sense of unity and oneness people of the 
African descent exude, when they meet, interact and work together. Pan-Africanism transcends 
the realm of ideology, it is prac cable and ought to reflect in all our dealings as a people. 
Unfortunately, the essence of pan-Africanism has been devalued by Africans. Disunity has proven 
to be the worst barrier for the con nent. The absence of unity, even amongst African leaders and 
the youths, shows the lack of understanding of the power and significance of pan-Africanism. 
Real leaders must be willing to sacrifice all for the welfare of their people; hence any leader who 
places self-aggrandisement above the ci zenry debases the essence of pan-Africanism. It is not 
enough to originate from Africa, we must do so much together in order to promote the status of 
our con nent and improve its percep on. The future of pan-Africanism lies in the strength of our 
society and our ability to bring together young people, social workers, poli cal organisers, trade 
unionists, ac vists, scholars and women’s right promoters behind a common vision of moving 
Africa to the First World status. Our history as a people is history that needs to be told, that needs 
to be learned and that needs to be recorded; as such we must selflessly work together so as to 
fulil the goals of the Agenda 2063 and create the Africa we want. Every African, including the 
reader, must show responsibility towards the con nent by doing as li le as can be done in order 
to promote its status. Pan-Africanism is faith in Africa. It does not deny the fact that Africa has 
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its numerous problems and leadership challenges, rather it proffers solu ons and denies the fact 
the ability to lord it permanently over Africa. We can work out the Africa we want if we believe, 
work and stay together.
IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT
It is the social will of the African people that their standard of living be improved. Our struggle 
as a con nent is geared towards achieving a prosperous Africa conducive for Africans and for 
our visitors. Our collec ve wish is to enjoy the dividends of development, but this can only be 
realised when we experience a great range of development on different spheres. Development is 
an unavoidable datum of life. It was defined by Michael Todaro as involving: “The reorganisa on 
and reorienta on of en re economic and social systems. In addi on to improvements in incomes 
and output, it typically involves radical changes in ins tu on, social and administra ve structures 
as well as in popular a tudes and some mes even beliefs and customs.” 3 This deini on of 
development hinted on the need for ‘radical changes’ even in the a tudes, beliefs and customs 
of a people. The essence of pan-Africanism is to raise the belief of the average African about 
the prosperity of the con nent whilst inculca ng inherently values of responsibility towards this 
prosperity. Thus, pan-Africanism remains the vital ingredient needed to successfully achieve the 
development of Africa and the agenda 2063 vision plan. 
As soon as Africans start exuding the spirit of pan-Africanism, there would be a massive unfolding 
of inner poten ali es which will undoubtedly promote our development. In this line, the African 
Philosopher, Pantaleon Iroegbu explained development to be: “…the progressive unfolding of 
the inner poten ali es of a given reality. It is to de-envelop, that is to bring out to light, the 
existen al, func onal and epistemic, which was enveloped, folded or hidden. As it applies to 
a people, development is the integra on of different givens: na onal, physical, acquired and 
human, of a people towards the full working out, permanently and cumula vely, of their being as 
persons of their community and of their real produc vity.” 4
Four major types of development affects a con nent posi vely. They invariably boost a people’s 
standard of living and protect their freedoms, rights. These developments are: economic 
development, social development, poli cal development and individual development. Let us 
a empt brief explana ons:
Economic Development
This type of development is greatly influenced by the industrial advancement of that society. 
It refers to the sustained, concerted ac ons of socie es and policymakers that improve the 
standards of living and economic health of a people. It improves the quality of life by crea ng or 
retaining jobs and suppor ng or growing incomes. For B. Ohiani, economic development is “the 
qualita ve and quan ta ve increase of factors of produc on and goods and services produced 
with these factors, equitable distribu on of wealth produced by a given popula on of an area and 
increase in the standard of living of a given popula on over a measurable period of  me.” 5 This 
type of development adopts new technologies, transits from local agriculture-based to industry-
based economy and improves living standards. 
Social Development
This type of development places people at the centre of development. It is defined as priori zing 
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human needs in the growth and progression of the society. Again, Ohiani explains social 
development to be “the con nuous increase in the consciousness of the people about their 
environmental and human factors, promote their wellbeing and their ability to control these 
factors so as to control their standards of living.” 6  The focus of social development is to improve 
the lives of regular ci zens, especially the poor, to make the society a be er place for everyone. 
To a large extent, it involves listening to poor people and promo ng their voices in development. 
Poli cal Development
This is best described as poli cal modernisa on. It may be defined in terms of the capacity 
of the poli cal system to sa sfy the changing needs of the members of the society7. This type 
of development involves the moral maturity and discipline of the operators of poli cs. It is 
important because there must be poli cal order for progress to exist in any society. For a na on 
to experience order, it must have an agent of order which is the government in power. This agent 
of order controls or determines the economic and social development of the society, thus, any 
development without poli cal development is no development at all. 
Individual Development
This type of development is also known as personal development. It is paramount as it provides 
the founda on for development. Man is the bedrock of the society, and without first solving the 
problem of the individual, it is impossible for any na on to develop. Individual development 
covers ac vi es that improve awareness and iden ty, develops talents and poten al, builds human 
capital, enhances the quality of life and contributes to the realisa on of dreams and aspira ons. 
This type of development involves both the moral courage and intellectual adroitness of an 
individual. Its nature determines the nature of the society as man is the measure of all things. 
Since the economic, social and poli cal types of development all rest on individual development, 
it suffices for Africa to lay more emphasis and give more primacy to individual development. 
There is need for our con nent to invest more in the development of its people, especially the 
youth and future leaders, who will in turn promote the economic, social, poli cal and other types 
of development. 
PAN-AFRICAN LEADERSHIP
The founda on of a na on’s development is individual development. The extent to which an 
individual can affect a na on or con nent depends on the posi on occupied by such individual. 
A leadership that is personally developed has the moral courage to live up to expecta on and 
understands the dynamics of a changing world. Such a leadership will place the interest of the 
people above that of the self, and exude competence in the face of technical challenges. Whilst 
describing the challenges faced by Nigeria, the prominent African scholar, Chinua Achebe, had 
asserted that “the trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership.” 8 This 
failure which Achebe talked about was and is s ll traceable to the lack of personal development. 
Our goals and visions as na ons within Africa can be best achieved when our leaderships are 
anchored by individuals, with character and competence, who are commi ed to promo ng the 
social will of the people they serve. Since we have now unanimously agreed to project ourselves 
to the First World status by 2063, there is the need to ins tu onalise what is called pan-African 
leadership if sustainable development is to be indeed sustained in Africa. By pan-African 
leadership, I mean unified and codified con nental governance and leadership system, modus 
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operandi which will help spread the dividends of development throughout all African na ons 
in record  me. From different fronts, this kind of system would undoubtedly promote the living 
standards of Africans and help project the con nent to the First World status. When taken into 
serious considera on, the following points and ac vi es will help us realise that Africa we want.
Firstly, the rate of ci zenry living below poverty line is a barrier to our legacy as a people; but 
since poli cal development is the determining factor for both economic and social developments, 
it suffices to pay detailed a en on to the emergence of successive and progressive African 
poli cs. This kind of poli cs can come to stay when Africa indoctrinates the principle of personal 
development by systemically establishing a firm poli cal ins tu on which will be headquartered 
in any African na on and supervised by the African Union. The most important task will be to 
establish efficient governments and effec ve spirited leaders – with competence and character 
– who are devoted to development, and have the ability to promote it. Genuine development 
cannot afford to sacrifice the well-being of the majority; hence without first strengthening good 
governance in Africa, it is impossible for the con nent to achieve our Agenda 2063 vision plan. 
Secondly, educa on remains the best legacy and it is necessary we make huge investments ahead 
of 2063. In order to automa cally install personally developed individuals into strategic leadership 
posi ons in the con nent, the AUC, ECOWAS, AFDB and the likes must invest thoroughly in the 
educa on of youths, especially those showing thorough understanding of the rudiments of pan-
Africanism and the Agenda 2063. Already, the African Union’s Pan African University scheme 
and the ECOWAS Fellowship Programme, amongst others, serve as pla orms for the prepara on 
of Africa’s future leaders, but more can be done in the educa onal sector, and swi ly, to meet up 
with our target in 47 years.
Thirdly, because we live in an age of sophis cated orchestrated designs by na ons, companies 
and individuals to posi on themselves in such a way as to become colossal and powerful with 
myriads of tentacles of domina on, our integra on, which is an expression of pan-Africanism, is 
highly necessary. Civil socie es, companies, government agencies, development organisa ons; 
NGOs and NPOs alike are required to work together to build up sustainable development projects 
from the grassroots all over Africa. The agenda 2063 is an open call for all Africans to lend a 
helping hand to li ing Africa; thus it is needful for all Africans (even the diaspora) to support 
mo ons which are geared towards improving the standards of living on African soil. If we are 
to be a bit cynical, we would realise that the spate at which NGOs, civil socie es struggle to 
survive in Africa has somewhat contributed to some of the internal crises within our borders. 
For instance, when indigenous youths come up with a fantas c development idea and approach 
a prominent, powerful body in the con nent and are turned down, they eventually seek support 
for their ideas from outside the shores of the con nent. Such experiences o en build nega ve 
momentum and the belief that these foreigners are more dedicated to the development of their 
communi es. This could possibly spur the naive ones into rebelling against their own leaders, 
governments in the name of “figh ng for the development of their country”. Inasmuch as I agree 
that somethings are not right with African leaderships, I do not believe in violent resolu ons. 
Rather, I believe in diplomacy, nego a on and the sharing of that feeling of belonging which 
could peacefully pave ways in even the most difficult ma ers against the government. However, 
many young people do not think the same way but believe in violent outbursts. Not looking 
too far to the death of Muammar Gaddafi, a recent case study was the #SHUTDOWNZIM and 
#THISFLAG campaigns in Zimbabwe which was reportedly claimed to be sponsored by some 
foreign influence. Whether sponsored or not, African big bodies, governments, companies and 
organisa ons need to show full support to the youth and carry them along if we are to raise young 
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people with pan-African consciousness who would not be used like pawns in a chess game. 
Several ‘African’ NGOs, NPOs partook in the #SHUTDOWNZIM exercise and were ready to 
create chaos which would have thrown nega ve spotlight on Africa, whereas we should be more 
united in the spirit of pan-Africanism and seek be er ways to project the agenda 2063. 
Fourthly, the common idiom, “as you make your bed, so you must lie on it”, reminds us of 
the fact that the future has its founda on in today. To prepare a more formidable ground for 
Africa’s future leaders, our present leaders (presidents, heads of state) ought to exude the spirit of 
oneness and speak from one voice. How do we expect the globe to take our concerns into serious 
considera on when we don’t speak as one authen c voice? Of course, pan-African leadership is 
a ni y-gri y for Africa’s development; and this is why one of the foremost goals of the agenda 
2063 vision plan is to build the much needed unity in the con nent. Imagine that Africa seeks 
permanent representa on on the UN Security Council so as to effec vely tackle our problems of 
peace and security issues, but only few of our leaders have been passionate enough to declare our 
collec ve aspira on before the globe. Yet, we are classified as one of the world’s most populated 
con nents and every year our leaders a end the UN General Assembly. One is tempted to ask, 
where does the allegiance lie? 
Finally, the outgoing AUC Chairperson, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s email dated January 
24, 2063 must con nue to serve as an encourager when we lose the zeal to individually carry 
on the torch of development in our diverse communi es. Not only did it reveal that the agenda 
2063 plan became successful when pan-Africanism had its root amongst the early genera ons, 
it also appraised the roles played by successive genera ons of African youth. This goes to show 
that the togetherness of African youth is key to the realisa on of agenda 2063 and the eventual 
development of Africa. We ought to be overwhelmed by communal jingoism as our development 
as a people can only be bolstered when we stop ac ng as fi y-ive fragmented individual countries; 
and start ac ng as one powerful group.  
CONCLUSION
Pan-Africanism is key to our development as a people. Our abundant natural resources are 
sufficient to place our na ons on the forefront of global development, but good governance 
enshrined in the ideals of pan-Africanism is essen al to carry all African na ons along. In 
bu ressing this point, Professor Obi Oguejiofor rightly asserted that: “From whatever angle 
the solu on to the problems of the con nent may come, it is evident that proper governance or 
management of the available resources of all kinds is essen al in moving the con nent forward 
and in ensuring that the proper atmosphere exist to enable what could be done to be done in order 
to advance on the way of progress”. 9
Africa’s present and future leaderships must reposi on their various na ons on the threshold of 
a new pan-African orienta on which will recognise our collec ve future in the agenda 2063, 
call for changes in a tudes and mindsets as well as inculcate the right set of African values – 
like honesty, transparency, discipline, integrity and the love for Africa and its people. This is 
impera ve because only pan-Africanism can synthesise different African cultures, ideologies and 
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AFRICA RISING - ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS TOO! 
THE NEED FOR RESOLUTE LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA’S 
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
Sombo M. Chunda




This paper seeks to understand the rela onship between Africa’s poten al, the increase in illicit 
financial lows, and the leadership challenge in resource management. It looks at the resources 
that the con nent possesses (human and natural), the serious challenge of illicit financial lows, 
and the need for deliberate and resolute leadership within and beyond the con nent’s borders. It 
makes an asser on that there is a need to effec vely manage the resources of the con nent and 
proposes the need for concerted efforts to fight the illicit lows of resources out of the con nent 
- a trend that doesn’t seem to slow down. It implores the need for ac ve par cipa on of all 
Africans in the management of resources as a sure way to maintain the rise. In and of itself, it 
is not an exhaus ve analysis because the topic under discussion is broad and interlinked with 
important aspects like development. 
INTRODUCTION
There is a shi  in the global portrayal of Africa. From the dark con nent ravaged with diseases 
and poverty to a sleeping giant now rising. This centre stage has been earned as a result of 
resources.  Africa is the second largest con nent a er Asia and home to around 1.2 billion people 
50 % of whom are younger than 19 years old. Africa has about 30.2 million km 2 land and that 
accounts for 20.4 % of the earth's total land area. The world’s second largest rainforest is found in 
Africa. The largest propor on of natural resources - gold, diamonds, gemstones, oil, and copper- 
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are found in Africa. In the midst of this rise is the systemic corrup on that needs more than 
pronouncements, but ac on, to fight. The con nent's youthful popula on gives it the advantage 
of a large and cheap workforce that will be useful in the exploita on of its natural resources. This 
also entails that there will be a ready demand and market for products. More importantly, the 
youthful popula on will contribute to the various na ons' tax base and bring development to the 
various countries.
AFRICA’S RESOURCES
Africa is synonymous with natural resources from minerals, natural gas, oil and woodlands. 
Minerals are found in various parts of the con nent and have been used to bring about economic 
development in some cases while others, the source of conflict. Wherever you look in Africa, there 
are mineral resources. In the south, Botswana has about 35 % of Africa’s diamonds and produces 
copper, nickel and soda ash while South Africa is the largest producer of gold diamonds and is the 
world’s largest producer of chrome, manganese, pla num, vanadium and vermiculite. It is also 
the second largest producer of ilmenite, palladium, ru le and zirconium. Zambia has over 75% 
of the con nents copper and is the world’s largest producer of emeralds from one single mine 
found in the impoverished district of Lufwanyama on the outskirts of the Copperbelt province. 
Mozambique has about 32 % of aluminum and there has been recent discoveries of huge reserves 
of natural gas. In the east, Tanzania is the fourth largest producer of gold on the con nent and 
has deposits of iron ore, nickel, copper, cobalt, silver and more. In the west, Niger has 44 % of 
uranium while Guinea is responsible for 95 % of the con nents bauxite produc on. With these 
resources, it would be expected that the con nent would be developed. On the contrary, the 
men on of Africa’s resources does not translate to a con nent with ci es well planned, a vibrant 
working class or hopeful youth soon to graduate from university and join the working class.  
Africa’s resources have been plundered, will con nue to be looted and a source of conflict if no 
deliberate ac ons are taken. The Democra c Republic of Congo is a good example of instability 
stemming from resources. With the largest world reserves of co an, the most important metal 
in the produc on of laptops and smartphones, the DRC has known no peace. It is the largest 
producer of copper in Africa and has a significant share of the world's cobalt reserves. In 2009, it 
was es mated that the country had $24 trillion worth of untapped resources.  
ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS
It is es mated that more than 50 billion US dollars  is lost from Africa annually through illicit 
financial lows. This is twice the amount that comes to Africa in form of aid. Illicit financial 
lows are facilitated by interna onal tax havens and jurisdic ons that enable the crea ng and 
opera ng of disguised corpora ons, shell companies, anonymous trust accounts and fake 
charitable founda ons. Other techniques used are money laundering and transfer pricing. The 
plunder of the con nent’s resources makes news almost everyday. Corrup on is rife in many 
African countries and according to Transparency Interna onal, the top most corrupt countries in 
the world are in Africa. It is probable that even more resources are lost from Africa in the absence 
of a clearly defined mechanism to ascertain the loss. 
The recent increase of China’s interest in Africa has brought with it, serious challenges in 
resource governance. This trend will con nue if Africa does not collec vely define the terms of 
engagement with the East. In looking at the resource ou lows, it is important to keep in mind that 
there is a need for more accountability in the management of exis ng resources. And the primary 
custodian for accountability are the leaders.
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LEADERSHIP IS KEY
The one important issue that needs a en on and clearly stands in the way for Africa’s turnaround 
is the leadership challenge. Most African countries are fairly stable and have embraced democracy 
as a form of government. It is also true that a number of countries with vast natural resources 
have seen and s ll experience a fair share of conflict. There is need to get the leadership right 
and this is closely connected to the level of educa on and awareness of the popula on. African 
leaders have facilitated the loo ng of resources from the con nent by not taking responsibility 
in formula ng policies and ensuring execu on of the same for the development of the con nent. 
There is need for African leaders to clearly denounce corrup on and ins tute measures that will 
curb the vice. Leaders should not be assumed to be figh ng corrup on, they should be seen to be 
doing so and should act in the fight against corrup on. This sends a clear message to those that 
have been involved and those that may wish to be involved. Nigeria’s President Muhammadu 
Buhari is on record for sta ng categorically that his inten on is to wipe out corrup on. His 
demand for the return of money kept in Bri sh Banks should be supported by all those that are for 
the development of Africa. Notable, also, is the ferocious fight that has been put up by Tanzania’s 
President John Magufuli who has adopted the reputa on of a broom. Tanzania has endemic 
corrup on and is placed at number 117 out of 168 countries globally. With resolute leadership, 
the illicit financial lows can be reduced significantly. The war against illicit financial lows is the 
single most important war that Africans should fight. Because if the resources do not low out and 
are kept within the con nent, schools and universi es can be financed, roads can be constructed, 
health care facili es and other social infrastructure can be built. There will be no need for African 
leaders to ly to Europe and Asia to access good medical services leaving the people that elected 
them to power to die in ill-equipped hospitals. The fight against illicit financial lows needs 
more than two commi ed leaders, it needs independent ins tu ons like the Africa Union and the 
Africa Development Bank as champions.
It is gra fying to note that ins tu ons like the African Development Bank are now taking centre 
stage in this discourse. There is a clear realisa on that the con nent is capable of rewri ng its 
history and the  me is now. The Bank's five point development plan is carefully cra ed and 
inspired by the fact that yes, Africa does have the resources to make this a reality. 
NEED FOR GLOBAL SUPPORT
In April, the world woke up to a shock of the Panama Papers - a revela on of how money is 
stored away and tax is evaded. In his address to the world, President Barack Obama called for 
joint global efforts to fight tax fraud. This call comes at the right  me when Africa has been 
struggling with tax fraud by mul na onal corpora ons for years. Tax fraud and transfer pricing 
could account for major ways in which money lows out of Africa. African leaders through 
established ins tu ons like the African Union and the African Development Bank should seek 
ways to work closely with the United States of America to fight illicit financial lows.
CONCLUSION
Africa will rise, Africa is rising! The  me is now for Africa to rewrite history and change the 
fortunes of the con nent. All the indicators for the rise are in favour of Africa and all that is 
needed is deliberate leadership and joint effort to make the narra ve a reality.
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NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE, DEVELOPMENT AND 
POLITICAL STABILITY IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION: 
CASE STUDY OF THE OIL SECTOR IN UGANDA
Jacqueline Nakaiza 
PhD Researcher, Makerere University,
Uganda
ABSTRACT
Discovery of significant oil resources in Uganda has been met with both op mism and skep cism. 
In as much as the country’s government argues that the discovery and exploita on of the oil will 
be a boost to the country’s development process, scholars, members of the poli cal opposi on 
and sec ons of the civil society contend that there is reason to fear for a possible oil resource 
curse. It is against this background that this study was undertaken; to scru nize the content, 
process and implementa on of the policies rela ng to exploita on of the oil and to determine 
whether these policies guarantee that the country will not suffer the resource curse. The study 
uses data generated from key informant interviews, which it augments with evidence culled from 
government publica ons, including policy documents and sector reports, and related literature. 
The study found that although the oil sector policies are comprehensive and were adopted 
through inclusive technical and poli cal processes, the implementa on of these policies is not 
transparent. Hence the country could become a vic m of the resource curse. Recommenda ons 
towards redressing this problem are made.
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
Since a ainment of poli cal independence in the 1960s and 1970s, most of the countries in the Great 
Lakes Region have been stuck in a vicious cycle of conflict, including the genocide in Rwanda, 
the conflict in Burundi, the conflict in Southern Sudan, the ethnic clashes in Western Kenya, the 
protracted conflict in Somalia, the ethnic clashes in various parts of DRC and rebellions by the 
Uganda Na onal Rescue Front, Allied Democra c Forces and West Nile Bank Front. Among other 
factors, the conflicts have been responsible for economic stagna on and retrogression, despite 
the region’s enormous natural resources endowment (OSAA, 2006). Although the conflicts have 
revolved around poli cal struggles for the control of the state, several studies have pointed to 
the significance of contested rights to access to natural resources in causing and sustaining the 
conflicts (Huggins et al, 2005; Muwanga, 2012; OSAA, 2006; Kameri-Mbote, 2005). However, 
over the last two decades, efforts at the na onal, regional and interna onal levels have helped to 
mi gate majority of the conflicts and peace has slowly returned to most parts of the region. 
Presently, a key concern the countries face pertains to the long-term sustainability of this peace. 
Evidence that the post-independence conflicts in the region were caused and sustained by 
contested rights to access natural resources lends credence to the hunch that accountable and 
visionary governance of the region’s natural resources that is targeted at posi ve transforma on 
of its poli cal economy is pivotal to the sustainability of this peace. Accordingly, the discovery 
(and planned exploita on) of oil resources in various parts of the region does not only present an 
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opportunity for the socioeconomic transforma on of the region; it also threatens the prospect of 
sustainable peace in the region. 
Thus, a United Na ons panel of experts on natural resources and conflict in Africa concludes 
that the countries need to mi gate the risk factors associated with the management of the oil 
sector—to maximize its poten al for promo ng transforma on whilst restraining its poten al 
for promo ng conflicts (OSAA, 2006). To achieve this objec ve, the countries need quality 
informa on on these factors that is suited to their peculiarity—to adopt suitable policy op ons. 
Although policy alterna ves could be drawn from the experiences of other countries, these must 
be tailored to the unique needs of the region. Customiza on of these policy alterna ves to the 
region’s peculiarity would benefit from rigorous examina on of the alterna ves and the way they 
may relate to this peculiarity. However, review of related literature (e.g. Kameri-Mbote, 2006) 
shows that this examina on has not been conducted. Thus, this study is proposed to plug this 
gap through scru nizing the risk factors in natural resource governance that are relevant to the 
region’s oil sector and ways in which they could be mi gated--to promote equitable development 
and sustainable peace in the region. The research drew on the case of Uganda’s nascent oil 
sector.  It employed Process Tracing research method because it allows within-case analysis in 
the evalua on of causal processes. The other jus fica on for using the method was that it does 
not solely rely on the comparison of varia ons across variables in each case, but also inves gates 
and explains the decision process by which various ini al condi ons are translated into outcomes 
(George and McKeown, 1985).
Since a ainment of poli cal independence in the 1960s, the countries of the Great Lakes Region 
of Africa (GLRA) (i.e. Burundi, DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) have struggled 
to achieve economic development. Notwithstanding, some progress that some of the countries 
have been able to realise is seen from their socioeconomic indicators, but most of them remain 
underdeveloped and majority of their ci zens are trapped in extreme poverty (see, for example, 
UNDP, 2012).
Two explana ons have been primarily advanced for the persistent underdevelopment of these 
countries. The first is that these countries lack the resources required to invest in infrastructural 
and human capital development, hence they are trapped in a vicious cycle of underdevelopment 
and poverty (Siggel, 2005). The second explana on is that the countries have failed to achieve 
development because they do not exploit their resources op mally for developmental purposes 
(Todaro & Smith, 2011)—because their leaders collude and make egocentric poli cal se lements 
that result into plundering of the resources (cf. Eichstaedt, 2011). Meanwhile, groups that are 
excluded from such arrangements remain disgruntled and usually mobilize to cause  poli cal 
instability in a bid to compete over the right to control/ exploit the resources (Lindemann, 2010). 
For example, in Uganda, Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2013) observe that this kind of poli cs has 
closely shaped the character and performance of ins tu ons and actors responsible for delivering 
development since the a ainment of poli cal independence in 1962. They note that successive 
poli cal leaders and regimes sought to establish “dominant ruler” forms of poli cal se lement, 
with a li le sustained effort to depersonalize public ins tu ons or build stable and inclusive 
poli cal coali ons.
Over the last ten years, three of the GLRA countries (i.e. Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania) have 
discovered substan al oil deposits. For instance, in Uganda, poten al revenues from the oil 
that has been explored are es mated at $148 billion (Lesedi 2010, NDP 2010). It is hoped that 
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commercial exploita on of these oil resources could generate significant income that the countries 
could invest in infrastructure and human capital development (Collier, 2011; NDP 2010). 
Accordingly, discovery of the oil is seen as presen ng enormous poten al for the countries’ 
economic development and poverty allevia on. 
Nevertheless, the proposi ons of public choice theory give credence to the hunch that, in as much 
as discovery of oil in the region presents an opportunity for the socioeconomic transforma on of 
the region, it also presents threats in terms of the so-called oil-curse (Thorp et al 2012; Jonathan 
Di John, 2007; Weisshaar, 2007; Bategeka & Matovu, 2011; Kiiza, Bategeka & Ssewanyana, 
2011). This is especially so when the history of the countries’ resource related conflicts and bad 
resource governance are taken into account. According to Lipsey and Crystal (1999), full blown 
public choice theory deals with three u lity maximizing groups: 1) elected oficials, who seek to 
maximize the votes they can get at elec ons; 2) civil servants, who seek to maximize the salaries 
they draw from the public purse; and 3) voters, who seek to maximize u lity from social services. 
Consequently, there may be nobody to a end to the general interest of society and the interests 
of others in the investment of public resources. 
In the context of oil in the GLRA, the groups in society that public choice theory iden ies 
can usefully be categorized into two: 1) the elites (poli cal leaders, civil servants, individuals 
owning large businesses and opinion leaders etc.); and 2) the populace. It is an cipated that the 
elites will govern the development of the oil sector and the u liza on of its proceeds within the 
constraints of the poli cal se lements that they make among themselves. Authors like Di John 
and Putzel (2009) note that developmental poli cal se lements could manifest in the structure of 
property rights and en tlements, which give some social actors more distribu onal advantages 
than others in the regulatory structure of the state. Conversely, other se lements are narrow 
and, from the theore cal point of view of public choice theory, there is reason to fear that the 
elite may look out for their egocentric beneits from the oil sector, with the consequence of 
promo ng corrup on and environmental degrada on (see, for example, Ako, 2013). In turn, this 
could lead to socioeconomic dispari es and poli cal exclusion, conlict, poli cal instability and, 
consequently, persistence of underdevelopment despite exploita on of the oil resources. 
A ainment of poli cal stability and, subsequently, inclusive development requires that the 
poli cal se lements on the oil resources reached guarantee implementa on of policies that 
a ract the best returns from the oil sector and ensure that these returns are strategically invested 
in the promo on of economic development and poverty reduc on  (Bebbington 2013; Thorp et 
al 2012). Accordingly, there is need for up-to-date informa on about the poli cal se lements 
rela ng to the oil sector that the poli cal regimes in the region are making - to reach value 
judgments on the effec veness with which the poten al of the sector is being harnessed in favor 
of both poli cal stability and economic development.  Indeed, authors like Golooba-Mutebi and 
Hickey (2013) have highlighted need for rigorous  studies on the way oil is being governed within 
the current poli cal se lement; the way oil is reshaping the contours and func oning of the ruling 
coali ons;  the ideas shaping the governance of oil and how the presence of oil is reshaping 
the poli cal imaginary in countries of the region;  the role transna onal actors are playing and 
their impacts on the poli cal se lement; the na onal–local and intra-local dynamics involved 
here, and the implica ons they have for the nature and func oning of the poli cal se lement at 
different levels; and the implica ons oil has for inclusive development in the region. 
However, a survey of the literature leads to the conclusion that, hitherto, few studies have delved 
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into these concerns. Currently, there are few comprehensive studies scru nizing the oil sector 
related poli cal se lements that the elites are making and implemen ng and the implica ons 
of these se lements for poli cal stability, poverty allevia on and overall development of the 
GLRA. Moreover, even the few studies dealing with oil governance (e.g. ESID, 2011; Ako, 2013, 
etc.) that are available, focus on countries outside the GLRA.
This paper will report the findings of a study that was undertaken to plug this knowledge gap. 
Drawing on the case of Uganda’s nascent oil sector, the study employed process tracing research 
methodology to respond to three research ques ons: What is the content of the poli cal se lements 
rela ng to the oil sector policies that have been promulgated in Uganda? By what processes were 
these poli cal se lements reached and to what extent were the processes poli cally inclusive? 
How are the oil-sector related poli cal se lements in Uganda being implemented and how is 
this linked to the country’s economic development? Accordingly, the paper discusses the extent 
to which the oil resources in the region are being governed in ways that secure development, 
poverty reduc on and poli cal inclusion a er which it propounds recommenda ons for policy 
and further research.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The discovery, explora on and planned exploita on of oil resources in Uganda have a racted very 
significant op mism and pessimism for the country’s prospects for stability and development. 
Different groups have different expecta ons and concerns and the country’s policy makers and 
implementers; ci zenry; civil society; and development partners are keen to ensuring that the 
country does not only avoid the oil curse but also that it uses the proceeds from the nascent oil 
sector to develop the country. The informa on that the proposed study hopes to generate will 
guide the aforemen oned actors in the country’s oil sector in their efforts to ensure that the country 
avoids the oil resource curse and uses the proceeds from the oil sector to transform the country. In 
par cular, the significance of the study derives primarily from its intended empiricist/ diagnos c 
approach by which it hopes to ill gaps in past studies on the oil sector in the country (e.g. Kiiza, 
Bategeka&Ssewanyana, 2011), which mostly follow an idealist/ prescrip ve approach. Through 
scru nizing the processes of oil related legisla ons, policies and prac ces, the study will scru nize 
how and why the different actors in the country’s oil sector are ac ng out their roles as well as 
the implica ons of their ac ons for relevant policy and prac ce. The study will inform efforts to 
ill gaps in the oil and gas revenue management policy—to ensure keener a en on to managing 
relevant oil-related expecta ons—thereby mi ga ng risk of the oil resource curse and the threat 
to stability and development that it presents. Hence, the ministries of energy and inance; relevant 
local and regional governments; non-governmental organisa ons; and oil explora on/ produc on 
companies will ind the study useful. Beyond Uganda, the study may be useful to other countries 
in the region, since legisla on on the management of oil resources in all the countries in the 
Great Lakes region is only budding. Finally, the study will make reference and contribute, to 
discourse on the interplay between the management of natural resources, stability and sustainable 
development so future researchers in related fields may ind it useful.
GENERAL OBJECTIVE
The general objec ve of the study was to inves gate the nature of the poli cal coali ons 
responsible for the oil related policies and ins tu ons in Uganda.
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SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES
1. To inves gate the ways in which the discovery and planned exploita on of oil are influencing 
the func oning of the ruling coali ons in Uganda.
2. To inves gate the ideas that are shaping the governance and development of the oil sector 
in Uganda.
3. To inves gate the ways in which interna onal actors are influencing the ideas shaping the 
governance and development of the oil sector in Uganda.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. How is the discovery and planned exploita on of oil influencing the func oning of the 
ruling coali ons in Uganda?
2. What ideas are shaping the governance and development of the oil sector in Uganda?
3. How are interna onal actors influencing the ideas shaping the governance and development 
of the oil sector in Uganda?
SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The study was carried out in Uganda. Focus was put on the processes, content and implementa on 
of the legisla ons and policies rela ng to the oil sector in Uganda. Specific reference was made 
to the way per nent poli cal se lements have been reached and implemented, as well as the 
implica ons of these for the performance and contribu on of the oil sector to the country’s 
development. Accordingly, the study reached representa ves of the key oil policy making and 
implemen ng organisa ons (including the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Development, Parliament of the Republic of Uganda, oil explora on 
and produc on companies, etc.); per nent civil society organisa ons, the academia and oil 
policy think tanks. Uganda presents a par cularly important case for study because it is just 
emerging out of a protracted insurgency that has been a ributed, at least in part, to contest for the 
right to control natural resources, the inference being that it is extremely important to manage 
the newly found oil wealth in ways that will ensure that insurgency does not resurface in the 
region. Genera ng quality informa on on per nent poli cal coali ons and the ways in which 
these are inluencing the governance of the oil sector could guide efforts to ensure that the oil 
wealth is developed and used in ways that will ensure that insurgency does not resurface in the 
region. On the other hand, focus on the processes, content and implementa on of the legisla ons 
and policies rela ng to the oil sector is jus fied by the realisa on that although wri ng rela ng 
to the oil sector in Uganda is increasingly appearing, past authors on the subject have focused 
primarily on what the country should do rather than what it is doing and why it is doing it. And 
now that related legisla ons and policies are coming out and being implemented, the researcher 
is interested in extending the discussion to consider what the country is doing and how/why it is 
doing it.
RELATED LITERATURE AND KNOWLEDGE GAP
The oil sector in Uganda has a racted notable a en on from the scholarly community, civil 
society, policy think tanks and development partners. Accordingly, wri ng on the sector has 
appeared in the form of scholarly ar cles (e.g. Kashambuzi, 2010; Henstridge and Page, 2012; 
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Collier, 2011, etcetera); reports from civil society organisa ons (e.g. Interna onal Alert, 2011); 
and development research policy papers (e.g. NDP, 2010; Modise, 2011; Vision 2040, 2012). 
Three other forms of wri ng relevant to the sector are: 1) legisla ons and policies on the oil 
sector in the country (i.e. Oil and Gas Revenue Management Policy, 2012; Na onal Oil and Gas 
Policy 2008; Petroleum Explora on, Development and Produc on Bill, 2012); 2) mass media 
reports on the oil sector (e.g. Ssekikka, 2013; 2014); and 3) scholarly ar cles on highly valuable 
(natural) resources in general (e.g. ADB & AU, 2009; Guichaoua, 2012; Karl, 2007; Collier, 
2010; Bebbington, 2013).
A major point of congruence in the aforemen oned and other literature is that, although the 
discovery of oil in Uganda presents the country with an opportunity to develop, it also presents it 
with a threat of the oil-curse and Dutch disease. Thus, the authors contend that government, and 
other actors in the country’s oil sector, should develop the oil resources innova vely, to ensure 
that the outcomes of the oil sector are posi ve and impact on the country’s development and 
stability in significant and sustainable ways.
Two key variables relevant to the outcomes of the oil sector are: the way the sector is governed, 
and the way the proceeds are invested into the country’s development processes. The way 
the oil sector is governed and proceeds from it are invested into the country’s development 
processes are a func on of per nent legisla ons and policies and the way these are implemented. 
Subsequently, these have been the subject of very significant debate in its literature and there 
is very significant knowledge on what government should do and what it shouldn’t do to avoid 
the oil resource curse. However, a key gap in the literature relates to the fact that very li le 
research has been conducted on what might influence government’s decisions and ac ons in the 
oil sector. Although notable a en on has been paid to legisla ons and policies rela ng to the oil 
sector and how these are being implemented, sufficient a en on has not been paid to the nes ng 
nature of these laws and policies. An insigh ul analysis rela ng to this gap in the literature is by 
Poteete (2007). According to Poteete, behind policies, ins tu ons, and state building lie poli cal 
coali ons. He adds that poli cians with narrow and unstable coali ons see ren er poli cs as an 
a rac ve coali on building strategy albeit these poli cians’ use of ren er poli cs as a poli cal 
coali on building strategy hinders state building. On the other hand, poli cians with broader and 
more stable coali ons are less likely to turn to ren er poli cs to bolster poli cal support, in part 
because they are more apt to believe that they will reap the benefits from investments in state 
building. 
In Uganda’s case, it is par cularly noteworthy that, at the  me the country’s oil resources are 
being discovered and their exploita on is being planned, the legi macy of the ruling (NRM) 
government is significantly contested. A er nearly 30 years in power, a growing poli cal 
opposi on and an increasingly cri cal cadre of civil society and diploma c organisa ons are 
challenging the legi macy of the ruling party more significantly by the day. From Poteete (2007)’s 
point of view, circumstances like these could dispose key policy makers to ren er poli cs—with 
the view to build poli cal coali ons that will enhance their grip on power despite increasing 
perceived illegi macy. In turn, such inclina on towards ren er poli cs might result into failure 
to adopt sound macroeconomic policy op ons that regulate the low of the proceeds from the oil 
sector into the domes c economy and, subsequently, prevent the oil curse and Dutch disease. 
Thus, Poteete (2007) poses a per nent ques on: “under what condi ons are governments able to 
overcome poli cal pressures to spend their new income now and adopt macroeconomic policies 
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that protect long-term economic growth?” 
In the context of the proposed study, it is par cularly noteworthy that this ques on is relevant to 
Uganda’s nascent oil sector, especially considering that challenges to the ruling party’s legi macy 
could incline it towards ren er poli cs. This being the case, it is essen al that quality informa on 
is generated in ways in which the discovery and planned exploita on of oil is inluencing the 
func oning of the ruling coali ons in Uganda; the ideas that are shaping the governance and 
development of the oil sector; and the ways in which interna onal actors are influencing the ideas 
shaping the governance and development of the country’s oil sector. However, informa on on 
these is generally nonexistent. An apparent reason for this knowledge gap is that scholars and 
commentators on the country’s oil sector have focused primarily on what the government should 
do or should not do in developing the oil sector albeit they fail to take cognizance of the role of 
the overall ideas, poli cal pressures and subsequent poli cal coali ons that may determine what 
the government does or does not do. This study is proposed to ill this gap, by extending the 
debate on the development of the country’s oil sector from asking what the government should 
do to avert the resource curse to why the government may or may not do what it needs to do to 
avert the curse.
DESIGN
The study was carried out following a case study design through which cross sec onal data was 
collected on the poli cal coali ons responsible for the oil sector policies and ins tu ons that are 
being developed in Uganda. The design was well suited for the study because its specificity of 
focus which enables iden fica on of key features of the poli cal economy of natural resources 
in Uganda, thereby allowing the researcher to gain insight into per nent poli cal coali ons 
and the ways in which they relate to the impact of the oil sector on Uganda’s poli cal stability 
and development (Bell, 2005). The cross sec onal nature of the study ensured that all the data 
necessitated was collected at one point in  me (Amin, 2005), which was important considering 
that poli cal coali ons are dynamic and could change over long periods of  me. Implementa on 
of the study involved the use of process tracing methods through which qualita ve data was 
collected about the nature of the poli cal coali ons responsible for the oil related policies and 
ins tu ons in Uganda.
POPULATION AND SAMPLE
The popula on of the study included all the stakeholders in Uganda’s oil sector. These include 
the government of Uganda, civil society organisa ons, oil related policy think tanks, opposi on 
poli cal organisa ons, oil companies and Uganda’s ci zenry. Data was collected from members 
of each of these categories of stakeholders. These were selected following snowball sampling 
techniques because it was hoped that the key actors in Uganda’s oil sector and poli cal discourse 
that were contacted ini ally might know other actors that would provide the informa on required 
for the study. The actual selec on of respondents in the study was systema zed and targeted at 
the a ainment of satura on.
DATA SOURCES AND COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS
Data was collected primarily from the key actors in Uganda’s oil sector and poli cal discourse. 
This was done using individual and group interviews. Therefore, interview guides and recording 
equipment were used. The interview guides were unstructured, to ensure that the ques ons put 
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to each respondent or group of respondents are tailored to the peculiarity of the respondents’ 
knowledge or/ and jurisdic on. Before using them to collect data, the interview guides were 
submi ed to the research project supervisor for valida on and revised in accordance with the 
feedback received on their quality. Secondary data was also culled from relevant reports and 
publica ons.
RESEARCH PROCEDURE
The study progressed through three major stages namely, prepara on for data collec on; data 
collec on and analysis; and repor ng. During the first stage, an ini al sample of respondents was 
selected and data collec on instruments developed and validated. Data collec on assistants were 
also selected and trained. During the second stage, interviews were conducted. Lastly, during the 
third stage, the data collected was transcribed, analysed and compiled into a report. This stage 
also involved the prepara on and submission of manuscripts and policy reports for publica on.
DATA MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS
The interviews were recorded electronically. Therea er, the records were transcribed and 
subjected to content analysis, to iden fy the key themes arising out of the respondents’ responses. 
The content analysis was conducted using qualita ve data miner (QDM). The themes on the 
nature of the poli cal coali ons responsible for the oil related policies and ins tu ons in Uganda 
that were iden fied were then cross-referenced to relevant secondary sources and literature to 
reach conclusions on the variables involved in the study.
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Before data collec on, the research proposal was submi ed to the University’s Research Review 
Board and Uganda Na onal Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) for ethical clearance. 
And all the respondents were kept confiden al.  
FINDINGS, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Content of the Poli cal Se lements Rela ng to the Oil Sector Policies in Uganda
The na onal gas and oil policy for Uganda (2008) and Petroleum Explora on and Produc on Act 
(2000) embody the contents of the poli cal se lements rela ng to the oil sector in the country. 
These include: 1) the country’s goals and objec ves for the oil sector; 2) the guiding principles 
for the development of instruments for the development and regula on of the sector; 3) the roles 
and privileges of stakeholders in the country’s oil sector. According to the policy, the country’s 
goals are to: ensure efficiency in licensing areas with the poten al for oil and gas produc on in the 
country; establish and efficiently manage the country’s oil and gas resource poten al; efficiently 
produce the country’s oil and gas resources; promote valuable u liza on of the country’s oil and 
gas resources; promote the development of suitable transport and storage solu ons which give 
good value to the country’s oil and gas resources; ensure collec on of the right revenues and 
use them to create las ng value for the en re na on; ensure op mum na onal par cipa on in 
oil and gas ac vi es; support the development and maintenance of na onal skills and exper se; 
ensure that oil and gas ac vi es are undertaken in a manner that conserves the environment 
and biodiversity; and ensure mutually beneficial rela onships between all stakeholders in the 
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development of a desirable oil and gas sector for the country.
To promote a ainment of these goals, the policy outlines seven guiding principles for the 
development of the country’s oil sector: using the exhaus ble oil and gas resources to create las ng 
benefits to society; manage resources efficiently; transparency and accountability; compe  veness 
and produc vity; protec on of the environment and conserva on of biodiversity; co-opera on 
with per nent stakeholders; and capacity and ins tu on building. The policy expounds on these 
guiding principles, demonstra ng the keenness to ensure that the oil resources are democra cally 
governed in an efficient way that will guarantee the best returns for the country while at the 
same  me avoiding the resource curse. In fact, the oil and gas policy discusses the need to, and 
makes provisions for amendment of the Petroleum Explora on and Produc on Act (2000)—to 
ensure its adherence to the aforemen oned guiding principles and, ul mately, realisa on of the 
country’s goals in the oil sector as cited above. The document goes ahead to specify the roles 
and responsibili es of the different actors in the oil sector. Rela ng to this, it is noteworthy that 
roles are specified for a diverse range of stakeholders (including legislators, technocrats, local 
leaders, representa ves of oil explora on and produc on companies, cultural leaders and even 
members of the grassroots). The inference here is that the contents of the poli cal se lements 
rela ng to Uganda’s oil sector are all inclusive, taking cognizance of the claims of all the 
relevant stakeholders. A er all, upon careful considera on, it is notable that adherence to these 
guiding principles would go a long way in securing the oil-sector goals cited above, which are in 
themselves notably inclusive, showing care for the current and future genera ons.
PROCESS OF THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS RELATING TO THE OIL SECTOR 
POLICIES IN UGANDA
Two key points discernible from the discussion on the content of the oil-sector related poli cal 
se lements in Uganda are that: 1) the poli cal se lements are forward-looking and focus on 
emula ng best prac ces from around the world with the view to ensure efficiency, profitable 
produc on and environmental conserva on (mindful of oil’s nature as a non-renewable 
resource); and 2) the poli cal se lement aspires to be all inclusive, reflec ng the views and 
interests of a diverse range of stakeholders in the country’s oil sector. These are invariably strong 
components of the discourse on the country’s oil sector. However, beyond the issue of these 
plans and aspira ons, are the even more important issues of whether/ how they are actually 
implemented. It is against this background that this study traced the processes of the oil-related 
poli cal se lements—to generate answers to ques ons in this regard.
The findings were that the oil-sector related se lements were originated by the ruling coali on, 
albeit per nent stakeholders were provided with an opportunity to influence their ul mate content 
at different stages and in a number of ways. Specifically, the oil policy was dra ed by the Ministry 
of Energy with input from the interna onal community, experts and poli cal stakeholders. 
Subsequently, the policy was discussed and endorsed by cabinet—to form the background to 
oil-sector related legisla ons. The Ministry of Energy (2008) recounts this process thus: The 
Na onal Oil and Gas Policy is a result of an intensive consulta ve process which started with the 
review of oil and gas policies from Algeria, Chad, Egypt, East Timor, Indonesia, Kenya, Libya, 
Malaysia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, Sao Tome and Principe, South Africa, 
Tanzania, United Kingdom, USA and Venezuela. Three consulta ve mee ngs and workshops 
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were held with technical staff of various government ins tu ons between 25th-28th April, 2006; 
17th-18th July, 2006; and 31st July-1st August, 2006 a er which a working document of the dra  
policy was formulated.
The dra  policy was then forwarded to representa ves of local and urban authori es, cultural 
ins tu ons in the Alber ne Graben, civil society organisa ons and academic ins tu ons for their 
review before par cipa ng in a two-day stakeholder’s consulta ve workshop held between 29th 
and 30th November, 2006. Many views received during the workshop were incorporated into 
the dra  policy. It was presented and discussed at the Permanent Secretaries mee ng held on 7th 
August, 2007.
Addi onal consulta ve mee ngs were held on 10th, 12th of August and 3rd December, 2007 
in Hoima, Arua and Kasese respec vely. The mee ngs were a ended by area Members of 
Parliament, officials of the District Execu ve Commi ees and Council Members of the districts 
of Hoima, Masindi, Kibale, Bullisa, Arua, Nebbi, Moyo, Amuru, Gulu, Kabarole, Kyenjojo 
Bundibugyo, Kasese, Kamwenge, Bushenyi, Rukungiri and Kanungu.
Guidance was received from H.E. the President when he reviewed the dra  policy with the 
Ministries of Energy and Mineral Development, Finance, Planning and Economic Development 
and Jus ce and Cons tu onal Affairs at State House, Nakasero on 25th September, 2007. A 
consulta ve workshop was held for Cabinet on 26th September 2007 in which the dra  policy 
was presented for considera on before formal submission for approval. The comments received 
during these mee ngs enriched the policy immensely. The policy was approved by Cabinet on 
30th January, 2008.
The foregoing shows that the process of formula ng the oil and gas policy was technical, poli cal 
and consulta ve. It was technical in a way that it drew on the exper se of a mul disciplinary of 
experts in the related areas of mining, oil resources management and natural resources economics. 
Then it was poli cal in a way that it drew the input of poli cal leaders across the en re poli cal 
spectrum in the leadership of the country, including councilors at the local council level, cultural 
leaders in the oil-rich Alber ne Graben, members of parliament, cabinet ministers and the 
president. Finally, the process was consulta ve in a way that it did not only invite and integrate 
the views of people at the grassroots, but it also integrated insights drawn from the experiences 
of other countries that are involved in oil explora on and produc on across the en re con nent, 
including those that are more developed and those that are not.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS RELATING TO THE OIL 
SECTOR POLICIES IN UGANDA
The Ministry of Energy is in charge of implemen ng the poli cal se lements rela ng to the 
oil sector in Uganda. Implementa on of the oil policy has been primarily through the passing 
of relevant legisla on and conclusion of Produc on Sharing Agreements with interna onal 
oil explora on and produc on companies. Review of the oil policy shows that it touches on 
both these items. Specifically, the policy ar culated the need for amendment of the Petroleum 
Explora on and Produc on Act of 2000 to enable a ainment of the goals the country is pursuing 
through the oil sector. It also ar culates the need for and modali es for the considera on and 
determina on of relevant produc on sharing agreements.
pg |027
Two important achievements in the implementa on of the oil-related poli cal se lements are 
that the Petroleum Explora on, Development and Produc on Act 2013 has been passed and 
various produc on sharing agreements signed (Musoke 2013). However, interviews conducted 
with members of Uganda’s parliament early this year show that there have been two shor alls in 
the implementa on of the otherwise good and inclusive oil related poli cal se lements. First, the 
members of parliament noted that although a generally good piece of legisla on, parts of the Oil 
and Gas Law of 2013 required more cri cal considera on albeit the bill was passed hurriedly. In 
an interview, a Honourable member of parliament said that, “The controversial Clause 9, which 
gives control over explora on and produc on licensing to the minister in charge of petroleum.”
Although respondents from the Ministry of Energy gave a counter argument that there was 
urgent need to pass the law to provide a legal framework within which the oil opera ons would 
be regulated, a counter argument was that the debate and passing of the law were marred by 
influence pedaling and intrigue, with the result that the law was passed only hurriedly. Of 
par cular conten on was the issue of the rights of the minister (of energy) in the conclusion of 
oil produc on sharing agreements, with skep cs fearing for the possibility of various forms and 
levels of corrup on and their a endant consequences. One of the members of parliament talked 
to, said that, “Retaining the controversial clause 9 in the act is only meant to advance the state’s 
commercial interests in the oil sector."
The second problem cited in the implementa on of the oil sector related poli cal se lements 
is that discussion and sharing of the produc on sharing agreements are strictly secret. A major 
point of conten on here is that when the final component of the oil process, namely, concluding 
of the agreements is done secretly, moreover in a legal dispensa on where the minister is given 
a propor onately large amount of authority over the oil resources, corrupt tendencies may not be 
checked and the country’s best interests may not be served. It is noteworthy that, when interpreted 
concurrently, the findings on the content, process and implementa on of the oil sector policies 
in Uganda, it becomes apparent that the problem is with the implementa on of policies that 
are otherwise well reached and inclusive. This appears to explain the widespread skep cism, 
dissent and concern rela ng to oil witnessed in Uganda’s media (see, for example, Musisi (2014), 
Nakayi (2013) and scholarship on the oil sector in general (see, for example, Mbabazi (2012), 
Hickey (2013). 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The present study points to recommenda ons aimed at enhancing transparency in the 
implementa on of the poli cal se lements rela ng to the oil sector. The study appears to show 
that although Uganda has adopted very good policies and following an inclusive and consulta ve 
process, this is a necessary but insufficient condi on for success in the oil sector and for preven ng 
the oil curse. It is recommended that government gives itself to the transparent execu on of 
the sector policies as the sufficient condi on for success in the sector. At the present stage, it 
is recommended that government discloses the produc on sharing agreements that have been 
reached. A er all, this is in line with the provisions of the access to informa on act. This will help 
to give contentment to those involved in the process of developing the policy that indeed, their 
views are being carried through and their interests catered for as promised in the policies. It may 
also help to ensure that rec fiable gaps are highlighted for redress. And now that the Petroleum 
Explora on, Development and Produc on Act 2013 is already in place, it is recommended that 
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the ministry of energy reconsiders some of the voices that may not have been given expression 
when the bill was debated. These might form part of future amendments that will be aimed at 
overcoming the shor alls in the oil sector that this study highlights among others.
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ABSTRACT
Na onalism has long been a subject of discussion in the literature of development. It helps 
facilitate development by crea ng a strong sense of na onal iden ty which allows the ci zenry 
to commit to na on-building. This paper examines the role of the African youth in promo ng 
the con nent’s development through developmental na onalism. Africa’s young people are 
recognised as the con nent’s greatest assets and the most suited to play this role. The fact that 
the con nent needs development suggests a compelling need for the poten als of youth to be 
harnessed to drive any development agenda. In the past, young people played historic roles in 
promo ng development through na onalis c causes but today’s youth are facing increasing 
difficul es in sustaining this legacy. This paper, therefore, makes a case for rebuilding this past 
legacy and for the empowerment of Africa’s young people to drive the con nent’s development.
DEVELOPMENTAL NATIONALISM: THE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN YOUTH
The Merriam-Webster dic onary defines na onalism as loyalty and devo on to a na on, a sense 
of na onal consciousness exal ng one na on above all others and placing primary emphasis on 
promo on of its culture and interests as opposed to those of other na ons or suprana onal groups 
(Merriam-Webster, 2015).
In the same vein, the Encyclopaedia Britannica also defines na onalism as an ideology based on 
the premise that individual’s loyalty and devo on to a na on-state surpass other individual or 
group interest (Encyclopaedia Bri anica, 2015).  While na onalism does not connote disdain for 
other na ons or other group interests, it represents patrio sm, na onal pride and absolute loyalty 
to na onal interest before all other interests.
Na onalism has long been a subject of discussion in the literature on development. Musluk (2010) 
argues that na onalism came forth in many third World countries as an understanding which is 
thought to pave the way for development as it imagines a na on based on integrity (Musluk, C, 
2010). This view is supported by Law (Law, C., 2010) who argues that in mul -cultural socie es 
like Canada and the United States, na onalism has helped to facilitate development by crea ng 
a na onal iden ty based on shared poli cal values. Where a strong sense of na onal iden ty 
exists, the ci zenry commits to na on-building. The implica on for mul -cultural socie es like 
Africa is that na onalism could be paramount for the realisa on of the social, economic and 
cultural aspira ons of our people.
In what follows, an argument on why the youth are most suited to champion the cause of 
na onalism is presented. The different roles youth have played in promo ng na onalism are also 
discussed ci ng examples from the global and African experience.
Uzoigwe Chimezie Daniel
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HISTORIC ROLE OF YOUTHS IN PROMOTING NATIONALISM
The world’s greatest asset is the youth. Not only are they energe c, ebullient and boisterous, 
when they are meaningfully engaged, their produc vity is higher than that of any other age 
group. Countries with a dominant youth popula on are considered as having an important 
advantage over countries with an ageing popula on. This is why countries like Japan with an 
ageing popula on are doing everything possible to reverse the trend. Japan’s quest to reverse her 
current ageing popula on is explained by the produc vity argument already adduced.
With this, it is clear that the youth have an important role to play in promo ng na onalism. This is 
so because young people have the needed energy to champion na onalis c causes. Young people 
are very important stakeholders in society as the leaders and followers in the nearest future. 
As the trustees of posterity, the youth should, therefore, be concerned about playing important 
na onalis c roles to shape the future of their society. History shows that Africa's youth have 
not fallen short in playing this important role. At very cri cal moments in history, young people 
have played very prominent roles in fast-tracking development through na onalis c causes on a 
na onal and global scale. A few of these roles are highlighted below:
•    Youths as Champions of a Freer, Fairer and Safer World
The Youths have made immense contribu ons towards promo ng human freedom and dignity. In 
doing this, they sacrifice to help in achieving freedom for the human race. For example, the former 
Cuban leader, Fidel Castro was a young student at the University of Havana when he pushed for 
the Cuban revolu on which culminated in the overthrow of Cuban President Fulgencio Ba sta’s 
military junta. In the same vein, President Nelson Mandela’s fight against the apartheid regime 
in South Africa was mo vated by his experience as a young black South African student when 
he was expelled from the University College of Fort Hare for joining in a student protest. The 
acclaimed Arab Spring that has revolu onised freedom and governance in some Arab countries 
of North Africa and the Middle East was driven by young people, who felt dissa sfied with the 
state of their na ons.
For Africa, many cases abound. People like W.E.B. Dubois and other Pan-Africanists were at 
the prime of their youth when they pushed for the decoloniza on of Africa and the West Indies 
through the Pan African Congress. In the same vein, Kwame Nkrumah, Herbert Macauley, 
H.O. Davies, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo and others were young people when they 
founded organisa ons that fought for Africa’s decoloniza on. It was also in the University that 
Wole Soyinka and some other young students founded organisa ons that fought corrup on and 
injus ce against black African students.  
•    The Youth and the Democra sa on Process
The role young people have played in the democra sa on process cannot be over-emphasized. 
Apart from confron ng and even bringing down many military regimes across the world, youth 
movements have played very prominent roles in deepening democracy. Because the youth 
community is enlightened, they are wiser in their vo ng decisions and can easily mobilise to 
vote out a bad government.
•    The Role of the Youth as a Pressure Group
Young people when well organised can serve as an important pressure group that can shape 
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governance and accountability. In 2010, when there was a leadership vacuum in the Nigerian 
Presidency, young Nigerians played prominent roles in suppor ng the Pastor Tunde Bakare-led 
Save Nigeria Group (SNG) through protests to bring pressure to bear on a so-called cabal to 
allow the then Vice-President, Goodluck Jonathan, to act as President. This was achieved through 
the invoca on of the doctrine of necessity and a looming leadership crisis was avoided. In 2012, 
young people partnered with labour and civil society groups to protest against the sudden removal 
of fuel subsidy on January 1st, 2012 when most Nigerians got stuck in their hometowns a er the 
Christmas holidays. The protests brought pressure on the government to reach a compromise with 
labour and civil society groups. The outcome was a be er deal for the Nigerian masses. In the 
same vein, student unions have at different  mes fought for the interest of the student community 
and called ruling governments to order when necessary. One area this o en plays out is when 
governments increase school fees without taking into account the impact this would have on 
family income and the standard of living in such families. Student movements have successfully 
resisted such arbitrary increases most  mes. The basis for resis ng these hikes in school fees is 
that such increases, reduce access to educa on by the poor, a situa on that perpetuates an eli st 
society while absolute poverty remains endemic. A recent case is the University fee protests led 
by South African Students which caused the country’s president to agree to freeze fee increases 
across South African universi es.
•    Youth Groups and the Socialisa on Process
Youth groups and organisa ons serve as a hotbed of socialisa on. Such groups like clubs, 
socie es and student unions have contributed in fast-tracking the socialisa on process. This 
helps in preparing youth members to thrive and survive in the larger society. A key part of this 
process is the ideals of integrity, honesty and contentment which young people are encouraged to 
imbibe to make them responsible members of society.
•    Youths as Tomorrow’s Na onal Manpower Stock
Youths make up tomorrow’s na onal manpower stock. In literature, the role of human capital 
development has been widely discussed. The 1998 human development report was the irst to 
recognise the cri cal role of human development in na onal development. The report recognised 
human capital as the real wealth of na ons and the ul mate driver of sustainable development.
In line with this, Awopegba (2003) posits that the development of human capital has been 
recognised by development planners as an essen al pre-condi on for a country’s economic and 
socio-cultural transforma on. As young people such as students mature and become professionals 
in their chosen endeavours, they join the labour force and become part of the country’s stock of 
human capital. When they are engaged in their fields of speciality, they contribute to society's 
progress and development by offering their services with vigour and enthusiasm; and displaying 
quality leadership skills cri cal for the con nent’s development.
DEVELOPMENTAL NATIONALISM: CONCERNS WITH TODAY’S AFRICAN 
YOUTH
Is today’s African youth ac ve in promo ng na onalism? Or are these examples more like 
reliving the good old days? A few young people are s ll very involved in acts of na onalism and 
na on-building. Many of Africa’s young people are involved in the ac vi es of Civil Society 
Organisa ons (CSOs) and Non-Governmental Organisa ons (NGOs) where they are making 
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modest contribu ons to na onal development. Nigeria and Tanzania have also conducted a 
successful 2015 elec on that saw the youth play an ac ve role, par cularly through social media.
However, it is easy to see that more progress was made in the past than at present as far as youth 
contribu ng to the promo on of na onalism is concerned. For some reasons, there has been 
a rapid deteriora on in the role young people played in promo ng na onalism and na onal 
development on almost all fronts. More African youths are taking to crimes like armed robbery, 
kidnapping, rape, fraud, internet scam etc. both at home and abroad. Only on April 28th, 2015, 
four Nigerians were put to death in Indonesia for contravening that country’s drug laws. The 
damage such events do to Nigeria’s na onal image can only be imagined. More African youths 
are concerned with how to get rich and popular through shortcuts and only a few are ready to 
work hard and contribute posi vely to na on-building. 
Unlike in the past, youth par cipa on in poli cs has become a sorry tale. The youth wings of most 
African poli cal par es have more or less become militant wings which unscrupulous poli cians 
use to in midate opponents and have their way. Even the educated youths are not spared. In 
a recent paper presenta on  tled “Good Governance: Sustainability of Democracy, the Role 
of Students in the Forthcoming General Elec ons” to mark the Interna onal Day of Students, 
Pastor Tunde Bakare lamented that “not only has students’ unionism fallen from its pinnacle of 
intellectual doggedness and ideological astuteness, it had also lost its ac vist steam, become a 
mere appendage of ruling poli cal par es and a tool in the hands of corrupt poli cians,”  (The 
Punch, 2014).
REDEFINING THE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN YOUTH IN PROMOTING 
NATIONALISM
The prominent roles played by students in the past in promo ng na onalism can be re-ignited. 
All that is to be done is to shape and redefine these roles where necessary. Some of the measures 
that could be taken to re-ignite the role of students in developmental na onalism might include:
•    Establishing Youth-led Community Development Service (CDS) Groups in Communi es 
and Schools
Youth-led Community Development Service (CDS) groups should be established in our schools so 
that young people can contribute to the building of communi es around them. Such groups would 
be concerned with core development issues affec ng communi es including poverty reduc on, 
HIV/AIDS preven on and management, family and community health, drug abuse and other 
salient community development issues. This will not only foster peer-to-peer interac on among 
young people and allow for the free low of innova ve ideas, it will enable young people to be 
ac ve in community development and ins l a strong sense of responsibility in them. This could 
also help reduce crime and foster peace and stability in our communi es. The impact of these 
community development service groups would be striking as it would help take development 
to the grassroots while making young people responsive to the needs of their communi es. My 
experience with Project Change Ini a ve (PCI), a student-led community development ac on 
pla orm within the University was awesome. PCI helped not only to promote the ideals of 
good studentship in campuses but enabled members to have a sense of ownership of the campus 
community and be concerned about its well-being. If we could have such ini a ves across all 
African campuses, it could indeed have a posi ve impact.  
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•    Promo ng Volunteerism in Communi es and Schools
One way the role of the African youth in promo ng developmental na onalism could be enhanced 
is by encouraging them to volunteer for just causes. Through volunteerism, young people would 
learn to do things that would benefit society while expec ng no remunera on and by doing 
this, they would ill themselves and the con nent with hope. Non-Governmental Organisa ons 
(NGOs) should, therefore, put mechanisms in place to engage youth volunteers in facilita ng 
their development work.
•    Engaging Youths in Agenda Se ng, Policymaking and Implementa on
The African youth should be engaged in agenda se ng, policy making and implementa on 
primarily on issues that affect them. It is impera ve that efforts should be made not only to 
engage the youth but to make them the fulcrum of public policy making and execu on. Engaging 
young people like students in agenda se ng and implementa on will not only bring fresh ideas 
and greater energy to the delivery of good governance but also guarantee sustainability in the 
near future and the much-needed stability that every country needs to thrive and blossom.
•    Encouraging Effec ve Partnership between Youth Groups and Civil Society Organisa ons 
(CSOs)
Since the youth community represents an enlightened populace, civil society organisa ons 
should be encouraged to improve on their partnership with youth groups including student bodies 
in their campaigns. This would add steam to the efforts of such organisa ons to get leaders to be 
responsible, accountable and deliver the much-needed dividends of democracy in Africa.
•    Redefining Student Unionism
Student unionism must be redefined to allow students to contribute produc vely to na onal 
development. This redefini on must be in such a way that unionism would not be le  to unserious, 
unintelligent and self-seeking charlatans who have dragged student unionism in their quest for 
self-glory. All efforts must be made to restore student unionism to its glorious days.
•    Making Civics Part of Educa on Curriculum
Civics should be made part of our academic curriculum from the kindergarten level to the ter ary 
level. This should form part of a catch-them-young strategy aimed at inculca ng in young people 
the prac cal aspects of ci zenship, their rights and du es, the du es of ci zens to each other as 
members of society and to the government. In the same vein, the relevant government agencies 
in each African country should embark on effec ve campaigns targeted at young people aimed 
at sensi sing them on their rights, obliga ons, conduct and privileges to enhance their role in 
developmental na onalism. This will educate the youth that ci zenship represents the ideals of 
integrity, selflessness, fearlessness and service and not the vices of corrup on, selishness and 
personal aggrandisement.
•    Promo ng Good Governance and Accountability
Good governance and accountability is key to promo ng developmental na onalism among the 
African youth. Government at all levels must be responsible and keep the social contract by 
ensuring that society provides an enabling society for its people to thrive and be responsible 
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ci zens. A situa on where poli cal leaders and their cronies abdicate their obliga ons to the 
ci zenry and instead steal the commonwealth and flaunt their affluence leaves nothing good for 
the young people to learn. Instead, it provokes the ‘get-rich-quick or die trying’ appe te in our 
youths which makes them resort to all forms of an -social ac vi es to survive or "belong". Our 
leaders should lead by example and focus on building strong ins tu ons that will guarantee the 
effec ve delivery of good governance and accountability. The average African youth is talented 
and hardworking but faces a tough challenge from a society that offers limited opportuni es and 
has allowed high youth unemployment to fester. If Africa can provide an enabling environment 
for her young people to thrive, then she can sit and watch her youth populace unleash their 
poten als and energy and make her an enviable con nent.  
CONCLUSION  
That Africa direly needs development suggests a compelling need for the poten als of young 
people to be harnessed to drive developmental na onalism. Although this paper has suggested 
measures to achieve this, these measures would prove worthless if mechanisms are not put in 
place to bring them to frui on. We therefore need more ac ons than words to reposi on the 
African youth to deliver on their poten als in crea ng the Africa we all desire: a new Africa. 
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ABSTRACT
There have been many theories given on how Africa should develop, regardless, this paper argues 
on why it is important to focus on educa on as one of the major tools to move Africa forward. 
It scru nises the current educa on systems in African countries and how they are not tailored to 
equip the African child with the mindset and skills required for leadership. Instead of wai ng for 
aid and relief, this paper champions the need for Africans to arise and offer solu ons to Africa's 
problems. The challenge calls for stock-taking of the “state” of the different African countries 
so that the proper educa on system can be targeted to them. For Africa's educa on system to 
respond to the needs of poor children and to contribute to wealth crea on in communi es and 
society at large, it needs to take poverty into special considera on when planning educa on 
services.
EDUCATION: A PATHWAY TO AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT
Africa is the world's second-largest and second-most-populous con nent with 1.1 billion people 
as of 2013 accoun ng for about 15% of the world's human popula on. The con nent hosts a 
large diversity of ethnici es, cultures and languages, with its history da ng back to the late 19th 
century when European countries colonised most of its territories. Colonisa on of Africa is s ll a 
topic of contest to this day as many, like Prof Walter Rodney, believe it to have destroyed Africa. 
In his book “How Europe Underdeveloped Africa”, Prof Rodney explains how colonialism 
enriched Europe and reduced Africa to abject poverty. He argues that the riches of Africa and her 
raw materials fuelled the economies of imperialist countries.
Decade a er decade, poli cians and interna onal organisa ons are failing to reduce poverty in 
Africa, nor are they able to help generate growth or build basic infrastructure. Worse s ll between 
1975 and 2000 Africa was the only place on earth where poverty intensiied. It's only recently 
that the situa on has improved (Causes of Poverty in Africa, 2011).
Like Dr Mar n Luther, I have a dream. A dream for Africa, like World Bank’s mission carved in 
stone at Washington headquarters, the dream is “an Africa free of poverty”. This is Africa with 
improved living standards and access to all basic needs. Africa where every person has enough 
food, water, shelter, health and educa on. Africa where all na ons are democra c and ci zens 
have a say in their own future. Africa that is independent of foreign aid, able to manage and handle 
herself without struggle. Africa that will not depend on imports but will rather be a net exporter 
of goods and services to other countries. Yes! Africa that has achieved gender equality with 
empowered women and girls, having its own resilient infrastructure, able to promote inclusive 
and sustainable industrialisa on and foster innova on. 
Is it possible or just one of those dreams that a beggar would ride if wishes were horses?  Let 
Walusungu Lululukile Ngulube
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us ask countries that have experienced economic growth like China. Once among the poorest 
countries in the world, today China’s poverty rate has fallen from 85% to 15.9% accoun ng for 
nearly all the worlds’ reduc on in poverty.  The answer I get from them is, it is possible.
But where do we begin? There have been so many theories on how Africa should develop, 
stretching from economics to technology. Regardless, I concur with Nelson Mandela's saying that 
"educa on is the most powerful weapon which can be used to change the world”. Developing 
structures and increasing Africa’s GDP is necessary, but that is not where it begins. The Genesis 
is you and me, just as the United Na ons states: “people are the real wealth of any na on” . 
Development according to United Na ons is thus about expanding the choices people have to 
lead the lives they value. It is much more than economic growth, a very important means of 
enlarging people's choices.
Africa’s vicious cycle of poverty must be broken and human development should be the focus. 
The best form of human development that cannot be ignored is educa on. No country has 
succeeded if it has not educated its people. Educa on is important in not only reducing poverty 
but as a key to wealth crea on. Educa on is pivotal in breaking the vicious cycle and this is why 
it is ranked number 4 in the sustainable development goals: “Ensure inclusive and equitable 
quality educa on and promote lifelong learning opportuni es for all” .  
But why should educa on ma er to Africa? The United Na ons argues that educa on provides 
a direct path towards food security and out of poverty, ci ng that educated parents can earn an 
income, produce more food through agricultural ini a ves, and feed their children. Children who 
complete primary educa on are more likely to achieve food security as adults and end the cycle 
of poverty in their genera on. Educa on increases people’s confidence, enabling them to become 
self-suficient and be er able to contribute to their communi es. 
Educa on is thus an area of focus worth brooding over by developing countries because it further 
allows for gender equity, a huge struggle in many African communi es. According to the United 
Na ons girls and women who achieve higher levels of educa on are greater contributors to 
the overall economic development and to children’s welfare within communi es. Achieving 
educa onal equity for girls – including educa ng communi es on the value of girls’ educa on – 
is an essen al factor in sustainable poverty allevia on (CFC, 2016).
As we focus on educa on, what is required under this umbrella is the quality of educa on by all 
African communi es. According to Motsoko Pheko,  " quality educa on is the key to crea ng, 
owning and controlling Africa’s wealth and mentally decolonizing her people’s captured minds. 
Africa needs a diverse educa on tailored to the economic needs of her people. That educa on 
must be free for the poor. No African child must be without educa on, merely because of his 
or her condi on of poverty. African children must be taught the true history of Africa, not the 
colonial history of Africa’s invaders that is full of perfidy to protect their colonial interests” 
(Motsoko, 2012).
Instead of wai ng for aid, and a way out from our dire situa ons from developed countries, I 
believe it is  me Africa owned its educa onal systems and curriculums. Obama hits the nail 
on the head when he said “Change will not come if we rely on another person or another  me 
to come and make those changes. We have to be that change, we are those people we’ve been 
wai ng for, and we can achieve those changes we have been longing for” (Obama, 2016). This 
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somewhat mo va onal speech can inspire Africa to take ac on and try more than it has.
The challenge calls for stock-taking of the “state” of the different African countries so that the 
appropriate educa onal system can be targeted to its people. For the educa on system to respond 
to the needs of poor children and to contribute to wealth crea on in communi es and society 
at large, there is need to take poverty into special considera on in the planning of educa on 
services. 
In their paper, Mark J. Epstein & Kris  Yuthas highlight how educa onal programs adopt 
tradi onal Western models of educa on, with an emphasis on math, science, language, and 
social studies. These programs allocate scarce resources to topics like Greek mythology, prime 
numbers, or tectonic plate movement—topics that may provide intellectual s mula on, but have 
li le relevance in the lives of impoverished children (Mark J. Epstein & Kris  Yuthas, 2012).
Poor children have many disadvantages compared to their be er-off counterparts. They are less 
healthy, their language skills less developed, and they are less well equipped- socially, emo onally 
and physically to undertake school programs. If their disadvantaged posi on and different day-
to-day experience are not taken into account by school educa on, it is no wonder they do not 
benefit from the school system.
For too long, governments and organisa ons inves ng in educa on in developing countries have 
operated under the unques oned assump on that improved test scores were clear evidence that 
their investments have paid off. But if, as we argue here, according  to Mark J. Epstein & Kris  
Yuthas mastery of the basic primary school curriculum is not the best means for improving 
life's chances and reducing poverty in developing countries, that model is broken. Inves ng in 
interven ons that produce the highest test scores is no longer a valid approach for alloca ng 
scarce educa onal dollars or the scarce  me available to develop young minds. It is  me to seek 
the interven ons that lead to the greatest social and economic impact for the poor.
It is a necessity for the educa onal systems in Africa to priori se preparing all children, rich or 
poor, to achieve at school, and empower them by heightening their awareness of their rights and 
responsibili es. Show them their abili es and enhance their self-confidence to enable them to 
improve their lives. 
Mark J. Epstein & Kris  Yuthas further propose that what students in impoverished regions 
need is not more academic skills, but rather life skills that enable them to improve their financial 
prospects and well-being. These include financial literacy and entrepreneurial skills; health 
maintenance and management skills; and administra ve capabili es, such as teamwork, problem 
solving, and project management. It is vital that educa on systems heed the lessons of successful 
and less successful ini a ves implemented by NGOs, private individuals, religious bodies and 
government themselves and translate these ini a ves into policies, strategies and specific ac on 
that can be taken to scale. We will never eradicate poverty without quality educa on.
The con nent will have the poten al to develop with li le or no help from the developed countries 
if it has a skilled human resource, well equipped with the ability and knowledge of harnessing 
Africa’s natural and human resources. Africa is not a poor con nent, it has great poten al that 
requires the right skill to cul vate it. That cul va on lies in its people, therefore developing them 
in knowledge and skill should be of vital necessity.
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ABSTRACT
Conflict is a pervasive reality which resonates and occurs globally in diverse forms. UNDP 
(2014) noted that conflict and a sense of personal insecurity have pervasive adverse impacts on 
human development and leave billions of people living in precarious condi ons. Conflicts have 
short and long term impacts which affect both conflic ng and non-conlic ng par es in different 
ways. This is most poignant at work, where workplace conflicts can escalate, inflict enormous 
harm on firms, employers, managers, employees, unions etc and pose a great threat to societal 
as well as na onal stability and progress. Hence, it becomes expedient for stakeholders at work 
to promptly and amicably se le conflicts whenever it erupts. It is against this backdrop that this 
paper calls for synergy between workplace par es and ins tu on in developing accessible and 
transparent mechanisms for resolving workplace conflicts in Nigeria, given the complexi es of 
our economy and low industrial capacity u liza on in private and public enterprises.
Keywords:  Conflict Management, Workers, Employers, Workplace, Nigeria 
CONFLICT
The world has become less peaceful every year since 2008, highligh ng the importance of be er 
understanding conflict and violence risk (GP1 2014). In affirming this, UNDP (2014) noted that 
more than 1.5 billion people live in countries affected by conflict— about a fi h of the world’s 
popula on. Conflict has been said to be innate in human nature and a dis nguishing feature 
of human socializa on processes. It has also been iden fied as a vital ingredient in a aining 
development and highlighted as a permanent fixture in human interac ons and existence. 
According to Withers and Wisinski, (2007), conflict is an inevitable part of our working lives, 
although it may not occur on a daily basis, when it happens it can be overwhelming. This is 
normal, natural and some mes necessary for con nued growth and development. Anywhere that 
there are more than two people, there is bound to be conflict. This is because people are inherently 
different, that is, in terms of interests, orienta on and background. Conflict occurs when these 
differences come to light. Workplace conflicts are a clash of interests and resultant disputes of 
varying intensity between workplace actors such as trade unions and employers associa ons. It 
revolves around sharing the gains of work; incompa bility of goals, interests and values; and 
a empt to control or dictate the direc on of things or policies in the workplace. It is of immense 
socio-economic and poli cal import for workplace par es. This is in line with the stand of Coser 
(1956) that conflict too has to do with a struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce 
resources, in which the aim of the conflic ng par es are not only to gain the desired values but 
also to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals. Ingram (2016) opined that conflict is inevitable 
in workplace se ngs, and conflicts can arise between co-workers, supervisors and subordinates 
or between employees and external stakeholders, such as customers, suppliers and regulatory 
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agencies. Conflicts may also take the form of disagreements that emerge when goals, interests 
or values of workplace par es are incompa ble and par es try to thwart each other’s efforts to 
achieve their objec ves. Weber (1949) pointed out that conflict is part of social life, meaning that 
conflict is normal, essen al and accepted as part of man’s daily endeavors.  
TYPES OF WORKPLACE CONFLICTS
Conflicts are a key element of human and organisa onal interac ons at work. However, the 
two par es despite being partners in progress and joint key players in the workplace schema 
may  have partly congruent and partly divergent interests. The interac ons between , among 
and within these par es over employment and other work related ma ers could produce both 
agreements and disagreements, generate tensions, opposing viewpoints and contradictory stands 
which could set the stage for the erup on of conflicts. Conflicts are very frequent occurrences 
in Nigerian industries (Yesufu, 2000; Fagbemi, 2004;  Obono, 2007; ILO, 2009; Onyejeli, 2011; 
Akinwale, 2011). In the Nigerian workplace, there are three major types of conflicts, management-
union, union-union and management-worker conflicts respec vely. These conflicts are caused by 
diverse factors. In connec on with this, Ojeifo (2000) noted that in many organisa ons in Nigeria, 
internal (intrapersonal) and interpersonal conflicts are consuming so much organisa onal  me 
and a en on that organisa ons are star ng to look as though conflict is their primary business. 
Allowing conflict to fester in workplaces o en creates net nega ve effects and lose-lose outcomes 
especially in a na on with low capacity u liza on and produc vity like Nigeria. A theore cal 
framework that can be u lized to expound on workplace conflicts is John Burton’s human needs 
theory. Burton (1990) was of the opinion that in analyzing conflicts, one must be able to iden fy 
and separate interests, values and needs. For instance, workers' needs are quite different from 
the desires of employers, so also the values and interests of workplace par es are poles apart. 
Withers and Wisinki,(2007) expounded that we can divide most of what people fight over at work 
into three general categories. Two of these three categories are: not enough to go around and 
goals that workers want to reach. They claimed further that most o en at work, conflicts seem 
to be about resources, turf boundaries, or conflic ng goals. The defini on by Tille  and French 
(2007) that conflicts occur when one or more employees or groups perceive their values or needs 
to be incompa ble with others or the organisa on is quite applicable in this sphere. The reward 
systems, management style and nature of work in Nigerian organisa ons are prone to manifest 
conflict.
The type of conflict that occurs between trade unions is commonly referred to as inter-union 
disputes. This occurs mostly as a result of overlapping jurisdic ons, in which case two or more 
unions may make membership claims within the same organisa on and sector.  Also, the tussle 
for superiority in the workplace may enhance this kind of conflict. An example is what happens 
in the Nigerian Universi es between the two key unions, the Academic Staff Union of Nigerian 
Universi es (ASUU) and the Senior Staff Associa on of Nigerian Universi es (SSANU). 
Another  example can be found in Hospitals between the various professional groups. 
The second type is intra-union conflicts. This basically occurs between and among members 
of the same union. For example, conflict between or among elected or appointed oficials and 
even ordinary members over the control of power, policy disagreements and u liza on of funds. 
Ojeli (1977) stated that the causes of industrial conflict in Nigeria is the lukewarm a tude 
of employers and government in responding to the demands of the workers or trea ng their 
demand with levity; and also, non-recogni on of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) as an 
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organ for harmonizing possible conflicts between the employers of labor and employees.  Non-
implementa on of valid agreements, impugning and/or abnega on of workers’ rights could also 
lead to crisis in the workplace, especially when the employers have a pedigree of constantly 
viola ng workers' rights and denying them of their en tlements.
MEANING OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
People naturally approach the se lement of conflict in diverse ways depending on dynamics, 
peculiari es, abili es and skills of the representa ves of each of the conflic ng par es; past 
experiences of par es; willingness and commitment of par es to reach resolu ons; the posi on 
of the law; and the expecta ons of all other stakeholders. In as much as conflicts in the workplace 
are natural occurrences and unavoidable phenomenon, Tille  and French (2007) noted that in 
managing conflict in organisa ons, it is important to iden fy the underlying cause(s) rather than 
accept events or issues at face value. This is because, conflicts mean very different things to 
different people. It is may also be hinged on the type of profession, sector or industry. 
Withers and Wisinski, (2007) pointed out that when handled effec vely, conflict can help people 
meet their goals and objec ves within teams or departments in an organisa on. However in order 
not to capsize the organisa onal ship, it is very important for unions and employers to deploy 
conflict management techniques that would reduce the tendencies to conflict, diminish the span 
of conflicts with crippling effects, divert the energies in conflict towards mutually beneficial 
outcomes and improve synergy between the par es to avoid preference for conflict. Conflict 
management connotes systema c, organized, orderly and methodical approach to stop or reduce 
the effect of conflicts.
Efficient handling of conflicts presupposes that the workplace rela onship is naturally conflict 
prone. Workers and employers have different views on how the workplace rela onship and issues 
should be handled. To many Nigerian workers and their representa ves, management should 
improve the social, economic and poli cal benefits workers derive from work. Workers desire 
enterprises where their emoluments are jointly decided, taking cognizance of the state of the 
economy, industry-wide benchmarks and principles of fairness and equity. Also, conflicts would 
occur less in organisa ons where employees are well paid, mentored, challenged, promoted, 
involved, appreciated, valued, empowered and trusted. Conflicts can be palliated by more 
understanding and empathy on the part of the workplace par es. McCabe and Rabil (2001) 
enthused that conflict management systems have been described as providing for workplace 
jus ce.
NATURE OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
Conflict management is an ongoing, con nuous and never ending exercise to cope with, and rein 
in conflict. Ingram ( 2016) pointed out that managing conflict is a key management competency 
and all small business owners should study and prac ce effec ve conflict management skills to 
maintain a posi ve workplace environment. Conflic ng par es should be involved in all conflict 
management efforts for it to be effec ve. Others such as regulatory ins tu ons or the appropriate 
agencies of the state may be peripherally involved. Rela onships between owners and workers, 
owners and workers' groups, managers and the managed, state and workers and owners and state 
in Nigeria are prone to diverse forms of constant conflicts because of  our peculiar nature, varied 
and dissimilar interests, values, percep ons, norms, desires, and ideologies. 
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On one side of the divide are the managers who are the representa ves of the owners and are 
responsible for the day to day running of the enterprise , while on the other side are workers 
and their representa ves who are legi mately elected members of the workers’ unions. The 
Government is expected to be an unbiased umpire and impar al arbiter to guarantee that the rights 
and interests of the par es are nego ated in atmospheres devoid of in mida on and typified by 
freedom. Society gains most when conflicts in organisa ons are immediately addressed. In the 
Nigerian context, workers and their representa ves feel that the state is usually on the side of 
the employers instead of being neutral. They have the mindset that the ac ons, statements and 
policy direc ons of Government does not portray it as the objec ve party that it should be. The 
tough economic terrain within which organisa ons in Nigeria operate creates a fer le ground 
for conflicts and strike ac ons which bode ill for the na on’s nascent democracy and to ering 
economy. Iche (2016) asserted that Small and Medium Enterprises  (SMEs) may cut jobs as part 
of cost-saving measures  as a result of the prevailing economic situa on in Nigeria. With this 
comes the inability to adequately pay off disengagement benefits leading to conflicts. This is a 
poten al danger currently facing Nigerian firms.
Shagwert (2011) emphasized that the essence of labor movement is: workers organizing themselves 
and ge ng together with their communi es to iden fy some real injus ces that are systemic 
throughout the country. Hence, the rights of workers represented by unions to collec vely bargain 
with employers' representa ves in fulfillment of the workers’ right to belong to groups that best 
protect their personal interest should be given effect at all levels of industry to promote peace 
and harmonious condi ons that are germane for the purpose of advancing na onal development. 
According to Wright (2011), recent studies point to the posi ve role played by unions in helping 
to resolve workplace disputes. Autonomy from management and the availability of effec ve 
dispute resolu on skills and exper se puts union representa ves in pole posi on to peacefully 
resolve workplace conflicts. When workers unionize and are strengthened by laws and ins tu onal 
frameworks for the purpose of furthering peace and enhancing condi ons necessary for las ng 
prosperity for all, engagements between the independent representa ves of the workers and 
employers to reach consensus for common growth and mutually beneficial improvements would 
increase commitment and enhance contribu ons needed for enhanced workplace performance 
for the common good of all par es.  Nigeria’s case is exacerbated by its low ranking of 5 on the 
2015 ITUC Global Rights Index as one of the worst countries for workers rights. Countries with 
the ra ng of 5 are the worst countries in the world to work in. While the legisla on may spell 
out certain rights, workers have effec vely no access to these rights and are therefore exposed to 
autocra c regimes and unfair labour prac ces.
SCOPE OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
The scope of conflict management can be based also on analysis of the par es involved.  Nigerian 
workplaces have their value system through which priori es are determined. When different 
priori es collide, conflict is o en the result. How we engage these differences becomes cri cally 
important (Withers and Wisinki, 2007). Conflict management could entail engagement of par es 
at the bipar te or the tripar te level. The principle of tripar sm which is the system of Industrial 
Rela ons in Nigeria specifies the equality of the three stakeholders, but conceptually and even 
in prac ce, the argument of engagement of equals does not hold water. This is because the 
Nigerian government as one of the biggest employers of labour in Nigeria, the manager of the 
na onal economy and the apex poli cal ins tu on, o en calls the shots. Clarement and Davis 
(2005) advocated for collabora ve conflict management which is concerned with conflict at the 
group or organisa onal level. It depends upon the willingness of employees at the workplace to 
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work collabora vely to resolve differences and can include a third party facilitator. Against the 
backdrop of pervasive and diverse conflicts in the world of work, responsive and strategic union 
leaders and employers/management are expected to be proac ve advocates of coopera sm and 
conflict management in the workplace; op mum  developers of workers and employers through 
entrenching posi ve work a tudes and skills that will reduce the propensity for conflicts to the 
barest minimum; willing users of  posi ve conflict management steps and posi ve nego ators 
for union and organisa onal progress; and exemplary in values, results-driven, ethics-based 
proac ve leaders with the con nued existence of the organisa on as their salient concern through 
partnership and coopera on with employers and workers respec vely. 
CONCLUSION
Inarguably, conflict is inevitable in Nigerian organisa ons, but its proper management for 
mutually beneficial outcomes can make it construc ve. To achieve this, the Labour Movement, 
Nigerian Government and Nigerian Employers Consulta ve Associa on should seek to engage in 
result-oriented nego a ons and dialogues that can guarantee win-win outcomes for all. Mutually 
formulated workplace conflict preven on strategies which are focal to increasing organisa onal 
performance should be the main agenda for trade unions and employers. In this era of heightened 
compe  veness among organisa ons, it has become essen al for organized labour to work with 
the organized private sector to iden fy and inculcate values, a tudes and ideals that can evolve 
and sustain good work ethics and a culture of partnership to ameliorate workplace conlicts. 
The quest for organisa onal effec veness in this present age and the unknown future begins 
with a personal commitment by workers, their employers and their representa ves to display 
posi ve work a tudes and create an environment that can promote cordial labour-management 
rela ons and prac ces. Finally, with respect to the larger society, UNDP (2014) opined that the 
presence of responsive and accountable ins tu ons of governance is cri cal to overcoming the 
sense of injus ce, vulnerability and exclusion that can fuel social discontent. Hence, the Nigerian 
Government should create conflict resolu on frameworks and mechanisms that can adequately 
deal with workplace conflicts and assuage the interests of the two workplace par es for the 
con nued growth, peace and stability of Nigeria.
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ABSTRACT
Livestock accrues benefits to women that include food, income and insurance against crop failure. 
This gives rise to the need for gender-friendly policies that promote and encourage women to 
own livestock. Women remain in the ranks of poor livestock keepers, although they make up two-
thirds of the popula on of livestock keepers. Factors that influence livestock produc vity among 
women range from rights to land, access to high yield breeds, applica on of new technologies and 
prac ces, access to educa on and extension services, and rigid cultural systems among others. 
These factors handled in a gender sensi ve manner would go a long way to realise increase in 
livestock produc on and income.
INTRODUCTION
This paper draws from studies conducted in various parts of the world to iden fy challenges 
that women face in livestock farming. It seeks to influence women’s capacity to par cipate in, 
and profit from animal husbandry. Addressing gender dispari es in livestock produc on means 
understanding its relevance and addressing different issues such as needs, livelihoods, priori es, 
interests, age, ethnicity, socio-economic status, and ability. Gender is a cri cal issue that crosscuts 
livestock produc on. By understanding the various roles that gender plays in livestock produc on, 
we can improve their outcomes and effec veness. 
The paper posits that many countries, especially in Africa s ll face challenges with enac ng 
legisla on that relates to ac onable access and control of resources at community and household 
levels for women. There is urgent need to support projects that serve as entry points for women 
and aim at capacity building, to augment women’s knowledge and skills; with the desired end 
being improved livelihoods and economic growth for their communi es and families. The study 
has further provided recommenda ons for possible solu ons, best prac ces and ini a ves for 
gender approach to support comprehensive, sustainable social and economic development.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The study uses the gender perspec ve to present livestock as a source of livelihood as developed 
by the Interna onal Livestock Research Ins tute. This point of view takes a livelihood approach 
that impinges importance on assets, markets and other ins tu ons. The framework hypothesises 
three pathways out of poverty: securing current and future assets, improving and sustaining 
the agricultural systems' produc vity important in livestock farming and facilita ng greater 
par cipa on of the poor in livestock-related markets. This framework has been used before to 
explore livestock as a source of women’s livelihood (ILRI, 2010).
Amailuk Joseph R., Nasubo Fred E.,  Njeri Njoroge E. 
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WOMEN AND ACCESS TO ASSETS
In most developing countries, rural popula ons are heavily dependent on agriculture for their 
livelihood. Livestock is also a key asset for rural livelihoods. (AGA, 2013). Rural women are 
major par cipants and play a crucial role in livestock farming and are responsible for many 
daily tasks. Rural women and men, depending on the region and livestock sub-sector, o en have 
specific knowledge about different aspects of animal husbandry. But women’s access to adequate 
knowledge, improved technologies, financial services, and other relevant social services remains 
a cri cal issue. The livestock sector has predominantly been trending upward, with the small-
scale produc on systems experiencing growth thereby suppor ng livelihoods and subsidising 
the gross domes c product significantly (WCILD, 2016). The main users of the locally adapted 
livestock breeds are women. They play a central role in animal resource management, thereby 
conserving them. They are usually responsible for the breeding decisions with a preference for 
animals that are disease resistant and easy to manage thereby reducing their workload (Köhler-
Rollefson, 2012).
Despite women's involvement in livestock farming, gender roles are customarily prejudiced 
against rural women who face many obstacles unlike men in obtaining the necessary tools 
that help them reach their full poten al in the livestock sector. Women have limited access to 
resources, hardly any extension services and limited par cipa on in decision-making. They  
enjoy a smaller share of the income derived from livestock farming compared to their male 
counterparts. Recognising and integra ng these diverse roles and specific dynamics into projects 
and programs can improve their outcomes and effec veness.
Gender dispari es also have nega ve consequences on the women’s ability to earn a stable 
income and have an adverse impact on the household income earned from livestock produc on. 
The nature and work of the women who operate within the livestock sector make them suscep ble 
to various health and safety issues such as the heightened exposure to zoono c diseases (Patel 
et al., 2016). Another challenge that women face in the livestock sub-sector is limited to access 
to natural resources and control. Despite women being crucial contributors to agriculture and 
food security, their management of biodiversity, energy, water and land remains way lower than 
the men. Ownership of livestock is par cularly a rac ve to women in socie es where, due to 
cultural norms, women’s access to land and mobility is restricted. The land user's ability are 
hampered as they are unable to upgrade and develop livestock ac vi es, since they o en lack 
grazing land and also lack collateral for investments (AGA, 2013).
Women have limited access to technologies, training and extension services. Culture limits 
women’s mobility and freedom to leave their homes. So, they are systema cally challenged 
from taking part in extension mee ngs or group ac vi es. Women are o en le  out of the male-
dominated networks and training. The women’s lower status and input to households restrict their 
control and decision-making power over assets and income. In many rural areas where cultural 
and social norms are unyielding, women are not engaged in the decision-making process.
Limited access to financial services is another challenge for women that results from many factors. 
SIDA (2015) notes the lack of collateral, customary rules and limited credit schemes designed 
for women as part of the challenge. These constraints narrow the business scope preven ng 
women from hiring needed employees or forcing them to use obsolete technology. Ensuring 
women have control and access to resources such as land, livestock, markets, informa on and 
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credit strengthens their inluence and social empowerment. This paper a empts to encourage 
governments to design livestock policies with a targeted gender approach that will encourage 
poverty reduc on and food security.
Despite their major role in the management of livestock assets, women have poor access to 
markets and play a limited role in the commercialisa on of livestock and livestock products. This 
tendency o en arises due to various factors including low levels of literacy, customary prac ces 
that prevent women from freely leaving the house, their marke ng strategies and informa on 
inadequacy. Thus, a market imbalance exists between the sexes in the benefits accrued from 
livestock-related income (Patel et al., 2016).
EXPLORING WOMEN’S ROLE IN INCREASING AND SUSTAINING LIVESTOCK 
PRODUCTIVITY
The rela onship between women and the produc vity of livestock is a growing area of interest 
among scholars due to the different purposes for which women keep livestock. Some women 
keep livestock for non-produc ve cultural reasons, they have livestock because culture dictates. 
On the other hand, others have livestock for food, security and income; which are produc ve. 
However, the non-produc ve reasons usually outweigh the produc ve ones hence posing a 
challenge in improving livestock produc vity. Other studies have also shown that livestock farms 
managed and operated by women for non-produc ve use do be er than male-owned ones (ILRI, 
2010). The lack of rights influences how these women engage in produc ve livestock ac vi es 
such as investments and income genera on, oscilla ng them towards non-produc ve livestock 
farming at the expense of produc ve farming. To address this phenomenon, various interven ons 
need to be put in place such as encouraging the rearing of high yielding breeds, and applying of 
new technologies or prac ces (SIDA, 2015). 
Köhler-Rollefson (2012) posits that three-quarters of Asian women's household responsibili es 
include managing livestock. Related studies show 90 percent of Nepal women as engaged in 
livestock produc on compared to 75 percent of the men (Herath, 2009). A study conducted in 
Central and Eastern Kenya by Njuki (2004) indicates that more women are responsible for the 
feeding of ca le while men concentrate on watering and disease management. Iden fying the 
different roles undertaken by women in livestock farming is vital in recognising the various 
challenges they face; giving room for developing projects and programs tailored to their specific 
needs.
PROMOTION OF WOMEN PARTICIPATION IN LIVESTOCK MARKETS
Keeping of livestock has a myriad of benefits that accrue to it. The animals reared are a source 
of food and fibre and can also be sold to the market for their meat and other by-products. The 
income earned can be used to access other commodi es needed by the livestock keepers. The 
same animals (livestock) act as insurance against crop failure; that is, considering that they also 
produce dairy products which contribute towards nutri on. With the excep on of ca le that 
requires rangelands, most livestock require small spaces for rearing. Livestock also provides 
manure used to produce biogas and provides excellent means of transport as well. Some keep 
goats to control weeds, as well as for their meat and protein benefits. Empowered women can 
gain access to land and are able to make choices that grow the economy and enhance food 
security (Interna onal Animal Agriculture, 2016).
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With small holding farmers accoun ng for 80% of Africa’s agricultural output, women are the 
backbone of rural and na onal economies and by extension development. They cons tute 75 
percent of the world’s agricultural labour force in some parts of the world. They also make up 
two-thirds of the 600 million poor livestock keepers (Kohler-Rollefson, 2012). It is impera ve 
that policy makers appreciate the role that women play considering their sheer numbers. In as 
much as they make up the largest agricultural workforce, they s ll ill the ranks of the poorest 
among livestock keepers.
The no on of benefits-sharing would work well as it assumes that goods and services are 
resul ng from the benefits the environment provides to its range of poten al users (Uprety, 2006; 
Costenbader, 2011). Benefits-sharing in this context applies to proper sharing of environment 
benefits (like the grasslands) among farmers who benefit from its pastures, and the lands are 
likewise rejuvenated from organic manure from the livestock resul ng in a win-win situa on 
and also reducing conflict on reserve lands because of legi mate mul ple land use. Promo ng 
and suppor ng sustainable rangeland management can accomplish this result, enhancing nutrient 
recycling, soil fer lity, preserving other forms of biodiversity and wildlife. Making specific 
poli cal choices to design benefit sharing mechanisms that seek the most promise would be a 
win and no regrets solu on (University of California, 2016).
More than half the world's lands are used for livestock related produc on (Stanford Report, 
2010). Policy influences the consequences of livestock produc on, which varies with the policy 
context and ins tu ons involved and the produc on systems. One challenge women have faced 
under livestock farming has to do with access to grasslands. Many of these lands have been 
placed under conserva on which has resulted in conflict with authori es over the lands use. The 
lands teeming with wildlife have been encroached upon in a search for pasture for the livestock. 
However, encouraging the women to perform integrated livestock farming is a part of the solu on. 
The women can u lise paddocks, or be er yet zero-graze the livestock which is then fed from the 
wastes generated from the farm produce. Zero-gazing also reduces the need for expanses of land 
and more livestock can be kept in smaller spaces and are easier to take care of. This way, women 
are not constrained for land and can produce more with less.
COMMERCIAL LIVESTOCK FARMING: MARKETING AND EXPORTS
The Horn of Africa has benefited from donor programs that have made signiicant investments in 
livestock in pastoralist areas. A en on has since extended to live animal exports from the region. 
Commercialisa on of agricultural outputs and by extension the export trade are a force in driving 
out poverty and at worst reducing its effects/levels. This hinges on the assump on that a linear 
rela onship exists between access to superior export markets and poverty allevia on according 
to Aklilu & Cately (2009).
A study commissioned by the Inter-governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) Livestock 
Policy Ini a ve and ins tuted by FAO challenges the understanding that pastoralists are 
universally poor. The IGAD report states that the poverty indicators that are used in such studies 
have no bearing on the pastoral se ng. Even so, they found livestock holdings to be a be er 
poverty measure than household incomes. This calls for policy-makers to appreciate be er this 
concept and its economics logic to be able to plan be er (Ibid). This makes a case for encouraging 
women to get more involved in livestock farming and apprecia ng that livestock farming is not 
a sentence to abject poverty.
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Most pastoral cultures keep livestock for reasons such as social status. The men under these 
se ngs have the final word on ma ers related to the animals and the women and in some cases, 
children are limited to providing labour. In the off-chance the women own any livestock; it is 
basically on a subsistence basis. A change in a tude among women would be easy to inculcate if 
they could collec vely as a group be given animals to rear for commercial returns. Considering 
they already play the role of labour, this should not create a ripple in their social se ng. The 
incomes generated would go a long way to collec vely empower the women. In the event that 
women make any proxy sales, the proceeds are s ll handed to the men who are culturally en tled 
to the assets with women having a passive role.
The women’s limited power and influence are in part contributed to by their lack of wealth 
or stock ownership. Limited access to markets and informa on, risk tolerance, their levels of 
vulnerability and low business acumen among others equally work against them. However, these 
factors can be worked on for the be erment of the women to reduce their passive response and 
reluctance to markets and exports. The strategy should employ poverty-focused approaches 
targe ng pastoralist areas as this would support and explicitly encourage herd growth among 
the poorer families, empowering them in the process; developing secondary infrastructure like 
roads, mobile phone communica ons to levels similar to the non-pastoral areas and development 
of markets where none exists. Easier access to traders offers reduced transac on costs and would 
also render trade monopolies less likely, making the poorer herders more bankable. Financial 
facili es should be tailored to their aspira ons, along with preven ng avoidable animal deaths 
with clear policies and appropriate veterinary services (Aklilu & Cately, 2009).
CONCLUSION
For women to benefit from livestock farming, the nature of support should be well defined to 
appreciate their makeup as the largest livestock farming labour force who perform the bulk of the 
work. It thus stands to note that empowered women have genera onal benefits that tap into the 
household, not usually the case with men. As a result, there exists a saying that if you educate a 
woman, you educate the en re village, to support what several studies have established. That said 
whatever ac ons are taken have to consider the impediments to women’s development without 
rocking cultural se ngs. It should also note the different needs women have. It calls for more 
involvement of women in the making and implementa on of these solu ons and policies to 
create prac cal resolu ons with far reaching results. 
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ABSTRACT
According to the 2009 African Governance Report (AGR II), by the United Na ons Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA), many democracies in Africa are suffering from an authoritarian 
hangover. Many African countries adopted the system of democracy because it enjoys global 
endorsement as the best form of government and panacea for underdevelopment. But it is a truism 
that development in Africa remains impeded. This is because many African leaders are ignorant 
and negligent of the philosophical principles upon which democracy is formed. This paper seeks 
to discuss, within an African framework, the link between democracy and development. The 
clamour for democracy all over the globe is not accidental. Those who go about agita ng for 
democracy are convinced that no society desirous of development can ignore democracy. The 
democra c experience of developed na ons lends credence to the truth of this claim. There is a 
close link between democracy and development. This is not to say that a country cannot develop 
without democracy, but where both exist, the outcomes are be er.
MEANING OF DEMOCRACY
Of Greek origin, the word 'democracy' is derived from two words, "demos" which means "the 
people" and "kra en" which connotes "to rule". Put together, it is "demokra a" which means 
"rule by the people".
Pericles - an Athenian Statesman in 431 BC provides an elaborate picture of this concept: “Our 
Cons tu on is named a democracy because it is in the hands not of the few but in the hands of the 
many. But our laws secure equal jus ce for all in their private disputes and our public opinion 
welcomes and honours every branch of achievements...” (Macridis, 1982).
In the modern era, democracy is defined as a system of government in which the whole eligible 
members of a state hold supreme power through their elected representa ves. A be er clarifica on 
can be derived from Abraham Lincoln's defini on of democracy as a government of the people, 
by the people and for the people.
Democracy has its fundamental principles, features or characteris cs. Various defini ons of 
democracy are formed from these fundamental features. The features include equality of men, 
individual rights, free exis ng poli cal par es, consensus or majority rule, separa on of power, 
checks and balances, the rule of law, freedom of the press and judicial autonomy. 
Equality of men
This is the fundamental tenet of democracy. It stresses that all human beings are born equal. In 
this sense, equality simply means equal opportunity for all and a rejec on of inherited poli cal 




Democracy considers the dignity and integrity of every individual as sacred and inviolable. These 
rights are the rights that the law accords to all individuals. They include the right to life, private 
and family life, freedom of expression and fair hearing.
Free Elec ons
This is another core feature of democracy. Free elec ons give the people the chance to choose 
good leaders of their choice. In line with democra c ideology, vo ng decisions are based on the 
rule of the majority. This implies that if only two contestants are involved in an elec on, the one 
who has more than half the number of votes cast becomes the winner. The principle of simple 
majority.
Existence of Poli cal Par es
This is a necessary feature of democracy. This would enable voters to vote for the poli cal par es 
they want in specific offices. In America, for instance, there are two main poli cal par es, the 
Republican and Democra c par es.
Majority rule, Minority Rights
According to Irish and Prothro, "the majority and minority rela ons in a free elec on are, when 
you stop to think about it, the most valuable aspects..." (Routeledge, Kegan and Paul, 1967). This 
feature points that the majority rule holds, yet the minority rights are protected.
Separa on of Power
According to Lord Acton, "all power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely". 
Separa on of power means that power is shared among the three arms of government; the 
execu ve, the legislature and the judiciary.
Checks and Balances
Ensuring a separa on of power means that the principle of checks and balances is provided for 
and prevents the abuse of enormous power by the various arms of government. Adhering to the 
principle of checks and balances is essen al to ensuring that no arm of government dominates 
power.
The Rule of Law
Respect for the rule of law by both the leaderships and the ci zenry is the basis and founda on 
of a prosperous democra c state. This would imply that no person is above the law.
Freedom of the Press
The press is described as the fourth estate of the realm of government behind the execu ve, 
legislature and the judiciary. Since the press is the means to a reliable "spotlight and microphone" 
in any government, there cannot be a true democracy without a free press. 
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Judicial Autonomy
This is referred to as "independence of the judiciary". It is the duty of the judiciary to protect 
the integrity of the law as enshrined in the cons tu on. The judiciary is the vital link and nexus 
in the uneasy but necessary rela ons between the execu ve arm and the legislature. Democracy 
therefore needs a judiciary that is courageous, impar al, resourceful, unbiased, reliable and above 
all, independent. 
A democracy that does not have the above features is not a true democracy.
DEVELOPMENT
The term development has no universally accepted defini on, yet it is an unavoidable datum of 
life. Many scholars have a empted to define the concept of development. For instance, Labret 
defines development as "the ascent of man, matura on, growth and crea vity of all human 
poten als achieved at the lowest possible cost in sacrificed values and human sufferings" (Marcel 
Onyibor, 2003).
An African philosopher, Pantaleon Iroegbu, also a empted a working defini on of development. 
For him “ development is the progressive unfolding of the inner poten als of a given reality. It 
is to de-envelop, that is, to bring out to light, the existen al, func onal and epistemic, which 
was enveloped, folded or hidden. As it applies to a people, development is the integra on of 
different givens: na onal, physical acquired and human, of a people towards the full working 
out, permanently and cumula vely, of their being as persons of their community and of their real 
produc vity” (Owerri, 1994).
Be it as it may, development is the growth or forma on and change of something over  me. It is 
the gradual growth, increase and change of a par cular phenomenon over  me. It must be about 
man because he is the agent and purpose of development.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT
Rich con nents tend to be more democra c than poor con nents. Understanding the link 
between democracy and development could be more crucial for policy making at the na onal and 
con nental levels. Besides giving ci zens more poli cal freedom, democracies are, on average, 
less likely to be at war with each other than dictatorships. A lack of democra c governance 
structure could prove an obstacle to sustainable development. 
In the United Na ons Secretary General's 1994 Agenda for Development, it is stated that: 
“Democracy and development are linked in fundamental ways. Because democracy provides the 
only long-term basis for managing compe ng ethnic, religious and cultural interests in a way 
that minimises the risk of violent internal conflict. Because democracy is a fundamental human 
right, the advancing of which is itself an important measure of development”  (UN, 1994). 
Democracy is an important way to reassure freedoms and is a vital requisite for the economic 
development of any con nent. Thus, this paper posits that developing and strengthening a 
democra c system is an essen al component of the process of development.
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WHY DEMOCRACY HAS FAILED IN AFRICA
Democracy has failed in Africa because African leaderships lack the moral courage to live up to 
its expecta ons. Characterised by greed, ignorance and negligence, many African leaders do not 
prac ce democracy in the light of the founda onal principles upon which democracy is formed. 
John Locke and other pro-democracy philosophers had based the ideals of democracy on the 
principles of discipline, tolerance, truth, nobility, restraint, jus ce, selflessness, self-control and 
equity. 
These principles have helped Europe and America develop. African leaders lack the moral 
courage to live up to expecta on; hence, they dri  from the path of democracy without difficulty 
to sa sfy their own whims and caprices, ending up prac sing pseudo-democracy.
WHAT AFRICA REQUIRES
Having studied the rela onship between democracy and development, it will be per nent to note 
that a democracy premised on the principles of selflessness, nobility, tolerance, truth, equality, 
jus ce, honesty, self-control and restraint, will promote the social, economic and poli cal 
development of Africa. 
Hence, Africa requires genuine operators of democracy. There is need for leaders with the 
moral courage to meet democra c expecta ons. Africa requires leaderships that will embrace 
true democracy and prac se it in the light of the solid founda onal principles upon which pro-
democra c scholars had based the ideals of democracy.   
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INTRODUCTION
African countries are limited in unifying themselves due to the boundaries and various requirements 
which hinder their free and perfect mobility, manifested in visa requirement, mul -currencies, 
different leadership, insecurity, unemployment, poor resource u lisa on and poor produc on.  
Leadership, perfect mobility and industrialisa on are the major sectors to Africa’s uniica on 
and prosperity. There is always the thinking that perhaps the means used by the imperialists to 
exploit Africa’s minerals and par  oning, that in return led to Europe’s industrialisa on, could 
be the very means to Africa’s unifica on, industrialisa on and becoming a first world con nent.
The effort to find a possible means of providing sustainable development and unifica on in 
Africa informed the decision to write this ar cle. It is about the history, uses, effects, benefits and 
descrip on of the railway system.
 
Today, Africa is facing a lot of poli cal leadership problems and corrup on mainly because 
the resources which were abundantly endowed to Africa were plundered through the railway 
development. Par  oning of Africa was also another tool deployed to make it impossible for 
Africans to relate and defend what belonged to them. This ar cle intends to show how the railway 
is Africa’s greatest tool to radical development and unifica on.
HISTORY OF THE RAILWAY
According to Wikipedia, rolling stock in railway transport systems generally suffers lower 
fric onal resistance than road vehicles, and the passenger and freight cars (carriages and wagons) 
can be coupled into longer trains. The opera on is carried out by a railway company, providing 
transport between train sta ons or freight customer facili es. Power is provided by locomo ves 
which either draw electric power from a railway electrifica on system or produce their own 
power, usually by diesel engines. Most tracks are accompanied by a signalling system. Railways 
are a safe land transport system when compared to other forms of transport. Railway transport is 
capable of high levels of passenger and cargo u liza on and energy efficiency, but is o en less 
flexible and more capital-intensive than road transport, when lower traffic levels are considered.
The oldest, man-hauled railways date back to the 6th century BC, with Periander, one of the 
Seven Sages of Greece, credited with its inven on. Rail transport blossomed a er the Bri sh 
development of the steam locomo ve as a viable source of its power in the 18th and 19th centuries. 
With steam engines, one could construct mainline railways, which were a key component of the 
Industrial Revolu on. Also, railways reduced the costs of shipping, and allowed for fewer lost 
goods, compared with water transport, which faced occasional sinking of ships. The change from 
canals to railways allowed for "na onal markets" in which prices varied very li le from city to 
city. The inven on and development of the railway in Europe was one of the most important 
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technological inven ons of the 19th century. In the United States, it is es mated that without 
railway system, GDP would have been lower by 7% in 1890.
BACKGROUND OF RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
During the 1870s, Africa was under imperialism. A lot of tools were used such as health centres, 
railway, religion, gi s, guns and poli cal arms to exploit Africa's minerals. When we analyse 
cri cally, they were used to facilitate the exploita on of minerals in the whole of Africa. And 
silently the railway played the major role since it was used to directly link the mines to the 
Africa’s coasts. 
Very li le informa on is known about the impact of railway contribu ons during the exploita on 
of Africa’s minerals by the western world. Except the slave commodity which was self- 
transpor ng, commodi es like gold, copper, coffee, co on, limestone, silver and many others 
were efficiently plundered by the use of the transporta on means of a railway. Tonnes of minerals 
were delivered at different coasts by the railway and this led to the industrialisa on of Europe, 
India and Britain. This is one of the major reasons behind their transforma on into "irst world" 
relying on cheap transporta on means and the presence of cheap raw materials from Africa. A er 
the successful plunder of Africa’s minerals, it was le  and abandoned. It is believed in some 
quarters that some of the raw materials that were mined from Africa are s ll in treasuries and 
stores abroad. It is no wonder that Europe, Britain and America prefer and consume mostly pure 
and quality products up to date. They set high standards because they have pure inputs.
This railway had unique advantages over other forms of transport such as the cheapest transport 
fares, maintenance and breakdowns costs compared to cars, aircra , and animals. In terms of 
haulage capacity, it was or is the best for moving bulky goods in large quan  es. In terms of 
accidents they were not expected and in any case, few injuries or damages were experienced due 
to their low speed. They were secure and very reliable in terms of safety and deliveries. They 
were not hindered by stops, traffic or weather.
Most, if not all countries in Africa, are connected by roads which are affected by trafic and 
associated with robbery terror, accidents causing extra payments, delays, loss of loved ones and 
valuable belongings. Airfreight, which is safer compared to road transport and  mely is very 
expensive to maintain and afford since Africa is s ll underdeveloped with a huge popula on that 
has a low income to spend even on basic needs. It is said that majority of the people in Africa 
spend less than a dollar each day.
USES AND EFFECTS OF AFRICAN INTER-CITY RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT
Currently in Africa, our rail system is facing low development and receiving inadequate a en on 
in terms of improvements that can promote perfect mobility in Africa. Not enough a en on 
is being paid to its possibili es and the outcomes of its deployment. This system should be 
developed so as to improve the lives and unity of people. This ar cle will a empt to show how 
this system will assist people living in Africa in a number of ways. Fully developing the railway 
system will lead to efficiency and effec veness which will increase resource u lisa on and 
reduce unemployment on the African con nent. The system will also s mulate specialisa on 
and quality output since systems and sectors (countries) will be linked by railway. 
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Developing the railway system will improve the health of many people by connec ng them to 
quality services. For instance, South Africa has one of the best health care services in Africa but 
accessing it by other na onali es is very expensive when the cost of transporta on is factored 
into the total cost of treatment. If the transport cost were to be lower from the recipient na on to 
South Africa then the medica on may be more affordable. 
Africa has developing countries which suffer from poor services like health care, take the example 
of Uganda. In situa ons like health emergencies, childbirth, transplants and even snake bites, 
people lose their lives to poor medical a en on. The public structure is limited with lack of 
equipment leading to the loss of very many lives. Doctors are not well paid and this hinders their 
efficiency and increases the occurrence of strike ac ons. The country's healthcare system also 
faces the problem of few technical personnel, so that even when equipment is available, there are 
only very few people skilled enough to operate them. In Uganda’s case, people have a poor a tude 
towards work so trying to improve any system calls for the importa on of skilled labour which 
is expensive. The development of railway will assist Ugandans and other na onali es to access 
quality health services in South Africa. This will reduce the death rate and gear development in 
Africa.
Besides health, another cri cal sector that will be improved is the agricultural sector. S ll using 
Uganda as a case study, the country's GDP relies heavily on agriculture. The main products of 
subsistence agriculture in Uganda include maize, Irish potato, orange, coffee, tomato, banana. 
These products are perishable and sensi ve to changes in weather. If the railway system is 
developed it would assist Uganda to profit greatly from easier sourced and cheaper inputs like 
fer lizer. Time will also be reduced to transport perishable crops to Sudan and other regions (it 
would normally take 1-2 weeks to reach the Sudanese market travelling by road, during which  me 
many of the crops would have become damaged or ro en). The risk of accidents, breakdowns and 
insecurity inherent in road transport will also be reduced. Crops can be sold at their normal prices 
when they are not ro en, damaged, or adversely affected by weather condi ons like extreme heat 
common with road transport. Sellers can thus make a decent profit and increase in GDP can be 
assured.  
Unlike in Uganda, Sudan and other East African countries, the film and entertainment industry 
is enjoying faster development in West African countries like Nigeria and Ghana. The film and 
entertainment industry can be used to boost tourism. Developing a func onal railway network 
across Africa will further promote this industry because its players would have easier and more 
affordable access to different loca ons, cultures and people. This will s mulate crea vity, create 
jobs, as well as promote and market the different African cultures, trends and fashion. It will help 
to project Africa in a posi ve light and improve the amount and quality of informa on available 
on the con nent's unique features and desires. It will also help to increase the apprecia on for 
African civilisa on, thereby reducing the influence of western civilisa on on the lives of young 
Africans.
Educa on in Africa is another sector that will be posi vely affected by inter-city railway system in 
Africa. Uganda for example has one of the best educa onal systems but is faced with a number of 
issues such as strikes and delayed salaries of teachers. Once there is perfect mobility, teachers and 
other workers would be able to offer their services to countries where there is be er remunera on 
and be er working condi ons. Students would have a broader choice of where to receive formal 
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educa on and academic materials will easily be delivered and accessed. 
An inter-city railway system can serve as an instrument in the unifica on of African countries. 
Infrastructures like an interconnected railway network will be affordable, fast, reliable and 
sustainable, allowing Africans to move conveniently from one country to another. Unfortunately, 
such infrastructure is s ll underdeveloped, a major manifesta on of poor governance, under-
u lisa on of resources, increased unemployment among others. 
It is recommended that Africa develop an inter-country railway infrastructure. The system 
currently available on the con nent was developed on a closed system basis, for example, 
na onally. Unifying all the African countries through railways would be quite hard if the system 
is not opened up through inter-country infrastructure development. 
In addi on to the above, insecurity and conflicts between and among Africans such as xenophobia 
in South Africa, recent conflicts between Zambians and Kenyans, terrorism in Kenya and Uganda 
by Africans are all due to boundaries and fear of insecurity as Africans. 
In the developed countries of the Western world, infrastructural developments that can further 
propagate industrialisa on are given first priority. For Africa, to be fully unified, a railway system 
connec ng all the major ci es and towns must be developed. This will reduce the bo lenecks 
created by na onal boundaries and it will promote industrialisa on with resultant effects like 
increased resource u lisa on, job crea on and massive reduc on in unemployment rate in the 
whole of Africa. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE INTER-CITY RAILWAY SYSTEM
An inter-city railway system will aim at connec ng all the major towns and ci es in Africa. It will 
be developed with upgraded technology which will make it very fast and reliable, enabling quick 
access to different ci es and na ons. It will have fixed schedules and huge capacity, enabling 
it to transport large numbers of people per li . The system’s lanes will be designed to have 
4x4 matrixes such that there is transport in different direc ons (West, East, South and North) 
simultaneously. This will assist the system to access and cover every part of Africa in a frac on 
of the  me that other systems might take. It will also be operated in a way that allows it to be an 
effec ve and efficient transport system in Africa.
OBJECTIVES
1. To improve the transporta on and movements of people on the African con nent.
2. To increase resource u lisa on on the con nent.
3. To lead to industrialisa on of the African con nent.
4. To empower different sectors in Africa to interlink and expand.
5. To avail informa on to decision makers and other par es.
BENEFITS AND OUTCOMES OF RAILWAY SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
1. It is a cheap means of transport that can accommodate the movement of low income earners 
from one country to another.
2. It is easy to maintain.
3. It will interlink all the African countries which will lead to Africa’s unifica on.
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4. It will lead to increased resource u lisa on which increases jobs, output and profits.
5. It will assist thousands to access quality services like healthcare, tourism and entertainment.
6. It will also help to improve governance in Africa.
7. Transporta on in Africa will be enhanced.
8. Tourism and adventure will be promoted and improved.
9. It will lead to be er u liza on of  me and resources in Africa.
In conclusion, the development of the African Inter-city Railway Connec on System will be a 
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ABSTRACT
The scourge of terrorism has become an interna onal crisis a er the 9/11 a acks in America. 
Terrorism has deeply encroached its claws in Africa on the premise of socio-economic challenges 
along the clash of civiliza ons. In countries such as Nigeria, Somalia, Central African Republic, 
Kenya and the Maghreb region, terrorism is a threat to peace and security, compounded by spiraling 
youth unemployment rates, the youth bulge, porous borders, poverty, arms prolifera on, weak 
governments, economic problems among other challenges. It is yet to be seen how Africans will 
unite to deal with this threat to security on the con nent given the above men oned problems. 
At the same  me, one will assess the ramifica ons, advantages, and pi alls of the youth bulge 
and foreign interven on to curb the spread of terrorism towards obtaining sustainable peace and 
security on the con nent.
INTRODUCTION
In this youth-dominated epoch, terrorism in Africa has become a vantage point to express 
disgruntlement and is a topical issue to the extent that scholars are a ribu ng this phenomenon 
to a plethora of factors; yet terrorism is as old as mankind itself. Many conflict theories have been 
suggested to explain this crisis which has become an existen al threat to humanity. However, the 
most earth-breaking theory which has tried to explain the salience of terrorism is the renowned 
20th-century ‘Clash of Civiliza ons’ by Samuel Hun ngton. This theory seems more prescient 
and accurate showing how discord between civiliza ons is becoming the greatest threat to world 
security, stability and peace in light of the recent terrorist ac vi es in Kenya, Nigeria, South 
Sudan, Mali and the Central African Republic and the possibility of emula on of such events in 
Malawi and Tanzania in the near future against which this theory is going to be tested. The author 
will also endeavour to prescribe solu ons for this scourge.
Keywords:  Clash of Civiliza ons, Youth, Terrorism, Religion, Violence, and Conflict
The ‘Clash of Civiliza ons’ is a theory that was formulated by Samuel Hun ngton (1993) ensuing 
the end of The Cold War and the triumph of Liberalism over Socialism. Neo-liberal scholars such 
as Francis Fukuyama traversed it as a moment marking the ul mate end of conflict in the world 
because liberal democracy had prevailed over dictatorship and tyranny in the world. Just about 
the same  me, Hun ngton differed and proposed yet another theory that conflict was going to 
be complex and dynamic because it was going to be rooted in culture and not the conven onal 
sources such as ideological fraterni es. The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of yet 
another conflict. The thrust of Hun ngton’s (1993) argument was that “the great divisions 
among mankind and the domina ng source of conflict will be cultural. The principal conflicts of 
global poli cs will occur between na ons and groups of different civiliza ons. The fault lines 
Tendaishe Tlou  
pg |063
between civiliza ons will be the ba le lines of the future along ethnical, gender, racial and most 
importantly, religious differences. ”
This quota on asserts that the aspect of ‘civiliza ons rallying’ is the central element in mobilisa on 
for a common cause, being the impetus for conflict including terrorism as it will be shown in this 
paper. However, I argue that terrorism is perpetuated by socio-economic challenges faced by 
youths along cultural differences. The means jus fies the ends.
There is not one unanimously agreed defini on of terrorism. However, for the purposes of this 
study, Schmidt and Jongman (2005) are of the view that terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method 
of repeated or simultaneous violent ac ons employed by semi-clandes ne individuals, groups or 
state actors mainly for idiosyncra c, criminal or poli cal reasons whereby the direct targets of 
violence are not the main targets. This implies that the violent tac cs employed by terrorists are 
meant to convey a message to the government which will be accused of different laws at different 
 mes. In the same vein, Crenshaw (1995) maintains that terrorism is a" conspira onal type of 
violence calculated to alter the a tudes and behaviour of a par cular mul tude or audience, 
a government or a community, conveyed through the media so that the intended message is 
appropriately put across."   (Igna us, 1992).
According to Lederach (1995) conflict is an intrinsic and inevitable disagreement between two 
or more par es that is perpetuated by incompa ble interests or goals, dissa sfied human needs 
(poor service delivery), unequal and suppressive poli cal-social structures (structural violence) 
than can be resolved or can lead to (direct) violence.
Perhaps the importance of the Clash of Civiliza ons is that its thrust is religion and ethnicity which 
are arguably at the epicentre of most terrorist movements and violence in Africa and abroad. It is 
interes ng to note that religious clashes are the most obvious examples of the ‘clash’ traversed by 
Hun ngton (1993) and it is presen ng the world with great challenges not in the fashion of those 
incurred in the past due to an ever increasing youth cohort. Coincidentally, terrorism illustrates or 
provides evidence of compe  on and conflict between contradic ng social, economic, poli cal 
and cultural ideals (Kristoff, 1997) to the extent of inci ng senseless bloodshed and killings.
Thousands of people are dying on a daily basis and ironically, youths are at the forefront in the 
spread of terrorism tradi onally in the Middle East and now Africa. This also shows how the 
state is losing its relevance in maintaining na onal security. In the face of globaliza on, iden ty 
poli cs is prevalent par cularly between young Muslims and non-Muslims, especially Chris ans 
each becoming the other’s "other". Although these elements have been the cause of conflict 
between humans throughout history, the radicaliza on of religious beliefs accompanied by an 
ever increasing youth bulge have since intensified the suspicion, hatred and animosity between 
Muslims and the rest, hence the term "Islamophobia".
The dynamism and intensifica on of youth Islamic fundamentalism are the drivers of many 
rela ve terrorist a acks, yet the causes are yet to be thoroughly explored. Youths as far as South 
Africa are fleeing their homes trying to go to Syria to join the Islamic State (ISIS). Terrorists 
tend also to be vicious and ruthless since fundamental issues of iden ty are at stake, however, 
this fana sm is salient among the youth. Although tradi onally, rela ons between Chris ans 
and Muslims have been stormy, the current confronta on between them suggests that the ‘clash’ 
has apparently reached its peak on the basis of a rapidly growing, energe c, over-ambi ous but 
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unemployed youthful populace. Esposito (1992) is of the view that their (Chris anity and Islam) 
historical dynamics o en ind the two communi es in compe  on and locked in a deadly combat 
for power, land and souls. For example, the Al-Shabaab (which in literal transla on means the 
youth) and Boko Haram want to establish theocracies based on fundamental Sharia law which 
they perceive to be able to address their socio-economic needs and which they perceive their 
governments to be failing to resolve, in Kenya, Somalia and Northern Nigeria respec vely, 
bringing to the fore why they are commi ng atroci es in all the three countries.
I explore the theme that the ‘needs’ behind these terrorist movements can no longer be disregarded 
because they are far beyond the red line given the deplorable crimes against humanity they 
are commi ng. Hence, in the defini ons of terrorism, the act is labelled as idiosyncra c, 
conspira onal or a crime to convey a par cular message to change the a tudes or behaviours of 
the one intended, in pursuit of (unrealis c) social, poli cal and financial goals with the objec ve 
of ins lling anarchy, fear and panic through violence in a bid to be no ced. Hence, the axiom 
‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.’ In my view, the string of terrorist rampages 
in Africa since 2010 has sparked pervasive condemna on amongst African popula ons with 
unequaled solu ons to effec vely deal with this scourge. The recurring a acks also show that 
over the years, Boko Haram has gained confidence, expanded to Chad and Cameroon and is 
adamant to con nue making demands to these countries’ governments.
Recurring abduc ons and violence have put terrorism in a posi on of strength. In my opinion, this 
renewed confidence has given more youths an a acking impetus that their ideals can no longer be 
confined to, for example Northern Nigeria alone, but to the rest of the country and in due course 
these terrorist a acks might spread to the rest of the region. The more they are not listened to, 
the more they spread. This possibility must not be undermined because unemployed youths are 
increasingly becoming disgruntled, expanding in numbers and governments are failing to contain 
them, let alone curb their violent ac vi es. My view is that if more youths are empowered, the 
lesser they will see the need to join terrorist movements.
The terrorist scourge resonates that youth poverty is the cause in light of the exponen al progress 
made by smaller terrorist groups in forging  es with the rich Al-Qaeda and ISIS which guarantee 
youths with both strategic and financial resources. The fight between the West and terrorists is 
compounded by the fact that the former does not want to relinquish its so-called ‘war on terror’ 
whilst the la er’s growth is generated by large numbers of both educated but unemployed and 
disaffected youths who become recruits to fundamental Islamist causes. In my view, this statement 
implies that the West is actually playing into the hands of Al-Qaeda and ISIS which agitates 
the forma on of an Islamic caliphate throughout the world so that the West, in its delusional 
objec ve to end terrorism by interven on, is actually deploying troops and conveying massive 
financial resources to different parts of the world un l it bleeds to bankruptcy, is weakened and 
forced to withdraw from all regions, especially America, a country which Islamic youths blame 
for their problems.  For example, deploying troops in Nigeria, Kenya, and the Maghreb is exactly 
what terrorists want so that youths ind a reason to join terrorist cells and fight. Upon joining, 
youths are promised financial gains so that they can take care of their families.
On the lip side of religious fundamentalism, terrorism is grounded in perpetua ng fear. Barber 
(2001) is of the view that fear is terrorism’s only weapon. He con nues to argue that fear is a 
far more potent weapon against those who live in ‘hope and prosperity’ than those who live in 
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‘despair with nothing to lose.’ In this case, the vic m becomes the perpetrator. Terrorists ins ll 
fear by ins ga ng violence in its en rety which explains their unwavering presence on media 
pla orms before and a er a acks. Aziz (1993) raises the ante by arguing that ba les for Islam 
are not won through the gun, but by striking fear into the heart of the (perceived) enemy; fear 
that youths are constantly living in, (imposed by socio-economic challenges) and the fear of the 
unknown, which ‘jus fies’ striking fear back in the hearts of others.
The African Union must an cipate and proac vely act against the emula on of similar incidences 
in Malawi, Ghana and Tanzania where there is a considerable concentra on and rapidly growing 
number of young Muslims, Chris ans and poverty. There have already been some reports of 
youth violence along religious lines in Zanzibar. A larger segment of Africa’s popula on is 
between the ages of twenty (20) to thirty five (35) amoun ng to 65%. This may, therefore, present 
a case in which alarming numbers of youths are vagabond and des tute (Peters, 2011). This 
increases the probability of contempla on by many youths to oust their governments by staging 
terrorist a acks. Annually, youths in this age group are increasingly taking part in violent protests 
and voluntarily joining terrorist movements, a cause for concern following the Arab Springs. 
Outstanding examples include the recent capture and intercep on by Kenyan authori es, of a 
university student who was allegedly radicalised because she was promised university tui on 
assistance and medical interns who were in the process of manufacturing biological bombs for 
anthrax a ack in exchange for "good" jobs a er comple on of their a achments (Winsor, 2016).
To curb terrorism, youth energy has to be redirected to posi ve outcomes and their ideas 
and needs have to be taken into considera on. I am of the view that Islamic fundamentalism 
is the misdirec on of energy and radicalisa on of religion which is as old as mankind itself. 
Historically, both Chris ans and Muslims have been wrongfully massacred for one fundamental 
reason or the other, but ethical people have always condemned this. This presents the world with 
an opportunity to work hand-in-hand with peace loving Chris an and Islamic people that have 
dissociated themselves from terrorist movements such as the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, and Boko 
Haram. Tradi onally, all religions co-existed despite their challenges. In Tanzania and Malawi, 
there are millions of both Muslims and Chris ans. However, there has never been protracted 
religious violence since  me immemorial.
For example, in December 2015 there was a cohort of Muslims  during the Mandera bus a ack 
in Kenya, who stood up for Chris an bus passengers under siege and stopped a massacre by 
saying "kill us all or let them (Chris ans) go" (The Independent Reporter, 2016). The protagonist 
Salah Farah who sustained bullet wounds during an alterca on with Al-Shabaab militants died in 
January 2016. He died because he refused to be separated from and tried to save, Chris ans. He is 
a true epitome of a ‘brother’s keeper.’ This kind of a tude save lives and presents an opportunity 
for peace within the clash of civilisa ons. It must be borne in mind that most Muslims are not 
radical and they do not jus fy what terrorist novices are doing.
No religion celebrates the killing of people such as the beheading of twelve journalists in Libya 
by the ISIS (Al-jazeera, 2015) or killing of humanitarian workers by Al-Shabaab in Somalia. 
These are just overzealous youths who see no value in humanity and are pursuing self-interests. 
I vehemently argue that if fundamentalism can be created it can also be disintegrated through 
peace educa on in the same way draconian and incomprehensible ideologies such as Fascism 
and Nazism propounded by Mussolini and Hitler respec vely, were condemned in the build-up 
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towards the infamous 2nd World War. War on terror and using gigan c military firepower is 
not the answer; it only pushes the world on the brink of a 3rd World War. Humanity will only 
be doing what terrorists expect of them when governments order and escalate bombings. This 
century has seen the world making posi ve strides in peace and human security which entails that 
terrorist violence has no place in this world. Farah’s gesture should be an example to the world 
to co-exist as one community and promote religious harmony and tolerance. Humanity prevailed 
before, it will prevail again.
I argue that most learned youths know that violence is detrimental to infrastructure and the 
economy; hence they prefer to engage in dialogue, diplomacy and nego a ons. I argue that 
many youths now believe in peaceful transi ons than the primi ve use of violence because it is 
retrogressive e.g in America, Nigeria, China, India and other States which extensively promote 
the civil society, infrastructural development, the music industry, sports, entrepreneurship, real 
estate, tourism, manufacturing, science and technology due to the increasingly shrinking space 
in the tradi onal industries. In the new millennium, high youth popula ons are now viewed 
as cheap and readily available labour that can be divided towards development (World Bank, 
2006). Hence, if the State-youth rela onship is carefully and strategically harnessed it can lead to 
posi ve than disastrous outcomes.       
The world must know that it is ba ling with an idea that was born out of human disgruntlement 
and was formulated many centuries ago. This must also be countered by yet another powerful 
idea. In line with Agenda 2063 that by 2020 all guns must be silenced in Africa, terrorism must be 
curbed through a pervasive and well coordinated peace educa on, socio-economic development, 
and youth empowerment programmes. An idea cannot be defeated through the barrel of a gun. 
Guerrilla warfare employed by terrorists is some sort of a ri on strategy that seeks to divide 
humanity. In the same vein, Rapoport (1984) argues that out of his study of what he terms ‘holy 
terror’, religion provides the only jus fica on for terrorism and in my view it must be used to 
create opportuni es for peace because it unites us all.
CONCLUSION
An analysis of the events characterizing Africa in this dispensa on illuminates the reality of 
the threat of terrorism on the con nent given the considerable concentra on of unemployed 
youths, Muslims, and Chris ans. Therefore, African leaders, policy makers, and researchers need 
to be pragma c and proac ve by formula ng interven ons to create harmony between religious 
fana sm and to address youth challenges before the con nent evolves into yet another Middle 
East. Given the fragile poli cal and socio-economic problems in Africa, the con nent cannot 
afford yet another cycle of violent conflicts spawned by religious differences as this threatens to 
divide it further. Africa needs to take advantage of the lessons it has obtained from the events in 
the Middle East, Kenya, and Nigeria. Negligence and ignorance are the last things that Africans 
need on the con nent, but coopera on and pragma sm are the only way to tackle terrorism 
sooner rather than later. 
pg |067
REFERENCES  
Al-Jazeera. (2015). Breaking News : ISIS beheads 12 Journalists in ba le for Libya’s Sirte. 
Aljazeera, 06/04/15.
Barber, B.R. (2001). Fear’s Empire. New York: W.W Norton and Company.
Crenshaw, M. (1995). The Logic of Terrorism. New York: SAGE Books.
Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism. USA: Columbia University Press.
 
Hun ngton, S. (1993). The Clash of Civilisa ons. Journal of Interna onal Affairs, 73, 3.
Igna us, D. (1992). Islam in the West’s sight: The wrong crusade. The Washington Post, USA.
Lederach, J.P. (1997). Preparing for Peace Across Cultures. New York: Syracruse University 
Press.
Peters, K. (2011). War and Crisis in Sierra Leone.  London: Cambridge University Press.
Rapoport, O. (1984). Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in three religious tradi ons. Poli cal Science 
Review , 78, 3.
Schmidt, A. and Jongman, A. (2005). Poli cal Terrorism. Piscataway: Transac on Publishers.
The Independent Reporter. (2016). Muslim man dies a er protec ng chris an bus passengers 
from Al-Shabaab terror a ack in Kenya. The Independent, 20/01/16.
The World Bank. (2006). The role of youths in development. World Bank, Washington DC.
Winsor, M. (2016). ISIS in Kenya: Police foil alleged anthrax a ack by ISIS linked medics, 
05/03/16.
pg |068
ETHNICITY AS A SYNOPSIS OF AFRICA’S 
UNDER-DEVELOPMENT; WAY FORWARD  
Pwakim Jacob Choji




Ethnicity has been differently defined but for the sake of our focus, it is a situa on of internal 
instability of a person in which he/she manifests his/her inability to have a good rela onship 
internally with himself/herself, others and God, which develops and snowballs into ethnic 
pandemonium1. Invariably, one of the ways of exhibi ng this internal uncertainty is in common 
differences exhibited due to ethnic diversi es; and because we so want to move into our safety 
zone, we begin to see our ethnic group as not just being superior but longing for protec on and 
advancement of territory. It is at this point that conflict begins because different people possess 
incompa ble values, needs and interests and have different ways of achieving them 2. The ethnic 
na onalism that has being spo ed in the above statements is summed in the defini on which 
states that it is a situa on in which the rela onship between members of one ethnic group and 
another, or generally amongst ethnic groups in a mul  polity (such as Guinea, Tanzania, Liberia, 
Nigeria and many African countries) is characterized by a lack of cordiality, heightened mutual 
suspicions and fears, by quarrelsomeness and a tendency towards violent confronta ons 3. 
In contemporary  mes, we hear pronouns like: I, mine, our, theirs, my tribal man, my language 
woman, my towns man, etc. forming the crux of describing the “we” versus the “them” which 
o en make people to only get interested in things that affect the “we” group to which they belong 
while they o en do not get bothered about whatever happens to the “them” group 4.  
Interes ngly, it is important to note that the original usage of the word ethnicity was not divisive 
but a way to celebrate the beauty in people's diverse cultures. It is meant to define the characters of 
ethnic groups to know more about each other and what each stands for but again as stated above, 
it's meaning has been basterdized to suit the aspira on of divisive poli cians whose ac ons have 
given prominence to the newly metamorphosed word which reflects more of nega vity. This new 
meaning of the word ethnicity is making many countries especially the developing ones to face 
internal instability from the processes of poli ciza on of the issue of ethnicity and ethniciza on 
of poli cs 5, stalling development as evident in Burudi, Rwanda, Liberia, Nigeria, Somali and of 
recent Sudan.
PREDISPOSING FACTORS TO ETHNICITY
As we move into understanding how ethnicity impacts on the development of na ons especially 
the African society, it is important that we conduct a prognosis of factors that are said to influence 
individuals or groups in the society into promo ng the concept. It has been acknowledged that 
social mobiliza on of people in a democra c society, existence of a pool of symbols conno ng 
dis nc veness of a people, selec on, standardiza on and transmission of such pool of symbols 
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in communi es by leadership and a par cular ethnic group being a reference point in rela on to 
whom a sense of rela ve depriva on (real or imaginary) is aggregated 6 are all seen as promo ng 
factors to ethnicity in communi es especially those with weak social ins tu ons. In Africa, these 
factors are majorly the means of iden fica on, which either takes one close to common wealth 
or the contrary, which makes those at the advantage to promote it while those at the disadvantage 
with regards to popula on, to disregard it. 
In a more explicit manner as stated above, elite contesta on for poli cal power to capture states 
which is characterized by cut-throat compe  on in a sort of zero-sum game manner on the altar of 
ethnic mobiliza on and ethno-religious and communal iden  es have created a lot of insecurity 
among ethnic na onals in the country 3 thereby calling for ethnic na onalism. People of a 
par cular ethnic group feel the importance of mobilizing support for their ethnic group because 
they stand at risk of marginaliza on and ex nc on on the extreme when they do not do it. Also, 
mass poverty has been spo ed as a pre-disposing factor closely linked to poli cal mobiliza on. 
This o en condi ons the minds and a tudes of people thereby making them suscep ble to elite 
manipula on and mobiliza on. The elites use differences in culture as a dividing line in other to 
achieve their vision  ed to poli cal aspira on. 
Systemic failure is also one of the factors that have made ethnicity to thrive in most African 
socie es. As states become unable to sa sfy basic needs of the people due to bad leadership, 
the poor people in-turn withdraw from the collec ve goals of the state into ethnic and religious 
cocoons with high level sensi vity to the roles of those they regard as “them” in their perceived 
marginaliza on and immisera on 7. This failure is used by the poli cians as an entry point 
especially in states with weak ins tu on as stated elsewhere in the paper. 
Fear of ethnic imperialism is one of the major factors that have caused ethnicity. People have 
developed all manner of defense mechanisms in a way of protec ng themselves from being 
annihilated by another ethnic group which may be drawn by past experiences. Explaining further, 
a professor at the University of Belgrade stated that, ethnic conflict is caused by the "fear of 
the future", lived through the past 8. This is because ethnic champions through their vantage 
posi ons mortgage the state system to the benefit of their people which o en goes a long way in 
re-enforcing ethnicity either by the benefi ng communi es or vic mized communi es. 
These and many other factors have widened the scope of ethnicity in the country which are pointers 
to where we can all start from if we must get it right, otherwise, we con nue to be a con nent in 
perpetual antagonism of each other, tampering not just with interpersonal rela onships but 
also leading to the loss of lives and property thereby promo ng underdevelopment that hitherto 
characterises the African con nent.
EFFECTS OF ETHNICITY ON DEVELOPMENT 
Due to our different desire for ethnic interests as against na onal interest, people have become 
entangled in a fight of "all against all." They play the role of a parasite to the na on with each 
ethnic na onality taking a bite from the na onal cake rather than contribu ng to its growth. 
We have refused to align to the progressive life style where people work together to ensure 
that the center holds. Our socie es have become common examples of instability, chaos and 
underdevelopment as a result of ethnic na onalism which is expressed through militancy, 
economic sabotage and poli cal propaganda. Today, people are killed, proper es are destroyed, 
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hate speeches are promoted against one another  in other to show our disgust for the crea vity 
of God who decided to make us either Berom, Tutsi, Hutu, Swali, Tiv, Idoma, Ntonkon, Fulani, 
Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa, etc. As a result of ethnicity, people have con nued to promote homogenous 
se lements which again breed insecurity while stalling development. For instance, we have the 
“no go” areas syndrome in communi es that have experienced one form of violent conflict or the 
other. Very important to development is the fact that sharing of ideas is limited and this can be 
seen in difference of development between rural areas were homogenous habita on exist and big 
ci es where mul culturalism is prominent.   
It is unfortunate that many government appointments are made based on religious or ethnic 
grounds, pu ng meritocracy in oblivion. This is affec ng the development of states within the 
con nent. People see occupying public space at whatever level as empowerment rather than 
service to the na on. Remarkably, the employment of a par cular person from a certain ethnic 
or religious group is celebrated while the person is mandated to promote ethnicity in office. This 
makes it difficult to get the best of hands to manage the public sector because mundane prac ces 
have overtaken objec vity which is against global prac ce. 
Ethnicity can lead to lingering suspicion among different groups which limits tendencies for trust 
and even corpora on. Par es are hardly able to access new informa on for common good or be 
recep ve to the ideas of perceived opposing groups in other not to place others at an advantage. 
Minds are so crowded with assump ons and prejudices that they are usually not willing to allow 
anything to change even if it is to their benefit. Any community with such an experience is at the 
verge of a violent erup on, perpetually insecure and unstable. Any minor disagreement may push 
things beyond precipice 3. They will hardly be willing to join forces to discuss the progress of 
the society or a na on and if they are compelled, they will be more interested in protec ng their 
interest as stated above.
We must come to a realisa on that ethnicity and many other factor have actually undermined 
many states' capacity to discharge fundamental obliga ons of a modern state to its ci zens 
such as socio-economic provisions, guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms, ensuring 
law and order and facilita ng peace and stability which are all pre-condi ons for growth and 
development3. Leaders have failed to deliver and may not even be ques oned because they are 
hiding under ethnic canopies for protec on from accountability seekers. Governance has become 
a turn by turn syndrome with everyone wai ng for his/her turn to perpetrate impunity rather than 
to deliver.  
To round off this discussion, at this level, we must be reminded that mul -ethnicity has become 
a socio-poli cal phenomenon in most civil socie es with inter-ethnic cleavages, compe  on and 
conflict seemingly acquiring a higher intensity. We must be very conscious of our environment 
to avoid a situa on where we will be deeply rooted in the war of all against all contrary to the 
tenants of development adopted by global na ons.
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This paper will be incomplete if we discuss the nomenclature of the concept without proffering 
some recommenda ons which are expected to serve as a ladder upon which we can build a 
society of tolerance, love and sustainable development as Africans because we are Africans.
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In the first instance, we must all be reminded that our diversi es are conscious efforts of God, 
evident in the variety of liturgies and the spiritual es in the diverse theological expressions 
and even in the variety of expressions of the same doctrines. These doctrines complements one 
another  showing that as a result of the communion with God Himself, diversity is not supposed 
to divide us but serves to bring glory to God for his gi s especially as Chris ans 9.
There should be the entrenchment of the rule of law as s pulated in the cons tu on where 
everyone is equal before it. This will fight group insecurity arising from fear of ethnic imperialism 
and unhealthy compe  on as stated above. To add to this, there is the need for government at all 
levels to fashion out a leadership that will reflect the interest of all based on everyone’s needs and 
not a projec on of the interest of another especially when it endangers others. This will go a long 
way to show that government is impar al 3.
Also, the extent and magnitude of poverty in the con nent must be addressed so that the right 
a tudes will be entrenched among people to avoid instances where they are easily mobilized 
along such vices based on who can pay more. 
We also have to cul vate the habit of interac onal habita on in our communi es. This will help 
us appreciate the beauty in each other’s culture as a result of interac on and informa on sharing. 
This should also be backed by consistent inter-cultural dialogue in every community that is 
mul cultural in nature so that conflict elements are discussed at that level to avoid misinforma on. 
There is the need for value reorienta on among people especially the too young and very elderly. 
This will become like an an dote to cure greedy and selfish disposi on that has been built over 
a period or that is about to be built. It will guide people into becoming more accommoda ng, 
tolerant, and harmonious in their rela onships and coexistence. 
We are reminded today that the role religious bodies play is of great implica on on not just their 
immediate environments but also the society as a whole. This is because, as Africans we are 
assumed to be religious and the religious leaders have great impact on their followers whether 
young or old.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, people are challenged to always see themselves as one single race regardless of 
accidents of births which are always inconsequen al to who people later become in life from an 
objec ve point of view. This will help Africa grow from a con nent of war to that of love and 
unity for sustainable development. It is necessary that we remind people that our differences are 
smaller than we expect and our hearts larger than we imagined. Only if we first admire each other 
without border, though tribe and tongue may differ, because in brotherhood and sisterhood we 
stand, will our society grow because variety is the spice of life. We must be able to reflect more 
on the advantages of collec ve living in-spite of our ethnicity rather than those things that have 
divided us thereby dehumanizing each other. In the words of pope John Paul II in Asia in 1986, “ if 
we fail to accept one another with love and as a common journey to a lo y des ny, if we realise 
other people are our brothers and sisters… it is either we learn to walk together in peace and 
harmony or we dri  apart and ruin ourselves and others. ”
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SOCIAL INNOVATION AND SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: 
INTEGRATING MENTAL HEALTH INTERVENTIONS
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OVERVIEW
An es mated 450 million people suffer from a mental or behavioural disorder. According to 
WHO’s Global Burden of Disease 2001, 3% of the years lived with disability (YLD) are due to 
neuropsychiatric disorders, a further 2.1% to inten onal injuries (WHO, 2013). Only 1% of the 
medical doctors and 4% of the nurses were specialized in psychiatry. The last revision of the 
mental health legisla on was in 1964. The legisla on basically focused on the custodial care of 
the mentally ill persons and is an an quated kind of law that has been overtaken by events. One 
percent (1%) of health care expenditures by the government health department was specifically 
directed towards mental health in primary care. Despite developing Uganda's mental health policy 
in 2000, it was s ll at dra  level. The policy included the following components: (1) developing 
community mental health services, (2) downsizing large mental hospitals, (3) developing a mental 
health component in primary healthcare, (4) human resources, (5) involvement of users and their 
families, (6) advocacy and promo on, (7) human rights protec on of users, (8) equity of access to 
mental health services across different groups, (9) Monitoring system. Of the overall expenditure 
on mental health, 55% was directed towards the Na onal Mental Hospital. The whole popula on 
(100%) had free access (of at least 80%) to essen al psychotropic medicines. This is based on the 
fact that medica on is provided at no cost in all public health facili es. For those who pay out of 
pocket, 37% of the daily minimum wage was needed to pay for one day an psycho c medica on, 
while 7% of daily wage was needed to pay for one day dose of an depressant medica on. Mental 
disorders were not covered in the current social insurance schemes (WHO, 2013). Moreover, 
goal three (3) of the Sustainable Development Goals was good health and wellness.
IMI Background Informa on
Mental health was everyone’s business –individuals, families, employers, educators, and all 
communi es who all had to play their part.  The idea of forming a mul -disciplinary, mul -
ideological and interac ve in union, using vital mental exercises and communica ve human 
behavior to create healthy rela onships that turn out to be sources of mental wellness emerged in 
2005, was documented in 2006 and was registered in 2015 as a community-based organisa on. 
Around this  me, Integrated Mental-Health Ini a ve (IMI) focused on social and environmental 
advocacies. Eight (8) years later, IMI accelerated its work towards the realisa on of its vision, 
mission and goal to most concrete levels with the “ac on now” drive amidst steadily rising 
cases of mental illness, breakdown of social fibre, ecological breakdown, and humanly induced 
elimina on of life systems. It aimed at iden fying and pooling together underu lized mental 
health professionals, allied prac  oners, and stakeholders to foster the wellbeing of communi es 
through the mindful use of ecological resources of every nature. It targeted gradua ng from a 
local ini a ve to a na onal and interna onal non-government organisa on in 3 to 6 years. In all 
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its opera ons, IMI followed system’s perspec ve, in which mul plicity of ideals interact without 
bias for the benefit of each other and everything (or everybody) connected to it. It linked human-
problem areas, communi es, and their leadership through informa on gathering, evalua on and 
re-evalua on, diagnoses, and therapy design and administra on using its established network of 
healthy corps, volunteers, interns and experiences from collabora ng ins tu ons. The ini a ve 
was and is s ll based in Jinja, Plot 15, Narambhai Road and it has had partnership arrangements 
with Makerere University, Restless Development, Uganda Buddhist Center, John Paul II Jus ce 
and Peace Center, Na onal Associa on of Professional Environmentalists and individual 
consultants. IMI joined sister agencies and affected communi es in realizing local beneits from 
their local environment that in many ways cause mental healing, beginning with its own staff 
who are our primary agents of change.
IMI GEOGRAPHY
Jinja District has an area of 767.7 sq km of which 701.9 sq km is land and the rest (65.8 Sq 
km) is covered by water bodies. The district is subdivided into 3 coun es namely, Butembe, 
Kagoma and Jinja Municipality. There are 11 sub-coun es, 46 parishes and 381 villages. Jinja 
Municipality has three sub-coun es and 55 villages.  It is the tourist capital of East Africa and the 
second largest city in Uganda, located in the East of the country, 80 Kilometers from Kampala, 
and with a popula on of 491,000. Its major hospital is the Jinja referral hospital. The IMI is 
located on Narambhai Road, Plot No. 15.
NEEDS STATEMENT
The predominantly clinical and ins tu onal management of mental health problems addressed 
fully-grown symptoms that were comorbid in nature yet needed diagnosis. Rapid assessments 
were inadequate to arrive at the righ ul case for management, which, like an onion, several layers 
had to be peeled off to arrive at the founda onal concern for all others that are physically and 
behaviorally seen. There was a ques on of who informed who in the diagnosis of our professional 
biases and pre-professional beliefs, which interfered with the administra on of psychotherapy. 
While many mental health prac  oners suffered the tempta ons to regard their religions as the 
model element in therapy administra on, healing too suffered along the course of trying to support 
recovery.  Much of the professional-pa ent rela onships were based on hypotheses development 
as the interac ons with pa ent went on, which in instu onalised se ngs such as clinics, were 
not given  me and a en on. Some prac ces linked and harmonised well, the conscious and 
subconscious mind such as mindfulness are easier to engage pa ents with - collec vely and 
individually. Even for respec ve tradi ons, experiences showed that over  me, disconnec ons 
from one's background values and tradi ons explained later confusion while reconnec ng to same 
tradi ons caused unity with the individual. Tradi onal healing was fundamentally concerned with 
interpersonal interac on extending beyond the dyadic pa ent-healer rela onship to necessary 
inclusion of par cular rather than human interac ons e.g., drummers, dancers, music, family. 
It was an important characteris c of media on between vulnerable individuals who suffered at 
the hands of powerful human beings. Tradi onal healing depended on the interpersonal rather 
than the mechanis c, on rela on rather than technical, and typically reinforced cosmologies, in 
which instrumental manipula on of naturalis c mechanisms - interac ng with all things - was 
largely unknown. Also, the strong link between poor governance and mental health was never 
an issue for discussion, and therefore, undermined efforts in comprehensive interven ons for 
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sustainable mental well-being. Such dimensions were found interes ng and eased psychotherapy 
administra on and pa ent recovery away from self-defea ng professional biases that gave 
limited singular approaches to interven ons. And if approaches were integrated into healing as 
part of the professional service package, it would predict good sustainable mental well-being, 
where vulnerability is eradicated, recovery eased and mental well-being maintained. However, an 
increasingly evidence-based prac ce was promoted. Scien fic evalua ons in rela on to expected 
outcomes were important for the sustainability of any integra on effort. 
IMI AIM
IMI aimed at establishing a pool of human and ecological resources to tackle emerging mental 
health complica ons, holis cally, and specifically designed to meet mental health needs of 
individuals and communi es so as to transform mental health challenges, reduce vulnerability, 
accelerate recovery and achieve sustainable mental well-being. Key objec ves were: to reduce 
economic stress and depression and revitalize good func oning of the body and mind; to encourage 
human and ecological-based health diagnosis and administra on of IMI approved medicinal herbs 
and alterna ve medicine(s); to lead formula on and applica on of humanly dignifying policies 
adoptable by leaders in life-threatening environments; and to inculcate ra onal understanding of 
spirituality, science, and philosophy – integrated studies to provide a be er understanding of the 
world we live in by everyone.
In view of the above, the Integrated Mental Health Ini a ve (IMI) carried out research on current 
and persis ng human life stressors or general health problems. Through making informa on found 
available to the studied communi es (concerning human and ecological safety), IMI generates 
awareness around major factors for the development and persistence of mental disorders. IMI 
maintains a brainstorming and consensus-building forum that helps provide answers to the ever-
emerging human problems related to mental health. By gaining input from local communi es, 
government officials, and local and interna onal health experts, the project finds appropriate 
solu ons for the common good of the community. In that respect, the Integrated Mental Health 
Ini a ve (IMI) set out to undertake the following ac vi es:
Current and on-going ac vi es
• Regular studies and analyses on mental health related subjects.    
• Home visits and home-based care.
• Psychotherapy sessions.
• Inculca ng the discipline of mindfulness for mental development and peaceful states of the 
mind and the environment
• Caregiver training.
• Community sensi sa on for mental health empowerment.
• Partnerships and collabora ons for conduc ng interven ons and resources mobilisa on.
• Forma on of community mental health clubs for self-help and self-suficiency .
• Capacity building for organisa ons, community leaders, teachers and parents.
• Strengthen development linkages and form affilia ons for clients, supported communi es 
and auxiliary mental health services reinforcers.
• Streamlining mental health prac ces among development agencies and grass root 
organisa ons.
• Monitoring and learning.
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•    Integra on of best prac ces in programing.
• Competency and professional development for staff and updates on newly developed 
psychotherapeu c programmes.
• Advocacies and campaigns to promote public mental health.
• Concepts development and partnership for development.
• Outreaches, profiling, research and advocacy.
• Fund-raising ac vi es – individual and ins tu onal.
• Home-based care for clients.
• Par cipa on in stakeholder fora.
• Organising professional seminars for knowledge and experience sharing.
• Speaking against injus ces that are detrimental to well-being and peace.
• Offer consultancies for organisa on development and collabora on pla orm.
• Support clientèle ac vi es and businesses by buying off their products and recrui ng other 
clients to sell them for a livelihood, and offer free psychotherapy sessions to the aggrieved 
and bereaved as a charity.
• Periodically offer representa ve as guest speaker at interna onal conferences.
• Forming networks for future engagement within development work.
IMI Experience (Lessons)
The mind was the vehicle for achieving the highest of goals, including public health goals. 
However, mental illness from across the globe was increasingly evident and highly contagious. 
The sick and neglected environment set the stage for the trials and tribula ons. Healing needed 
integra on. The macro-level condi ons provided trying moments for individuals to either be 
subdued or to subdue and prevail. It was those who failed to overcome the condi ons that suffered 
and both preven ve and healing medicines were rendered ineffec ve. Life a er the chronic stage 
was not catered for, yet clinical condi ons were insufficient without aspects of environment 
and spiritual diagnosis of mental illnesses. Without dealing with macro-level condi ons, mental 
healthcare was no care at all. Stronger a en on ought to focus on ins tu onal networking 
and coopera on with related ins tu ons and persons combining forces to realise the project’s 
goal through carrying out annual na onwide conferences on conflict resolu on, interna onal 
rela ons and nurturing peace as gateways to human and ecological security as well as ini a ng 
community-led infrastructure development to reduce vulnerability to mental dysfunc on and 
create prosperity for all. Such conferences formulate adoptable guidelines, legisla ve or legal 
structural designs and policies for local and interna onal managers for use in decision-making 
processes. The project membership and affilia ons were unlimited (consis ng of its staff, hired 
experts, researchers, volunteers, interns, guest speakers, collabora ng ins tu ons, etc) in nature, 
since we all needed one another in the struggle for human and ecological rights and are en tled 
to them. In its interven on programmes, the project has interests and undertakings in spirituality 
(faiths, beliefs or religious sects); mental and general health, including socio-cultural, socio-
environmental, ecological, socio-economical, and socio-poli cal spheres for general well-being 
and func oning of the communi es in their day-to-day lives. IMI project had a macro-vision of 
becoming a self-sustaining organisa on in a period of ten (10) years, fully equipped to sustainably 
manage resources under its supervision and monitor se ngs supported by its central fund that 
funds and manages projects relevant to the aims and objec ves of IMI. There was currently 
no mental health infrastructure to address the macro - psychosocial, economic, governmental, 
environmental and globalisa on issues that trigger vulnerabili es or accelerate mental health 
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problems. Interven ons were s ll on clinical or ins tu onal basis that offered services in unreal 
life situa ons that caused vulnerabili es and mental cases. 
GOVERNANCE AND MENTAL HEALTH
We have ac vely been involved in faith building among voters despite their distrust for 
government ins tu ons like the electoral commission. We knew those who never voted affect any 
li le change we would have. I pointed this through the opposi on leadership and directly to the 
masses using social media, leadership and peace pla orms in Uganda and around Africa, in light 
of local communi es served. We have reached out to individuals and affected areas to develop 
reports I can share with colleagues around the country and world. We have subsequently held 
sessions to develop right development journeys for bright future. We have demys fied fear for 
impending crisis and focused on building hope for development and peace. We have liaised with 
friends from Asia and Africa to form a pro-African pla orm for good governance, development 
and peace in Africa, which we are currently working on.
Through IMI, we demys fied non-par cipa on in governance, to ill the service gap in the 
mental health sector and support sufferers and their families to sustainable well-being, which 
was an abandoned and neglected sector. We reconstruct poten ally vic mising statements given 
by leaders and influen al people to be shunned and jus fy struggles for good governance as 
reciprocal to community well-being; help the youth to rediscover their poten al, to cope and 
exercise resilience in the face of adversity un l a  me when maladministra ons and poor 
governance systems collapse unsupported. In other words, the youths recover and are able to 
exercise resilience by adop ng private business ventures that detach them from the ill effects of 
poor governance as they denounce corrupt regime, rather than give in to subsistence abuse and 
hopelessness. This keeps the youth in endless struggles for be er livelihoods and good governance, 
which constantly reflects their well-being. In the last general elec ons, we managed to encourage 
and model ac vi es that promote par cipa on in na onal elec ons as either voter or candidate. 
But even with the injus ces and fraudulent elec ons that characterised the elec ons, we are 
helping to sustain the hope through ac ons that disassociate the people with an -people ventures 
of government, recognise legi macy, and keep the spirit of the struggle for legi mate leadership 
and be er governance high. It is from here that Ugandans can be assured of peace, rather than 
employ repressive ac ons and oppression as the means to achieve it and consider the absence of 
counter physical violence as peace - as many believe. We con nue to make it clear to the public 
that, there can be no peace under state repression, corrup on, illegi mate rule, unjust jus ce 
systems, unemployment, famine, poor health of Ugandans, poor infrastructure, poor livelihoods, 
and aliena on of the popula on. People are not peaceful in these states, whether there are bullet 
sounds and bullet deaths or not. That too, is a ma er of  me.
SUSTAINABILITY STRATEGY AND LESSONS
• Community ownership and mainstreaming mental health services in the main vessel of health 
care delivery.
• Representa on of mental health concerns in key areas of health administra on and policy 
formula on.
•  Forma on of mental health clubs and associa ons - with which to build capacity and help 
reduce pressure on exis ng manpower while helping to reduce adverse impact caused 
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by mental poor health - characterising violence, abuse and neglect of family and social 
responsibili es.
• Integrate major predisposing factors to mental illnesses such as human rights abuses, 
environmental degrada on, ignorance and poor socio-economic environment, to lessen 
vulnerability and promote economic and general mental well-being.
• Beneficiaries will be grouped in viable economic forces to gain economic, social and 
par cipa on power so as to recover fully from economic and psychological depression - in 
addi on to strengthening mental abili es to adjust towards and forth from any degree of 
depression (Mental health empowerment).
• A er working for the parent organisa on, they are graduated to manage their own businesses 
with minimal supervision.
• The IMI con nues to thrive from the shared resources to run organisa ons projects further 
ahead with remits from its internal investments built from the tapping of mighty talents and 
skills of its clients.
• We align them with the organisa on report and share with stakeholders, design new projects 
based on the insights got, and conduct research or write papers to gain wider understanding 
and conclusions on those insights so that they can be used to help others or ill development 
gaps.
REPLICABILITY
•    A er three years of clients working with IMI, they are prepared to enter a one-year transi on 
into gaining administra ve independence so that they can run and thrive on their own using the 
proceeds gained from working for the parent organisa on (IMI) plus a booster grant of 500USD 
- given to them.
•    First by widening resource base through renewable resource strategy, direct engagement with 
poten al funding, u liza on of local engagement to raise resources for self-help, and investment 
in its accumulated assets for sustainable revenue and self-funding as well as maximize private 
consulta ons. In line with increased resource base, the organisa on, which now operates at a 
district level, will ini alize country-wide, regional, inter-regional, and global mental health 
facili es for it service and products u liza on.
Best prac ces:
• Improve office infrastructure,
• Support sessions so that we do not have to charge fees to needy clients,
• Reach out to communi es who cannot make it to our offices,
• Provide free food and clothing to beneficiaries,
• Support self-sustenance of our beneficiaries,
• Provide basic literacy training to children and youth,
• Support mental empowerment programme for our beneficiaries - including youths, parents 
and local leaders.
WAY FORWARD
Future IMI will provide the entrance for sustained healing and also empower affected individuals 
to cope with the wider worldly challenges, brave the test, ind mechanisms for problem solving 
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and overcoming them so that they emerge victorious, happy and mentally well. IMI in its response 
relishes mul -systemic and mul -ideological strategies to transform afflic ons of individuals, 
groups, communi es, na onals, and regions into drivers of mental and general well-being. 
Without such amount of leadership that rallies forces and professional responses towards social, 
economic, governmental and individual afflic ons, communi es like any other organism will 
endlessly be threatened by misery and extermina on from life while adding more pressure to 
already vulnerable sec ons of society that are unable to cope with macro development pressures 
and overcome them in order to be mentally well. This is with established comprehensive mental 
healing infrastructure under IMI that, a er chronic stages of mental illness, caregivers are 
supported, the community is prepared on how best to relate with vulnerable members, leadership 
is lobbied to allocate resources, vulnerable communi es are supported with physical and spiritual 
needs with  es to mental illness as well as mental and skills training for vulnerable sec ons of 
the community.
A $200,000 USD budget will be needed as basic fund for IMI infrastructure.  However, specific 
programmes and ac vi es a ract funding of between $1500.00 USD and $50000.00 USD from 
direct and indirect funding arrangements – to address current and priority community needs. 
Generally, the project is a mul -stake type that integrates the different societal forces capable of 
helping to create a change in people’s lives. Account Number 6004667822 Barclay's Bank, Jinja 
Branch, Uganda.
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Radio Micah was launched in Lomé on May 1, 2015 by its founder, Mr. A vi, Okey to broadcast 
programmes to listeners online with the goal of transmi ng content about Togolese agriculture 
on the airwaves and thereby increasing the visibility of the work performed by the community, 
various supervisory authori es, na onal and interna onal organisa ons. The company MICAH 
FARM S.A.S recognized and responded to the need for a suitable communica on medium, 
resul ng in the birth of Radio Micah. The inten ons behind the crea on of Radio Micah can be 
summarised in the following statements:
• Radio Micah, the Farmer’s Voice, is an ini a ve of the MICAH FARM S.A.S agricultural 
society, which works in the produc on, promo onal and distribu on sectors of agriculture, 
dealing with agricultural products, breeding, farms, and the impor ng and expor ng of 
commodi es.
• Radio Micah is the voice of the agriculturalist and a dynamic website containing both wri en 
and audio-visual informa on.
• Radio Micah, the Farmer’s Voice, presents programming in French, English, and various 
indigenous languages of Togo, such as Ewé, Kabyè, etc. Broadcas ng from our website, www.
radiomicah.com, and from our Android app, we discuss issues of interest and importance to 
farmers, as well as ma ers pertaining to our organisa on.
Conscious of the fact that our African homelands cannot experience development without 
par cular emphasis being placed on agriculture, the Togolese people launched the Na onal 
Agricultural Investment and Food Security Programme (Programme Na onal d’Inves ssement 
Agricole et de Sécurité Alimentaire, or PNIASA) in 2011. Its areas of focus are threefold, namely 
the crea on, distribu on, and adapta on of technologies which could have a significant impact 
on three subsectors of the agricultural industry: plant, animal, and ish produc on. Enthusias c 
and suppor ve towards this undertaking, and indeed Togolese agriculture in general, Radio 
Micah wishes to shine a spotlight on PNIASA and serve as a medium of communica on for 
all par cipants therein. Specifically, our vision is to create a forum where all players in African 
agriculture can exchange their views, share their experiences, and suggest improvements. The 
vision of the Farmer’s Voice, according to its founder, Mr. A vi, Okey is thus: “We intend 
to impact the agricultural industry through our radio programmes. Our repor ng is meant to 
vitalize this growing sector and involve African youth at the centre of it.”  At present, Radio 
Micah has two studios. One, in Lomé, houses its produc on studio, where the network’s content 
is created, while another in Canada hosts a team of dynamic, young anchors and correspondents 
on the North American con nent.
Radio Micah, the Farmer’s Voice seeks to be a leader in informa on technology and heighten 
public awareness on agricultural ma ers. Our ambi on for the future is to expand the scope of our 
coverage, educa ng more and more people by reaching out on the FM airwaves and by satellite.
Akoueteh  Charles, Okey Ogbonin A vi
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ON BEING AN ENTREPRENEUR: THE NIGERIAN 
PERSPECTIVE
Olayinka K. Binuomoyo
Member, Ins tute of Chartered Economists of Nigeria (ICEN), Lagos, Nigeria
ABSTRACT
It is common knowledge that the success of an economy rests on the strength of its entrepreneurs. 
Present-day challenges make it impera ve for countries in the same bracket as Nigeria to de-
emphasize reliance on oil and government for social crumbs, to embrace innova ve ac vi es and 
deepen small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs). SMEs are important drivers of economic 
growth but they face significant challenges as obtained in Nigeria where infrastructures such as 
power, transporta on and financing needed to make entrepreneurship work seldom exists. With 
a high unemployment rate, young Nigerians are required to embrace entrepreneurship. The aim 
of this paper is to present the Nigerian entrepreneur within the country’s challenging business 
environment as a true defini on of an entrepreneur despite the general defini on. We presented 
a set of ques ons and gathered feedback through a set of ques onnaires administered using 
purposive sampling on 6 trade associa ons in Iwo Town, Osun state, Nigeria.
INTRODUCTION
Nigeria is the largest economy in Africa, a laudable feat going by its popula on of over 179 
million people (WPR, 2016), not considering the country's lower per capita income and mono-
economy dependent on importa on.
The country has the resources necessary to make its economy great: a large expanse of arable 
land that supports agriculture, a large market from within and without and communi es that team 
up with each other for communal economic development.
With its huge popula on, Nigeria boasts of huge human capital, accoun ng for 15 % of the 
con nent's popula on, 11 % of its output and 16 % of the foreign reserves, with phenomenal 
dominance in West Africa to include half of the sub-region's popula on and 70 % of its output.
Nigeria's human and non-human resources help Africa and the greater world by providing 
economic aid to Africa, poli cal resolu on of crises across the con nent, skills, and technical aid 
to countries in need in diverse sectors of the society. The na on's human resource endowment is 
such that one in ive Africans is a Nigerian. 
The country is the largest economy on the con nent with an annual gross domes c product (GDP) 
of $509.9 billion USD. It is the 13th largest oil producer in the world with 32 billion barrels of 
oil reserves, enough for 37 years (Bri sh Broadcas ng Corpora on, 2014). The country's gas 
reserves, going by the 2005 es mates, will last for 110 years at the current rates of usage (Oloja 
& Oretade, 2006). Some developed countries opposed debt relief for the country in 2005 ci ng 
the above.
Nigeria has abundant solid mineral deposits including coal,  n ore, gold, gemstones, marble, 
uranium, salt, soda, and sulphur (Na onal Planning Commission, 2004). The country earned 
Olayinka K. Binuomoyo
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N300 billion (Nigerian naira) from oil exports between 1970 and 2000. With these natural and 
other resource endowments, Nigeria has the poten al to sustain its status as Africa’s largest 
economy and a major player in the global economy, yet the country is wan ng.
The economic development status of Nigeria in the midst of these resources perplexes many. For 
example, in the build-up to nego a ons with the country's interna onal creditors on pardoning 
the country's debt in 2005, many of the creditor countries opposed Nigeria receiving debt pardon 
ci ng its vast resources. Hence, the need for another golden nest away from oil, to be found in 
entrepreneurship and SMEs.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ITS CONCEPTUALIZATION
An entrepreneur is a person who manages and takes business decisions. He/she innovates, comes 
up with ideas, iden fies opportuni es, seeks finance and strives to succeed. He/she decides what 
to produce, how to produce and for whom to produce, to make a profit.
Shane (2003) defines entrepreneurship as an act of being an entrepreneur, or someone who 
undertakes innova ons, finance and business in an effort to transform innova ons into economic 
goods. This can be internal expansion otherwise called intra-preneurship or new venturing 
altogether.
T he se ng of entrepreneurship is two-faced: the internal environment (psychological traits 
such as an entrepreneurial person being recognisable by his personal a ributes) and the external 
environment (the pla orm and characteris cs on which the ac vi es of the entrepreneur takes 
place). Three major ac vi es of entrepreneurship are discovery (of opportuni es and ideas), 
inves ng (pu ng to use of any or all available resources) and taking decisions (the use of the 
resources including resource alloca on and risk-taking). The entrepreneur is the heart and brain 
of the business. He has all the units and departments in him alone. He knows where he wants to 
be and decides when, how and some mes, if he wants to get there. 
The vast majority of developed and developing countries rely on dynamic, resourceful and risk-
taking entrepreneurs to trigger and sustain economic growth. In economic development, SMEs 
play an important role. Characteris cs such as endurance, compe  on and entrepreneurship, 
have external benefits to the economy besides efficiency and growth in produc vity. Advocates 
of SMEs support claims that they are generally more produc ve than larger irms.
Another argument further states that SMEs’ expansion boosts employment more than large 
firms' growth because SMEs are more labour-intensive. This may mean that subsidising SMEs 
can represent a poverty allevia on tools. By promo ng SMEs, individual countries and the 
interna onal community at large can make progress towards the main goal of reducing poverty. 
Entrepreneurial development is important to the Nigerian economy which is characterised by 
heavy dependence on oil, low agricultural produc on, high unemployment rate, low use of 
industrial capacity, high infla on rate and lack of industrial infrastructural base. These constraints 
can also limit the rate of growth of entrepreneurial ac vi es in Nigeria.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP CHALLENGES IN NIGERIA
The challenges faced by entrepreneurs are the same faced by established Tier-2 businesses. Chief 
among the challenges is corrup on, regulatory bo lenecks, access to credits or loans, power, 
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Country Nigeria South Africa Egypt Ghana Libya Angola Kenya
GDP (billion US $) 594.3 341.2 275.7 50.0 67.6 129.8 56.3
Global Ease of Doing 
Business
169 73 131 114 188 181 108
Star ng a Business 26 17 3 13 18 27 31
Dealing with
Construc on Permits
40 10 12 23 19 13 28
Ge ng Electricity 41 31 18 9 15 29 12
Registering Property 46 11 15 5 20 38 17
Ge ng Credit 7 7 1 4 18 45 3
Paying Taxes 41 2 18 15 19 23 11
Trading Across 
Borders
42 21 14 36 9 41 22
Enforcing Contracts 25 16 18 14 16 47 9
transporta on problems, infrastructure and market access. 
The ‘Doing Business’ report is based on the regulatory environment of business, measuring the 
economies of countries from many areas of the life of a business. The focus is on regulatory 
constraints for businesses. Crea ng a regulatory pla orm that allows entrepreneurship to blossom 
has huge posi ve impact on job crea on and the economy.
Table 1: 2015 GDP and Doing Business Ranking, 2016
Source: World Bank Group (2016); Africaranking.com
Let us discuss the ‘Doing Business 2016’ data from the World Bank economic ranking. The 
data highlights the country’s business environment defined as ease of doing business with key 
indices like star ng a business, ge ng electricity, ge ng credit (loan), and trading across borders 
(interna onal trade) as key focus (see Table 1). Nigeria has not fared be er than a smaller country 
like Ghana.
Primary data was developed from modified ‘Doing Business’ indices and data collected using 
purposive sampling with ques onnaires administered on members of 5 trading and business 
associa ons in Iwo Town of Osun state, Nigeria. Find the summary of key ques ons and responses 
in Table 2. The ques ons are based on the World Bank’s Doing Business indices.
The indices by which data is collected from members of the trade associa ons is defined with 
reference  to the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ indices as follows.
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1. Star ng a business: Referring to the ease of star ng a business by an entrepreneur. This also 
involves third-party (family, friends, public or government) support, the ease of business 
names registra on or incorpora on of new companies and access to business support 
services.
2. Obtaining business permits: This has to do with the ease of ge ng business licence, 
regulatory and professional permits. It also tends towards enforcing legality and quality of 
the products and services offered.
3. Access to electricity: This refers to reliability, adequacy, affordability and transparency. 
4. Registering business property or obtaining a cer ficate of occupancy: This means ge ng 
a proper trading outlet. Access to credits is o en predicated on collateral with both 
commercial and microfinance banks. With the clog created by the Land Use Act of 1978 
and considering the expensive fees, registering of landed proper es is complex and almost 
impossible.
5. Ge ng credit/loan: This has to do with access to financial supports for businesses from 
banks in par cular.
6. Public economics and policies: This refers to the extent to which government agencies, 
their ac ons and policies affect business opera ons. Worthy of a en on are levies, taxes 
and public finance which includes injec on of funds into the local economy through regular 
and adequate payment of salaries, pensions, etc.
7. Trading across borders: Defined with regards to interna onal trade-related policies like 
foreign trade, foreign exchange policies and processes issued by government agencies.
8. Enforcing the law and contracts: This refers to the strength of the rule of law in taking its 
course in the disposi on of jus ce par cularly on business transac ons.
9. Access to knowledge and skills supports: This is explained with regard to access to 
knowledge and informa on as well as skills necessary to equip the entrepreneur for a 
successful start-up. This is about addressing skills' shortage.
10. Road and other infrastructure: This refers to the availability of good roads and proper transport 
systems that are efficient for business transac ons. It also includes telecommunica ons and 
other social ameni es that will aid business success.
Table 2 shows data collected in a survey of ive trading operators in Iwo Town, Osun state, 
Nigeria. Over 50 members of each associa on took part in the survey, giving group answers. 
Ques ons documented by each indicator are asked in the posi ve while respondents answer YES 
or NO. For example, ques on starts like “Is it easy…?” The percentage of YES responses to the 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Considering the country's economy and the fact that the world is currently in regression, the 
Nigerian entrepreneur is a goal ge er and risk-taker. And if entrepreneurs, amidst challenges 
become proac ve, develop a sense of survival and seek deeper dimensions to the obstacles 
highlighted in Table 2, their success is a given.
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ABSTRACT
This paper looks at why it is necessary for churches to take part in the response to sexual and 
gender-based violence within the African context. As a star ng point, it is necessary to discuss 
the nature of influence that religion has on the society. The discussion focuses on understanding 
religion as a coping mechanism for stress. A en on is then turned to the context of the Chris an 
faith and available theological frameworks that can be a basis for response to sexual violence. 
The last part of this paper looks at the ability of the Chris an church to mobilise communi es 
and harness a wide geographic footprint to create a sustainable response to sexual violence within 
communi es. The paper concludes with a few recommenda ons targeted at policy makers and 
church leadership on developing responses to sexual violence within communi es. 
RELIGIOUS RESPONSE TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE: A BLACK THEOLOGY 
PERSPECTIVE
Before we delve deep into the above outline, let us first confine our discussion to a concise meaning 
of the term sexual violence. The concept of sexual violence is one that is o en difficult to pin 
down to one defini on and is o en misunderstood (Bradford, 2006). One cause for this difficulty 
is that several schools of thought define the concept differently. Psychiatry and psychology look 
at it as a behavioural disorder and define it within that framework. In the field of law, it is viewed 
from a perspec ve of social norms and legal principles. The World Health Organisa on (WHO) 
defines sexual violence as: “ Any sexual act, a empt to obtain a sexual act, unwanted sexual 
comments or advances, or acts to traffic, or otherwise directed, against a person’s sexuality using 
coercion, by any person regardless of their rela onship to the vic m, in any se ng, including but 
not limited to home and work. Coercion can cover a whole spectrum of degrees” (WHO, 2002).
It is regarded as the broad range of violent sexual behaviours that ranges from minor sexual 
deviant behaviours to sexual homicides (Bradford, 2006). Sexual violence is regarded as a 
spectrum of non-consensual sexual experiences, the most common one being that of rape (Brown 
et al., 2006). The key elements of sexual violence include the absence of consent and the varying 
nature of the ac ons that can be fi ed into this defini on. This gives us a clearer understanding 
of the concept of sexual violence. Now we can look at the influence of religion and its uses as a 
way to cope with life stress. 
Reports state that 796 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa, out of 822 million, claim associa on 
to some religious group, be it as an adherent or an ac ve member within that group (Pew Research 
Center,  2015). Africa is, by no stretch of imagina on, a highly religious society. It is interes ng 
to note the influence that religion has within any society. In this paper, the area of focus will be 
to explore the effects of religion in rela on to coping with life stress. 
Siyabulela Tonono
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Religion serves as a framework by which life events are understood and interpreted within the 
African context (Mbi , 1969). An individual’s religious belief systems operate as the lens through 
which the reali es of everyday life are perceived and interpreted (Silberman, 2005). What this 
suggests is that any explana on of events is supported by a certain worldview. According to this 
view, religion offers its congregants a coherent belief system that gives meaning to the world. 
Silberman argues that, much like any other meaning-making system, religion can influence the 
formula on of goals for self-regula on, affect emo ons and influence behaviour (Silberman, 
2005). Religion is at the epicentre of an immense web of beliefs, a tudes and feelings that form 
a worldview (Co ngham, 2003).  There are varie es in worldviews and the African context has 
its own worldview through which events are understood. The African view interprets reality as a 
closed system where everything hangs together, with changes affec ng all aspects of the en re 
system (Van Der Merwe, 2008). Within the African worldview the metaphysical, as represented 
by God and the ancestors, has a direct link to the physical manifesta on of life experienced by 
humanity and the rest of nature.  
In the Western worldview, religion is also a means of interpreta on of the experiences 
of life events. Within the western view, this is known as religious coping. Religious coping 
is understood as being the use of cogni ve or behavioural techniques that emanate out of an 
individual’s spirituality when an individual is confronted with life stress (Tix and Frazier, 1998). 
A characteris c of religious coping is that it provides a significant end and meaning to events that 
are stressful (Pargament et al., 1999). It is viewed as the quest for purpose, emo onal comfort, 
personal control and in macy with others using one’s spirituality and religious beliefs rela ng to 
stressful life events. Pargament et. al. argued that the most common use of religious coping takes 
place within the most disenfranchised sectors of society. 
There is an ever-increasing body of empirical studies that have looked at religious coping and its 
effects in mi ga ng life stress. Some studies have looked at the short-term effects of religious 
coping and others the long-term effects. In a 2005 study that looked at the how religious meaning 
can influence the coping process in bereaved college students in America, evidence showed 
that religion can serve as a framework through which the bereaved can reframe their loss, look 
for more non-threatening interpreta ons, find coping resources, and iden fy areas of personal 
growth (Park, 2005).   
Research also suggests that sexual vic misa on has nega ve effects on an individual’s trust 
of others in society (Tamburello et. al., 2014). In this context, trust is used to mean a default 
expecta on of others’ goodwill. He further suggests that the regular a endance of religious 
services weakened the nega ve effects that sexual vic misa on has on trust in individuals (Ibid, 
592).  There is a body of evidence that proves that religion has the capability of shaping the 
lens through which individuals view their world.  In stressful life events, religion can also be an 
an dote. 
The significance of religion is not only on individuals but also on society (Silberman, 2005). 
The centrality of religion in modern day society is one that cannot be underplayed. There is no 
doubt that within the Western worldview, Chris anity is one of the most dominant religions. 
It then becomes important that we understand Chris an texts and how their interpreta on has 
implica ons on our experience of the world. These interpreta ons of Chris an texts are used 
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to create various theological frameworks. The theological frameworks that result from various 
interpreta ons of Chris an texts become the theological founda ons upon which churches across 
the world anchor their ac ons. 
Mosala argues that biblical appropria ons and interpreta ons are always framed by the social 
and cultural loca ons and commitments of those who do them (Mosala, 1989). Inherent in that 
idea is the no on that there are always biblical appropria ons and interpreta ons that are being 
made. Within the Chris an tradi on, there are many theological frameworks that exist but the 
one that will be our focus will be that of Black theology of libera on. Moreso, the focus is on 
the relevance of black theology of libera on as a theological framework within the Chris an 
tradi on that can serve as a founda onal basis for ac on against sexual violence. 
It is necessary to look at black theology within its proper context if we are to get a full understanding 
of what black theology is. The emerging of black theology came around the 1960s in America 
during the civil rights movement. Wri ngs of James Cone such as “Black theology and black 
power”, published in 1968, are amongst some of the most influen al wri ngs that popularised 
the prophe c voice of figures such as Mar n Luther King Jnr and Malcolm X, cri cs of racism 
(Mtshiselwa, 2015). 
Black theology arose out of the suffering of black people in the United States of America and is 
anchored on the idea that any exposi on of the Gospel of Jesus Christ that omits God’s libera on 
of the poor is not a true exposi on (Cone, 2010). In South Africa, the idea took form during the 
same  me that the philosophy of black consciousness was taking root in the country. One cannot 
talk of black theology without referring to the philosophy of black consciousness (Mtshiselwa, 
2015). Within the South African context, black theology emerged from the oppression of the 
apartheid regime. What is evident is that the theology was born in the face of oppression.
Black theology is a cultural tool born out of the struggle of black people that seeks to break 
the silence of Chris an theology on the oppression of black people (Mosala, 1989). Black, in 
this context referring to those people that Boaventura de Sousa Santos classifies as nonexistent. 
"Nonexistent is to exist without any relevant or comprehensible way of being " (Santos, 2007).  
Black theology is a theology of libera on which reflects upon the socio-economic, ecclesias cal 
and poli cal reali es of the people in the African context (Muzorewa, 1989). It is deemed to be an 
a empt at presen ng the Chris an gospel to the black man with all its libera ng power (Gqubule, 
1974).  As a model of theology, black theology is entrenched in the actuali es of oppression 
(Vellem, 2015). What sets apart this framework of theology from other forms of theology is that 
the interlocutor of black theology is the “nonexistent”. It is a counter-cultural form of theology 
that brings to the fore the lived experiences of the marginalised people in the society and seeks to 
use its interpreta on of the Bible as a tool of libera on for such classes of people. 
The rise of black theology out of a context of suffering and oppression makes it, as a theological 
framework, much more sensi ve to the struggles of people across the world irrespec ve of the 
type of struggle. The manner in which black theology has found root in different parts of the 
globe such as La n America, North America, the Caribbean and Africa illustrates how people 
with different struggles have found a voice within this theological framework. Sexual violence is 
highly prevalent in the African contexts and those that are mainly at the receiving end are women 
and children (Kilonzo et al. 2013). It is within a theological framework such as black theology 
that voices of marginalised women and children can find edifica on. 
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Black theology's presence, therefore, suggests that within the Chris an tradi on there is a 
theological framework that can be a founda onal basis to build upon a response to sexual violence 
within the African context. A theological framework upon which a response can be built is not the 
only reason to encourage churches to respond to sexual violence. Kilonzo et. al. suggest that if 
responses to sexual violence are to be effec ve, they need to be community driven (Ibid: 5). The 
responses need a mul -faceted approach along the preven on-treatment con nuum (Magner et. 
al., 2015). 
Churches are the best places to use educa on to arouse dialogue on sexual violence as a way 
of crea ng awareness of the issue within their local context. These religious ins tu ons are 
nodal points that need to be harnessed to educate and transform social a tudes towards sexual 
violence. " The use of religious spaces, as a whole, has not been properly examined by policy 
makers and neglects the sheer influence that religious communi es have within the African 
con nent." (Tearfund, 2013). A unique vantage point that churches have is that they are present at 
the local level and command respect within the communi es they serve (LeRoux, 2015). Another 
key considera on is that the church has an ability to mobilise local communi es that cannot 
be matched. In 1986 the Free Methodist Church in Congo (DRC) embarked on mobilising the 
communi es they operate from to build schools. Within less than four years the church mobilised 
29 churches to build 15 schools across the Democra c Republic of Congo (Tearfund, 2010). 
The response of the Ecumenical movement in South Africa and its resistance to apartheid 
illustrates the ability of the church to mobilise communi es (Khumalo, 2009). It is evident that 
government and organisa ons cannot match the church's presence in communi es. Coupled with 
that presence is the ability to mobilise people and devoted members making it fer le ground in 
which responses to sexual violence can be planted and rooted. 
We have seen that religion has an ability to negate the effects of life's stress to its membership 
and acts a coping mechanism in the face of stress as a response to sexual violence. Further 
to that, within the Chris an context, it is necessary to have a theological framework upon 
which responses to sexual violence can be anchored. Black theology of libera on can be such 
a theological framework. The church has a footprint in every community that enables it to 
reach grassroots level, yet it operates at varying levels. This footprint coupled with its ability to 
mobilise communi es makes it well placed to respond to sexual violence. One may even stretch 
the argument to say that the church is located strategically to further the African development 
agenda. If the church is to be useful in responding to sexual violence, several things need to 
happen. 
1. At policy formula on stage, policymakers need to ensure that faith-based organisa ons are 
an integral part of the policy-making. There is a need to ensure that faith-based organisa ons 
such as churches are also an integral part of policy implementa on regarding sexual violence 
due to their access to communi es. 
2. Churches need to show more interest to capacitate their membership on sexual violence and 
train their leadership on the issues that face the African context and how best to respond to 
the challenges of the African context.
3. There is need for a mul -stakeholder approach towards responding to sexual violence that 
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ABSTRACT
The world is on a quest to achieve United Na ons Sustainable Development Goal 5 (SDG5), 
which seeks to promote gender equality and empowerment of women and girls. Women have 
been oppressed over me in most socie es. Sta s cs con nue to project increasing rates of  
various acts of gender based violence such as domes c violence, sexual violence, cultural and 
economic abuse and so on. These acts of abuse are accelerated by several factors per nent to our 
social systems such as culture, patriarchy and the Law. Using Kenya as a case study, this paper 
examines how these three factors contribute to differen al gender treatment. The purpose is to 
inform on the extent to which the welfare of African women has been compromised by the law, 
culture and patriarchy, to find relevant long-term solu ons to curb further degrada on of women 
in Africa and subsequently, achieve SDG5.
ISSUES
The following issues shall be discussed in this paper:
1. Culture
2. Women and poli cs
3. Family Law (marriage and divorce)
4. Property ownership
5. Domes c violence
6. Female genital mu la on (FGM)
7. Sexual inequality
INTRODUCTION
Culture largely defines behaviour and prac ces of any African society. The do’s and don’ts of 
the female gender are to a large extent, dictated and directed by the prac ces of society during 
a par cular period, either adop ng what was done from  me immemorial or the current norm. 
This has created stereotypes that are gendered in nature, such as to adversely affect the human, 
economic, civil and poli cal rights of women. For instance, few women opt to vie for elec ve 
posi ons in government because of the misguided percep on that such opportuni es are reserved 
for their male counterparts, who were tradi onally the chiefs and clan elders. Customs and 
prac ces of the people are subsequently considered as one of the sources of Law, which is created 
by enac ng of statutes by the same male-dominated Parliament. Loopholes in legisla on have in 




However, progress has been witnessed by amendment of legisla on and enactment of statutes 
that curb barbaric cultural prac ces and uphold the welfare of women in various situa ons that 
previously were gender discriminatory and oppressive.
1. CULTURE HAS CREATED A PRISON ENVIRONMENT FOR WOMEN 
Culture and tradi on greatly influence the family system in Kenya. Our society is patriarchal and 
is known for its history of oppressing women. Many women surrender their power and human 
rights and remain prisoners of the society (Engels, 1972).
Feminists and women empowerment ac vists have contested that women are yet to get the credit 
they deserve for their important role in the family and society. According to Cain, " …the category 
‘woman’ has not so much been wrongly defined by men, as it has been ignored and undervalued. 
Yes, women are nurturing. Yes, women value personal rela onships. These a ributes are to be 
valued” (Cain, 1990, p.836). 
An African saying goes, " The place of a woman is in the Kitchen." This is the conven onal role of 
the woman; to be a good wife, to take care of the children, to be caring, forgiving and sacrificing 
(Kabira & Muthoni, 1994). Most men will propose that good wives are the ones who hold families 
together, are not ambi ous or interested in poli cs, are hardworking and submissive. They should 
stay at home to love, obey and care for their husbands. Even when husbands are unfaithful, it is 
because their wives have neglected them. At work, they refuse to apply for posi ons because it is 
not feminine to look ambi ous. A woman should only be seen and not heard.(Kabira & Muthoni, 
1994). 
2. WOMEN AND POLITICS
All kinds of contradictory statements are given when a woman shows an interest in poli cs. We 
hear women being told:
• "You are divorced. You cannot maintain a household, much less a Cons tuency." 
• "You are married, steer clear of poli cs."
• "You have not gone to school; your opinion is not relevant."
• "You are educated; you do not understand our women at the grassroots."
It is unfortunate that such cultural idiosyncrasies are assimilated into our mindsets so much as to 
influence how both men and women exercise their vo ng rights. 
Radical feminists agree that women are subject to male poli cal domina on, as Catherine A. 
MacKinnon (1989) puts it, “ The state is male jurispruden ally: meaning that it adopts the 
standpoint of male power on the rela on between law and society… those who have freedoms 
like equality, liberty, privacy and speech socially keep them legally free of government intrusion. 
No one who does not have them socially is granted them legally. ” 
The Cons tu on of Kenya, 2010 a empts to tackle gender equality in poli cs. Ar cle 81(b) 
provides that not more than two-thirds of the members of elec ve public bodies shall be of the 
same gender. To give effect to this, Ar cle 97(1) (b) creates in the Na onal Assembly, posi ons 
for forty-seven women, each elected by the registered voters of the coun es, each county making 
up a single-member cons tuency. 
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However, the reality is that gender equality is far from being achieved in poli cs. A Gender 
Bill introduced to the Na onal Assembly, to give effect to Ar cle 27 of the Cons tu on, which 
seeks to promote affirma ve ac on mechanisms that ensure that not more than two-thirds of 
the members in elec ve and appoin ve bodies shall be of the same gender, was rejected. The 
Gender Bill was debated upon in early May, 2016 at the Na onal Assembly. Out of the 199 
members present, 178 objected to it. The general feeling among male members of parliament was 
an interpreta on that it was a move to give ‘free’ seats to women. 
In the mean me, any issues pertaining to women that are raised are either ignored, debated and 
not acted upon, legislated but not implemented, given low priority, misinterpreted as destroying 
our tradi ons and culture and most o en, they do not even pass to law as they are rejected by the 
majority of the Members of Parliament who are men.
3.  FAMILY LAW (MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE)
Feminists propound that the structuring of the law itself is a reason for gender inequality. Family 
and matrimonial issues con nue to be approached from a gendered perspec ve. 
According to tradi onal African society, culture ruled that property should be owned by the 
husband in marriage. The place of women in society was to maintain a family and raise children. 
In divorce cases, the insistence on dividing property according to contribu on has in many 
instances, failed to protect women who are housewives and whose contribu ons are not monetary 
yet who work so hard to keep their families intact while their husbands go to work. 
Before the enactment of the Matrimonial Property of 2013, Sec on 17 of the Married Women's 
Property Act (MWPA) of 1882 (now repealed) was used to divide matrimonial property in divorce 
cases. It was first applied in Kenya in the case of I vs I  (1970), as a statute of general applica on. 
Such a statute can only be applied if there is no other wri en law to that effect and in so far as the 
circumstances of Kenya and its inhabitants permit, according to sec on 3 of the Judicature Act 
(Chapter 8, Laws of Kenya). It states: " In any dispute between husband and wife as to the  tle 
or possession of property, either of them may apply to the High Court... and the judge may make 
such order with respect to property in dispute... as he thinks it. " (ibid).
Kenyan courts have innova vely interpreted sec on 17 of the MWPA to develop jurispudence in 
the division of matrimonial property (Baraza, 2009). The problem is that sec on 17 was applied 
inconsistently by case law, o en to the detriment of women. In the Kenyan case of Karanja vs 
Karanja (1976), the wife alleged she had contributed money to the purchase of their matrimonial 
property, which included a matrimonial home but the husband evicted her from their home. The 
court awarded her only a third of the property while the husband remained in the matrimonial 
home.
It is also important to note that housewives are not the only women vulnerable to economic 
domina on and exploita on by their husbands. Elite women may also be oppressed in other 
non-cultural ways. For example, many working women take loans to purchase property to be 
registered in their husbands’ names or buy cars for their husbands while they go to work by bus 
(Kabira and Muthoni, 1994). The reason is simply because of the cultural ideologies entrenched 
in our society that a man should be 'seen' as the one who is doing economically be er than his 
wife. Neither educa on nor the law can fully erase this tradi onal mindset.
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Ar cle 45(3) of The Cons tu on of Kenya (2010) is a great milestone as it tries to cure the defect 
of sec on 17 of the MWPA. It states; " Par es to a marriage are en tled to equal rights at the 
 me of the marriage, during the marriage and at the dissolu on of the marriage." (COK, Art 45).
The Matrimonial Property Act however provides for the division of matrimonial property on 
the basis of contribu on, which contradicts the cons tu onal right to equality in marriage. 
To remedy this, courts have construed the meaning of contribu on to matrimonial property to 
include contribu on in both monetary and non-monetary terms. For instance, the holding in 
Kivuitu vs Kivuitu (1997) suggests that par cipa on of a wife in managing the famiy affairs is 
sufficient contribu on (Baraza, 2009). However, strict evidence has to be adduced to convince 
the court to adopt such posi on, hence the assump on that neither party is an 'automa c asset' to 
the matrimonial property un l the value of their contribu on is proven.
4. PROPERTY OWNERSHIP
Ar cle 40 of the Cons tu on provides that every person has the right to own property. Under all 
customary law, property, land in par cular, could only be possessed by men. Women could not 
own property as they were also considered property. The inequality has been reflected in divorce 
and succession disputes, many of which were se led by clan elders. Kenya's Cons tu on and the 
Law of Succession now protects women from customary depriva on of property rights. 
The Law of Succession Act, which is the main legisla on in succession ma ers, does not 
discriminate against children as any child of the deceased is en tled to inherit, whether male or 
female. This posi on has been upheld by the Cons tu on which invalidates any customary law 
inconsistent with the Cons tu on. 
5.     DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Domes c and family violence occurs when someone in an in mate or familial rela onship 
a empts to gain and/or maintain power and control over another through a wide range of abusive 
behaviours. Abuse may be demonstrated by a single act as well as several acts that form a pa ern, 
even though some or all of those acts, when viewed in isola on, may seem insignificant.
Many cases go unreported because the vic ms accept and condone the violence. In African 
Tradi onal society, a man had a right to chas se his wife, and she had a duty to apologise. The 
customary ideology was that the wife had wronged the husband and therefore deserved a bea ng.
In Kenya, as in many socie es, women are socialised to accept, tolerate, and even ra onalise 
domes c violence, and to remain silent about such experiences. One reason is because the family 
is said to be a private se ng, whose issues are further considered private family ma ers. Families 
will o en hide and dismiss blatant and frequent crimes, including murder, rape, and physical 
abuse of women in the home, in the name of defending the family honour. Subsequently, many 
vic ms of abuse in in mate rela onships do not seek help or report for fear of s gma sa on. 
Others cover up for the perpetrators because they may be the bread winners and they think they 
cannot live without them.
6. FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION (FGM)
The barbaric prac ce of Female Genital Mu la on (FGM) is one of the ways which gross 
violence has manifested itself by way of customs. It is also a unique form of violence against 
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women because it is o en perpetrated by women against other women, in the furtherance of 
culture and tradi on. 
The agony that accompanies FGM is intolerable and detrimental to human rights. It is a criminal 
offence and campaigns to eliminate this prac ce have been successful in many parts of the 
country.
7. SEXUAL INEQUALITY
Women's place in marriage has been held by culture to provide sex and consor um. One of the 
reasons given for polygamy in Tradi onal African society was to ensure that a man is sa sied 
sexually at all  mes. The wife had no similar conjugal rights. Women have been looked upon as 
sex objects by men and the society. 
Rape and defilement are criminal offences rampant in most African countries, including Kenya. 
Marital rape is not included in the Sexual Offences Act. Vic ms con nue to suffer in silence with 
nowhere to run for help. Cases of rape and defilement are rampant within the family, the majority 
of vic ms being women and children.
LEGAL MILESTONES: CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER PROVISIONS
The Penal Code as read with the Sexual Offences Act criminalises all forms of sexual offences. 
However, other factors hinder jus ce to rape vic ms. Many vic ms have complained that Police 
officers are not coopera ve in the inves ga on of cases and arrest of culprits while others have 
a ributed delayed jus ce to the complicated evidence gathering process.
The enactment of the Protec on Against Domes c Violence Act in 2014 is a milestone that has 
shown the state’s determina on towards curbing family perpetrated gender violence. However, 
it only grants an interim protec on order to the vic m but does not ini ate criminal proceedings, 
which are s ll ins tuted under the Penal Code, as normal assault. 
Currently, the Prohibi on against FGM Act seeks to protect women from this barbaric prac ce. 
It criminalises the prac ce of FGM of any kind in Kenya. Other than the statutes in place to deal 
with gender-based violence, such as the Sexual Offences Act, the Cons tu on of Kenya provides 
for the Bill of Rights (Chapter four of the Cons tu on), which provides for various fundamental 
rights and freedoms. 
Ar cle 27(4) outlaws discrimina on on the basis of sex while Ar cle 29(d) guarantees protec on 
for all Kenyans from torture, inhuman or degrading punishment and other treatment whether 
physical or psychological. Rape, marital or otherwise is a demeaning and undigniied act. It 
therefore falls into the category of inhuman and degrading treatment as enshrined in the 
Cons tu on. 
Equally, the protec on of the right to life under Ar cle 26 as well as the right to the security of 
the person is also evident and upholds the dignity of women. It states that no person shall be 
subjected to any form of violence from either public or private sources. The family is a ‘private’ 
se ng and therefore is prohibited from perpetra ng acts of violence.
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Ar cle 2(4) of the Cons tu on invalidates any law, including customary law, contrary to the 
Cons tu on. This automa cally invalidates tradi onal and cultural prac ces contrary to the Bill 
of Rights or repugnant to jus ce and morality.
Ar cle 2(5) of the Cons tu on, provides that the general rules of interna onal law shall form 
part of the law of Kenya; and ar cle 2(6) provides that any treaty or conven on ra ied by Kenya 
shall form part of the law of Kenya. Whether the ra ied trea es and conven ons will have the 
same force as laws enacted by the Kenyan legislature remains to be seen.
Interna onal trea es and conven ons that con nue to guide Kenya on the upholding of human 
rights and eradica on of gender-based violence include:
1. Universal Declara on of Human Rights
2. Conven on on the Elimina on of All Forms of Discrimina on against Women (CEDAW)
3. Declara on on the Elimina on of Violence against Women (DEVAW)
4. The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Banjul Conven on) Provisions on the 
Rights of Women
5. The Interna onal Covenant on Civil and Poli cal Rights (ICCPR)
6. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa.
7. The Interna onal Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
CONCLUSION
Culture and patriarchy remain dominant in the African family system. Some cultural prac ces 
infringe on human rights per nent to women, while some cultural stereotypes are a barrier to 
women empowerment. The law itself is male dominated, in its structure, interpreta on and its 
prac ce. The majority of the lawmakers are men, therefore, making it dificult to pass laws that 
beneit women. 
Judicial approach on gender issues is not impressive. Courts have a duty to interpret the 
cons tu on in a manner that upholds its dignity and supremacy. Several Judges have been 
accused of displaying ignorance on gender equality, notably in ma ers of divorce. Police oficers 
also relax on their role in maintaining law and order, in ensuring that the female gender is not 
vulnerable to gender-related abuse. 
Women should also strive to promote their own empowerment. For instance, one wonders why 
women are the minority in Parliament despite being the majority of voters. Is it because they are 
jealous of their fellow women? The ques on remains rhetoric. Certain types of Gender Violence 
such as FGM, are perpetrated by women. 
However, despite the setbacks, Kenya has witnessed remarkable improvement in the welfare 
of women. The Cons tu on itself has departed from harmful cultural prac ces and has upheld 
a deep regard for human rights and dignity. This is an indicator that there is progress in Africa 
towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, in par cular, SDG5.
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‘BLACK’ COLONIALISM IS THE LEADING CAUSE OF 
ZIMBABWE’S COLLAPSE
Sensewell Chingwaramusee
Theologian, Editor and Na onal Coordinator I – YALF Zimbabwe,
Gweru, Zimbabwe.
Black colonialism is the neo-oppression of black people by other black elite groups within a 
certain area according to the researcher. In this instance, some war veterans who fought for the 
libera on of Zimbabwe and other poli cians seem to have fought in order to replace the white 
oppressive regime. Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980 from the Ian Smith colonial rule 
and for a while, independence meant enjoying self-black majority rule  ll the elected poli cians 
began to ignore the needs of their masses. This ar cle serves to explicitly express the effects 
of black colonialism in Zimbabwe and how the wrath of the elite elevated their divide and rule 
tac cs. However, the researcher urges the youths to challenge the new type of oppression to 
guarantee a be er future for their children and grandchildren.
Poverty, hopelessness and tremendous pain are traits marked on the faces of every person branded 
Zimbabwean. Ques ons of what tomorrow will be hover around the stressed skulls of the great 
Zimbabweans as not enough love is buried deep underneath the li le overburdened hearts due 
to the incorrigible means of survival. Even these incorrigible means of survival have resulted 
in overnight mushrooming of Chris an movements as a guise to poverty deliverance and hope 
restora on. In our Shona vernacular 'they' is a proverb that says “mudzimu wakupa chironda 
wa nhunzi dzikudye,” that is, the spirits that have wounded one has le  them to be fed by lies. 
Just like the proverb, the researcher thinks that’s what we have become as Zimbabweans, in 
rela on to the very dry rain spell, pathe c poli cs and economics alas, we have become cursed as 
each day presents itself. Due to the hardship posed on by Black colonialism, Zimbabweans have 
entered into both the second and third stage of emo onal depression which are anger and bargain 
respec vely according to Kubler-Ross model (2005). This is why they have a lot of fault-inding 
ques ons in their minds. Is it God or the Ancestors or both who have placed this curse on us or 
have we self-inlicted the curse upon ourselves? What is wrong with being Zimbabwean? The 
ques ons remain unanswered but a solu on to break this bad spell upon our beloved Zimbabwe 
is needed urgently. 
Furthermore, describing Zimbabwe as the “land of Milk and Honey” according to the researcher 
is unmen onable, especially to the majority of Zimbabweans silently in agony with lat dry 
chests as well as honeyless bees that prohibit them from making ends meet as described in the 
previous paragraph. Perhaps the term “milk and honey” is rela ve to the elite poli cians who 
have, over the years, amassed wealth for themselves by abusing their powers as public office 
holders, resul ng in them having well-pronounced milk blossoms and honey bees to only feed 
their families. It is now difficult for an educated person to ind formal employment that suits their 
qualifica on. Instead, the people have resorted to survival means and according to The Standard 
(February 9, 2014), the streets have developed the phrase ‘degreed vendor’ reflec ng how 
milkless the na on has become in accommoda ng graduates. Many University graduates have 
resorted to selling secondhand clothes or air me to make ends meet since the few job openings 
Sensewell Chingwaramusee
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some mes are filled with the well-connected elites. Most of these 'degreed vendors' occupy the 
pavements, at the present moment, in Harare and other ci es which served as reference in The 
Herald of May 28, 2015 and Nehanda radio ar cle of April 17, 2016. 
In rela on to the la er, it seems like yesterday, when our parents encouraged us to be educated 
in the belief that educa on holds the key to success. This belief was based on evident examples 
of family and friends who had made it. But today, here we are, with the highest educa onal 
qualifica on and yet refered to by society as educated loafers or educated vendors. How then 
does one console such parents whose hopes have dwindled and who have had poverty slammed 
them in their faces a er educa ng their children for years? How does one mo vate the li le 
children whose dreams are as far reaching as their sleep can be, in a jobless society? How does 
one expect to receive a blessing from the creator where poverty, hopelessness and misery are 
inherited through the bellows of birth? No one wants to be born in poverty and shame despite 
how humble they will become later in life, that is if they escape the scourge and snares of being 
Zimbabwean by birth. Be that as it may, the effects of Black colonialism have destroyed our 
educa on sector to an extent that a university degree seems a worthless thing to a ain.
We can go on to say that hard work does not pay in Zimbabwe. With the example of the current 
economic situa on, such a statement can seem so valid. Zimbabwean children work so hard in 
their academics all through the years of acquiring knowledge and at the end, they become jobless 
in their own country where they are expected to have first preferences to opportuni es. Perhaps 
some might have been caught up in a maze, like Dambudzo Marechera (1979) describes, “…
smaller room: numb, dark, and also u erly empty. I could not bring myself to touch the walls to 
prove that they were there….” Some may finally escape the “House of Hunger” by skipping the 
borders for greener pastures, but in the end “...you travel to search and you come back home to 
ind yourself there ” accentuates Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie (2002). Zimbabweans are sca ered 
world over, not because they enjoy foreign na ons but as a way to escape the depressing effects 
of Black colonialism. This unfortunate exile exposes Zimbabweans to xenophobia, human 
trafficking among other evils found in living far from home. 
Black colonialism has oppressed the rights of those workers who are trying to serve the na on 
with their skills. Lest we forget, the civil servants as well as parastatal workers who have  relessly 
served our country with services to develop the na on for many years lose their job for no reason 
and are not given any benefits as evidenced in Reuters of 16 august 2015. Correspondingly, The 
Herald of April 15, 2016, writes about the 15 months unpaid salaries of railway workers: The 
abuse of workers’ rights in Zimbabwe has rife, thus the Chloe Mitchell (2010) mindset of ‘ …
so much of everything how do we leave with nothing?’ wrestle the workers’ minds resul ng in 
hampered progress. These workers have no choice but to remain working for no salary since 
finding another job in a jobless Zimbabwe (that has less than 11% employment rate) is equivalent 
to searching for a needle in a haystack. The elite poli cians are suffoca ng the workers for their 
own benefit because there is no month that a minister or parliamentarian goes unpaid, therefore, 
for the reason that their stomachs are full they will not represent the workers even if they are the 
ones who made them get into those powerful posi ons.
However, Zimbabwe is proudly and loudly applauded for being a hardworking na on, our 
weakness is that moment we are pinned to accept substandard rewards for our work and that is 
when these powerful poli cians step on us to reinforce their power. The researcher believes that 
what we consistently do becomes a habit. Let us break the habit of accep ng substandard rewards 
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for our hardwork. This should also apply to the rest of the con nent. We do not need to be irm to 
stand for the quality that we truly deserve; we only need to be more united in one voice, which is 
bold and authorita ve, to alter the system of things and become valid as we truly are. We need to 
have the a tude of Dambudzo, “when all else fails, don’t take it in silence: scream like hell…. ” 
With the case study of Zimbabwe, Africa has become vulnerable to predators channeling Black 
colonialism within and outside the land that preys on the masses' weakness as they amass their 
wealth by abusing mass power.
More so, Zimbabwe as well as Africa at large needs to work towards developing the youths and 
harnessing their poten al in various skills. The youths have so much energy to do a lot, plus 
they are technologically informed. It is evident that the youths in the 80's managed to change 
the face of Africa which was under colonial oppression. The likes of Kwame Nkrumah, Haile 
Selassie, Julius Nyerere, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Sekou Toure amongst other pan-Africanist 
formed the Organisa on of African Union (OAU) now African Union aiming “ to promote unity 
and solidarity of African states, safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, 
coordinate and intensify their coopera on and efforts to achieve a be er life for the people of 
Africa. "
Nevertheless, as Zimbabwean youths of this genera on, we do not only stand and complain but 
our voices are being thwarted and so are our ac ons. The playing field of ac vism is compromised. 
This is the same reason Zimbabwean youths have decided to be silent but con nue gnashing their 
teeth, being unable to reach their pinnacle for reasons they know but fear to express. Zimbabwe 
has had a fair share of brave youths that tried to challenge the oppressive system but they were 
silenced. Itai Dzamara was made as an example to bring fear on the youth for being poli cally 
expressive. Ace Lumumba’s reputa on was destroyed as soon as he turned his back on the power 
that mentored him which also made sure that young youthful leaders follow and not cri cize the 
system. Pastor Evan Mawarire with his #theflag movement gained mileage as youths found a 
brave man to rally behind in order to air their views but was cri cized and described as displaying 
childish emo onal outburst by Tafadzwa Musarara, a poli cal analyst in a debate interview on the 
Pla orm of ZI FM. In the mean me, Pastor Evan Mawarire has been standing against the black 
to black oppression system in Zimbabwe by organizing ci zens mee ng with the Reserve bank 
Governor, Dr Mangudya, to denounce the introduc on of bond notes which the elite poli cians 
are trying to introduce to Zimbabweans.
To conclude, Zimbabwean youths, as well as other African youths, need to focus on preparing 
our future and that of our children. Despite the challenges we face, we need to focus on raising 
our voices and ac ng towards our goals by uni ng and strengthening our voices together just 
like the OAU forefathers did in figh ng against Black colonialism. Let us begin to write our own 
stories to develop our countries, con nuing with the legacy of the OAU. This is not the  me just 
to ask the ques on "what is wrong with being Zimbabwean or African ", it is the  me to accept, 
ind solu ons and the purpose of being Zimbabwean or African. Young African Leaders Forum 
(YALF) is now bridging the gap aiming to move African na ons to the first world status and 
this begins by pu ng our voices out through such pla orms. The pen is migh er than the sword 
let us speak out Zimbabweans, let us speak out young Africans! Black colonialism is the new 
oppression that has affected our educa on, industries and social setup. The researcher desires the 
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ABSTRACT
With the underlying hypothesis that the quality of a teachers’ training is directly propor onal 
to the quality of educa on pupils eventually receive, this essay explores and cri ques the basic 
educa on teacher training process in Cameroon, using two notable educa onal theories to 
assess the possibility of quality educa on resul ng from Cameroonian government-trained basic 
educa on teachers. It was found that there is dire need to improve the quality of teachers we train 
to ensure that they can deliver the quality of educa on we seek. A brief outline of sugges ons is 
made towards improving the flawed training system. 
INTRODUCTION
Discourse on quality educa on is fairly recent. Though the interna onal community has long 
priori zed educa on as a fundamental human right, un l the year 2000, li le had been said on the 
quality of the compulsory basic educa on (EFA: GMR 2005). Today however, there is a notable 
shi  in both scholarly debate and interna onal development advocacy, which now emphasizes 
on the quality of educa on achieved more than the rates of enrolment, years of schooling or 
gender parity (Barre  et al. 2006). Though these are worthy and necessary indicators, they are 
considered limited as evidence of impac ul educa on for development.
But what is quality educa on? A review of literature suggests that quality has a different 
connota on depending on what lack in educa on is being addressed; whether lack in gender 
sensi vity, equality, pragma sm, relevance of content, pedagogic style or cultural rela vity. 
However, ‘Defining Quality in Educa on’, a working paper presented by UNICEF at the mee ng 
of The Interna onal Working Group on Educa on at Florence, Italy in June 2000, denotes ive 
‘dimensions’ of quality; learners’ well-being, environment, content, process, and outcome. A 
quality Cameroonian educa on would therefore entail holis cally healthy learners, provided 
with the adequate resources, facili es, and environments that are safe, secure, gender-sensi ve 
and inclusive (not barring the handicapped or those with different languages). Quality educa on 
as per this defini on requires teaching content that is relevant and able to add value; involving 
processes through which trained teachers use child-centred teaching in well-managed classrooms 
to facilitate learning rather than dictate. 
It is clear by this defini on that teachers and educators have a long standing order of how and 
what to impart in the classroom as well as a responsibility in ensuring the right frame of mind 
and environment for quality educa on to be carried out. The produc on of the required “first-rate 
teachers” then is a vital part of ensuring quality educa on is delivered. 
Monique Kwachou
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In Cameroon, the “produc on” of the majority (the majority refers to those under government 
employ) of teachers is in the hands of certain government ins tu ons. With the underlying 
hypothesis that the quality of a teacher’s training is directly propor onal to the quality of 
educa on pupils eventually receive, this essay shall outline the situa on of training of basic 
educa on teachers in Cameroon, using two notable educa onal theories to assess the possibility 
of quality educa on resul ng from such Cameroonian government trained teachers. These 
theories, the Social Reproduc on theory and the Nussbaum’s Capabili es Approach, will be used 
interchangeably to forward arguments answering the ques on of if and how well the teachers 
(of basic educa on par cularly) produced in Cameroon are equipped and up to the challenge of 
providing the quality of educa on sought a er.  
BASIC EDUCATION TEACHER TRAINING IN CAMEROON
Formal training of basic educa on teachers in Cameroon remains primarily in the hands of the 
government. This means that while there are a few private (mission) teacher training schools 
(Tchombe, 1998), the state does the greater share of teacher training with fi y-seven government 
owned teacher training ins tu ons (almost one for each of the country’s fi y-eight divisions). 
The state is also solely responsible for the provision of teachers to state schools, which are free - 
and subsequently the largest providers of educa on. 
With the implementa on of free basic educa on in 1999, the primary Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) 
increased from 87.7 percent in 2000 to 105.4 percent in 2002 (Ka an, 2006). New government 
policy limited basic teacher educa on to only courses for the Grade I teacher cer ficate based 
on law no. 98/004 of 14 April 1998 (Tchombe, 1998). The government intended to improve 
quality by revising student curricula, providing textbooks and teaching materials, improving 
school infrastructure, offering in-service training for exis ng teachers and hiring new teachers 
(Ka an,2006). Although government inten ons are rarely ever followed by ac ons, there has 
been noted changes in teacher training syllabus as of 2012, the crea on of an alternate route to 
teaching qualifica on via a university degree from the University of Buea, Cameroon and an 
increase in enrolment into teacher training colleges (MINESEC, 2012; Tchombe, 1998).
As of now, the teacher training procedure consists of selec ve admission into teachers’ training 
ins tu ons based on registra on for and success in an entrance examina on of wri en and oral 
parts (Tambo, 1995). The examina on, which is limited to ci zens between the ages of 18 and 
32 years, is in two parts: a language paper and a maths paper, both set at secondary school 
comprehension level by the Ministry of Secondary Educa on (MINESEC, 2012). Candidates 
who make it through this wri en session then have to pass an oral test/interview. This concludes 
the entry process into the teachers training college.  
As a student teacher, training generally focuses on educa onal theory, principles for prac ce and 
of course the academic disciplines they would teach (Tchombe, 1998). A more defined syllabus 
was drawn up by the Ministry of Secondary Educa on decree no. 2012/267 of 11 June 2012, 
(MINESEC, 2012).
This current syllabus is illustrated in the following tables.
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Levels
               Training   

























Teaching Prac ce 222 222 222 222 222 222
Didac cs of Primary 
and Nursery School 
Ac vi es
510 420 510 510 510 510
Science of Educa on 
Subjects
420 510 420 450 420 510
Bilingual Training 60 60 60 60 60 60
Total 1212 1212 1212 1242 1212 1302
Figure 1: Table Displaying Time Alloca on in Teacher Training Courses
Annual Dura on: 36 weeks
Average number of weekly teaching hours: 34 hours
The specific subjects within the training domains outlined above (except for teaching prac ce) 
with the corresponding hours per subject for all three pathways can be seen below.














c o u r s e : 
2nd year
O n e -
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2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Pedagogic 
Supervision
// 1 1 1 1 1 1
Philosophy of 
Educa on
// 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sociology of 
Educa on













1 1 1 1 1 1 1
First Language 2 2 // 2 // // 1
Second Language 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
French Didac cs 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
English Didac cs 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
Didac cs of 
Matheme cs














1 1 1 1 1 1 1














c o u r s e : 
2nd year
O n e -




Didac cs of Song 
and Music


















1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ini a on to 
Ac on research
// 1 1 1 1 1 2
Didac cs of 
Nursery Ac vi es
1 1 // 1 1 1 1
Total 34 35 32 35 35 35 31
MINESEC New Syllabus Manual, 2012 P. 7-8
As seen above, the training program comprises of one part theory, two parts content acquisi on 
(subjects to be taught) and one part teaching prac ce or tutorials in schools. Over the course of 
one, two or three years depending on the cycle, the candidates write a final examina on. They 
are also observed and evaluated on prac cal teaching skills by their professors, government 
inspectors and selected classroom teachers in the schools in which the students did their prac ce. 
In addi on, students are required to submit a long essay (supervised) on a topic related to their 
training (Tambo, 1995). 
Upon successful comple on candidates receive cer fica on for teaching called the Teacher Grade 
I cer ficate or the Cer icat d’Ap tude Pédagogue de  l’Enseignement Maternel et Primaire 
(Tchombe, 1998).  Teachers are subsequently deployed as regional delegates as per the needs of 
the schools in the regions. 
Despite certain changes in curriculum, several aspects have remained the same and issues 
persist with the “teacher produc on” process in Cameroon. According to the 2011 Transparency 
Interna onal Cameroon report, corrup on pervades the educa onal process from the admission of 
students into teachers' training ins tu ons through to the recruitment of teachers upon comple on. 
As stated earlier, entrance into GTTC/ENIEG ins tu ons is done through the passing of a 
compe  ve wri en examina on followed by an oral test for the shortlisted candidates. While the 
content of the wri en exam is rela vely transparent, the oral segment has been heavily cri cized 
and is a medium for the passing of bribes  to interviewers ensuring admission (Fokwang, 2003).
This prac ce has been inves gated and proven as common with na onal entrance examina ons 
or concours.
Again, VSO (2013) has cri qued Cameroon’s teachers’ training process as 'ungendered'. Aside 
from the lack of policies to address the wide gender disparity in basic educa on (Lyonga, 2014; 
EFA Global Monitoring Report, 2013/14), VSO (2013) further states that there is no a empt at 
raising gender consciousness via teacher training and this results in a lack of gender sensi vity 
in the classroom.
The inadequacy of teaching prac ce has likewise been noted by Tchombe (1998) and more 
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recently by Lyonga (2014). The amount of  me allocated for teaching prac ce is by far less than 
the focus given to the subject didac cs. Issues related to class popula ons were also perceived: 
student teachers mostly prac ce in pairs or more, and as such, do not really experience what it 
would be like to handle the overpopulated classes they will be recruited to teach, par cularly in 
rural areas. 
Tambo (1995) equally cri cizes the lack of diversity in teaching styles taught to teachers in 
training. He suggests that as a result of this inadequacy they eventually teach homogenously in 
classrooms, unable to cater to students with disabili es or ensure individualis c/student centred 
learning which considers differences in ap tudes. 
Likewise, this weakness in teaching style is echoed by Lyonga (2014).  In her research, student-
teachers hinged their own intelligence and subsequently that of the students they taught on the 
amount of knowledge they could reproduce in examina ons, this not only proves that they are 
trained to ignore different learning styles, but also illustrates what Freire (1970) refers to as a 
“banking system of knowledge”. 
The most common issue with the process of teacher produc on in Cameroon however, would be 
the low quality of candidates applying for training. Mingat (2002) found that teaching is mostly 
a last resort in African countries. In Cameroon for instance, prospec ve basic educa on teachers 
enter training ins tu ons above the age of twenty having only secondary school qualifica ons 
of Advance and/or Ordinary level GCE cer ficates with below average scores (above average 
would be more than two papers in the Advance level and ive or more at Ordinary level).
Considering that the standard age for those qualifica ons are age eighteen and below, it can be 
concluded that becoming a primary school teacher was not their original plan but rather something 
they have resigned to do for sustainance. Tambo (1995) asserts that poten al teachers ought to 
be required to demonstrate an interest in teaching and screened thoroughly to substan ate their 
academic qualifica ons in order to ascertain their mo va on for and a tude toward teaching and 
working with children as this would affect their quality. 
Finally, with inadequate libraries and ICT equipment in training schools, student-teachers are 
trained without necessary resources for their capacity building and professionaliza on (Tchombe, 
1998). This results in the teachers produced being somewhat inept in this informa on age.
THEORETICALLY CRITIQUING THE SITUATION
It is clear that there are significant problems with Cameroon’s basic educa on teacher training 
process. The subsequent part of this paper shall use two theories to assess the possibility of 
quality educa on resul ng from the situa on outlined above. 
The idea of Social Reproduc on first came to public a en on through the work of Bowles and 
Gin s (1976), American Marxist theorists who argued against the idealis c belief that educa on 
and schooling was a means of equalizing dispari es across social classes. Their work asserted 
that on the contrary, educa on was a means to a capitalist end of reproducing economic/social 
classifica ons (Nash, 1984). In summa on the Social Reproduc on theory asserts that formal 
educa on reproduces class structures either by who has priority access to the educa on or by 
what is taught and passed on in classroom.
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The Capabili es Approach on the other hand is a mul disciplinary framework that was originally 
formulated by economist Amartya Sen in the 1980’s (Sen, 1985). This framework is a norma ve 
one which proposes that the true indicator of well-being is what people are capable of doing/
being/achieving (func oning) (Unterhalter, Vaughan and Walker, 2007). The Capabili es 
Approach asserts that educa on is an instrument of expanding people’s capabili es and freedoms 
to achieve those func onings (Robeyns, 2006) which are important to them. Alkire (2005) also 
asserts that educa on is vital to agency as people need to be educated to par cipate poli cally and 
strive for change and the expansion of their valuable freedoms. Educa on is thus an achievement 
(func oning) on its own as well as a means enabling the individual to pursue subsequent 
freedoms (Robeyns, 2006). The Capabili es Approach is thus employed in educa onal research 
in evalua ng and assessing the extent to which the educa on one receives offers the individual 
necessary freedoms and abili es to achieve valuable func onings. 
It is these two theore cal lenses which shall be employed to assess the poten al output of quality 
from teacher training in Cameroon. For one, the aspect of gender sensi vity in required quality 
educa on is impinged by the ungendered teacher training process. Due to the lack of gender 
sensi ve training, teachers produced subsequently carry their tradi onally patriarchal percep ons 
and stereotypes into the classrooms where, as the Social Reproduc on theorist would have us 
understand, class/social structure specificaly in terms of gender construc on is generated and 
passed on to the next genera on. 
Likewise, the absence of different learning styles in training student teachers ensures they caters 
to learners of certain cogni ve styles over other children with different ap tudes or special needs, 
thus reproducing an unequal learning system. This teacher training therefore leaves teachers 
inept at providing learner centric educa on required of quality educa on.
Following the Capabili es Approach, the teacher training process equally falls short given that 
most applicants for teacher training ins tu ons are below average students who venture into 
teaching resignedly as opposed to inspiringly. They can hardly deliver an educa on which enables 
func oning, when their teaching as a last resort expresses the limits of their own func oning.
Using the Capabili es Approach, we can equally ques on the prospec ve teachers’ ability to 
deliver current, relevant content demanded of quality educa on, considering the inadequate 
resources, libraries, textbooks and ICT knowledge available for them to foster themselves with 
(Tchombe, 1998). It is worthy to note that a per nent problem facing basic educa on in Cameroon 
is the lack of textbooks with a majority of primary school pupils lacking accompanying texts 
(Worldbank, 2014). This could be interpreted by social reproduc on theorists as a result of 
teachers who have been trained without necessary resources and thus the absence of text-reading 
culture.  
Both the Capabili es Approach and Social Reproduc on theory, would suggest that the presence 
of corrup on in the recruitment process of poten al teachers inhibits the possibility of delivering 
quality educa on. On one hand, this brings the risk of reproducing corrupt a tudes and ensures 
that only a par cular class (those able to bribe their way in) would serve as teachers, inlfuencing 
the next genera on and s fling the agency of other groups from the classroom. 
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CONCLUSION
In summary, the interna onal call for quality educa on - while an admirable one, is unlikely to 
be realised in Cameroon un l teacher training enables prospec ve teachers with the capabili es 
to deliver quality and curbs the reproduc on of certain socio-cultural inequali es. 
It is recommended that in addi on to current government effort in increasing enrolment rate 
towards universal basic educa on, the quality of teachers' training is focused upon. Increased 
and be er investment in teacher training resources, gender sensi ve curriculum, an inclusive 
pedagogy, a more rigorous recruitment process which would diminish routes of corrup on and 
demand that candidates prove their mo va on for this career field are some sugges ons towards 
ensuring a more effec ve teacher training process.
 
Un l be er efforts and inputs are commi ed to training teachers, which Zumwalt (in Tambo, 
1995) describes as the key to educa on, no considerable a empt would have been made towards 
achieving quality in educa on.
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ABSTRACT
This study aimed at assessing the impact of conflict on the level of availability of selected non-
 mber forest products around Omo forest reserve of Ogun State. Data was collected with the aid of 
well-structured ques onnaire on one hundred and twenty marke ng households using mul stage 
sampling technique. The data was analyzed using descrip ve sta s cs, categoriza on method and 
t-test. The data analysis targeted socio-economic characteris cs, the level of availability of NTFP 
before/a er the conflict in the study area. It was revealed that majority (69.2%) were farmers and 
(75%) had experienced conflict more than 3  mes. It was discovered that the selected NTFPs 
were available in abundance with bi er kola and kola nut recording higher levels respec vely 
before conflict, while wild mango and walnut were NTFPs that were s ll available in excess a er 
conflict. The test of difference analysis result shows that there is a signiicant difference in the 
availability level before and a er conflict. 
INTRODUCTION
Forests can be simultaneously recognized as a ‘daily net’ and a ‘safety net’ for the rural dwellers 
that use forest resources (F.A.O 2005). Forests have sustained life on earth through the ages. 
They supply food, medicine, energy, shelter, fodder, wood and non-wood forest products and 
are a source of economic development for individuals and communi es. They have cultural 
and spiritual values. It is es mated that 90% of the world’s poor depend on forests for at least 
a por on of their income (World Bank, 2000; Scherl et al., 2004; USAID, 2006). In Nigeria, 
users of forest products include forest dwellers, nearby farmers, commercial users (including 
small traders, producers and employees) and the urban poor. Timber, non- mber forest products 
(NTFPs) and animal protein are all used by the rural poor for subsistence, and also as a source 
of income and employment. Nigeria NTFPs are a key resource for many poor communi es. 
NTFPs are o en open-access resources and require li le processing or the use of low cost (o en 
tradi onal) techniques. An overview of case studies indicates that forest products contribute 
between 20% and 40% of total household income in forest areas and that poor households tend 
to be dispropor onately dependent on forest resources (especially fuel wood and fodder) (Vedeld 
et al., 2007). Based on this type of findings, investment in NTFPs use has o en been proposed 
as a method of poverty allevia on (Brown & Williams, 2003). Conflicts have several  mes been 
related to poverty. Li le wonder it is o en said that a hungry man is an angry man. As stated 
by Draman (2003), with the end of the cold war, poverty and conflict have become the biggest 
challenges to sustainable development. Furthermore, he submi ed that (even though debatable) 
poverty is con nuously cited as one of the principal factors responsible for instability in many 
parts of Africa. Onigu (2001) in his view of conflict stated that what makes a society an ideal 
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polity is the extent to which the conflic ng interests and needs in the society are construc vely 
managed so that violence does not threaten its con nued existence. In Omo forest reserve, the 
dwellers around the reserves depended on the NTFPs for their income and survival. The income 
generated from the NTFPs was being threatened by various forms of conflicts around the reserve. 
In 2009, there was a serious conflict between the dwellers and government which threatened 
the livelihood of the dwellers within the forest reserves. The Ogun state government forcefully 
displaced the dwellers in the enclaves resul ng in the destruc on of lives and proper es. The 
displacement of people from the enclaves lasted for a period of two years before the government 
was ordered by the court of law to allow the people con nue with their day to day ac vi es. 
Against this background, the study intends to ascertain the effect of  recent conflict on cost and 
return of NTFPs in the study area  as well as level of availability of the iden ied selected NTFPs 
before and a er conflicts. 
METHODOLOGY
The Study Area
The study was carried out in Omo Biosphere Reserve, the largest reserve in Ogun State, situated 
in Ijebu East and North Local Government areas located between la tude 06o 35N to 7o 05N and 
Longitude 04 o 19N to 4 o 40E in the South-West of Nigeria; about 135km North–East of Lagos, 
about 120km East of Abeokuta and about 80km East of Ijebu-Ode. The Reserve covers about 
130,500 hectares in the area. There are more than 30 communi es/enclaves within and around 
Omo Forest Reserve with a popula on of 59,100 (N.P.C, 2006). A 460 hectares forest block is 
found within the expanse of land to the south of the confluence of Omo river and has a tributary 
in Owena river. The popula on of the study is the rural households in the forest communi es 
within the J4 enclaves of Omo forest reserve. Mul stage random sampling method was used in 
carrying out this study.
First stage
There are four (4) zones (J1, J3, J4 and J6) in Omo forest reserve with 50 enclaves. J4 was 
purposively selected because of records of conflicts and excess availability of NTFP. The J4 
comprises of 27 enclaves-  Osoko, Abeku 1, Abeku 11, Temidere, Aba Baale (Ajebandele), Eseke, 
Etemi, Sojukodoro, Tamitami, Erin Camp, Queens Forest, Opepe, Esiri, Ori Apata, Ologuna, 
Imopa, Gbonpa, London village, Erinla, Eleyele, Owonifari, Oloji, Ejegun, pocket money village, 
Aba tutun, Adekanbi Abatutun, Eriin.
Second stage
Simple random sampling method was used to select eight (8) enclaves that are mostly affected by 
conlicts in J4 – Aba tutun, Oloji, Aba, Baale, Etemi, Tamitami, Temidere, Osoku, Erinla. In Aba 
tutun, 38 households were iden ied, 32 in oloji, 30 in Aba Baale, 16 in Etemi, 20 in Tamitami, 
38 in Temidere, 50 in Osoku and 16 in Erinla. 
Third stage
Systema c random sampling techniques were used to select 19 in Aba tutun, 16 in Oloji, 15 
in Aba Baale, 8 in Etemi, 10 in Tamitami, 19 in Temidere, 25 in Osoku and 8 in Erinla. The 
differences in the number of respondents selected per enclaves are due to the differences in the 
number of households in these enclaves. In all, a total of 120 respondents were selected for the 
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study. The heads of selected marke ng households were interviewed by means of structured 
ques onnaires.
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS
The socio-economic characteris cs from Table 1 shows that majority (60%) of the respondents 
belonged to age bracket of 50 - 59 years and those in the ac ve age of 30 and below were 5.8%. 
Those between the age group of 40 - 49 years recorded 21.7% while age group above 60 years 
was 12.5%. This implies that the NTFPs marke ng and collec ng is less flexible and much easier 
for older people compared to real farming which requires energy. This is in agreement with 
F.A.O (2005) which stated that old people engaged in the collec on of NTFPs. On marital status 
distribu on of the respondents, the result showed that majority (65.8%) were married while 
18.4 % were divorced, single and widow were 2.5% and 13.3% respec vely. This revealed that 
marriage confines responsibili es. This is in agreement with the submission of Afolayan (1998) 
that majority of the married people were engaged in processing and marke ng of NTFPs in the 
rural area.
It was revealed from the table below that females (55.8%) were into NTFPs collec on and 
marke ng than their male (44.2%) counterpart. This finding is in agreement with FAO (1991) 
report that women o en dominate forest gathering ac vi es for household produc on, 
consump on and income. On occupa onal distribu on, the result revealed that majority (69.2%) 
were farmers while the remaining 30.8% were non-farmers. This implies that farmers in the study 
area combined gathering of NTFPs with farm work to assist them in genera ng more income 
to improving their standard of living. Furthermore, it was revealed from the table that majority 
(75.0%) of the respondents had experienced conflict in the area more than three  mes while 15% 
had experienced less than three cases of conflict. This implies that the respondents interviewed 
were aware of the effect of conflict on the gathering of non- mber forest products.
Table 1: Personal Characteris cs of the Respondents
Variables              Frequency                  Percentage
Age
<39                                 7                                                     5.8
40 – 49       26   21.7
50 – 59      72   60.0
> 69      15   12.5
Total                               1  2  0                          100
Marital Status  
Single                              3                            2.5
Married                          7  9                                     65.8
Divorced                         2   2                                     18.4
W    i d  o  w                               1  6                                     13.3
Gender  
Male               53              44.2
Female              67             55.8
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Total           120             100.0
Occupa on
Framers                         83                          69.2
Non-Farmers                37                                    30.8
Total                           120                        100.0 
           
Conlict experienced
Less than 3  mes         18                             15.0
Above 3  mes              108                           75.0
Total                               120                          100.0
SOURCE: FIELD SURVEY 2013
LEVEL OF AVAILABILITY OF NON-TIMBER FOREST PRODUCTS (NTFPS) BEFORE 
AND AFTER CONFLICT
Table 2 shows the level of availability before and a er conflict. The level of the ive selected 
NTFPs was high before the conflict with all the mean values for each NTFPs higher than the 
calculated mean which is 4. The availability varies with Walnut having the higher mean value 
of 4.36 which was closely followed by mango with mean value of 4.30. Bi er kola which has 
cultural and tradi onal value had a mean value of 4.57 while kolanut and African star apple had 
the mean value of 4.53 and 4.30 respec vely. This supported the finding of Aluko et al. (2013) 
who reported that livelihood ac vi es of dwellers within and around forest reserves can only be 
sustained in the atmosphere of peace.
The table reveals that the availability of non- mber forest products dropped dras cally a er 
conflict. It was observed that the mean value of bi er kola (Garicinia kola ), kolanut ( Cola 
acumulata) and African star apple ( Chrysophyiium conophorum ) were 3.03, 3.50 and 3.50 
respec vely. Also, wild mango ( Irvingia wombulu ) and walnut ( Tetracarpidium conophorus ) 
were low compared to the value before conflict. In general, it was deduced that the level of 
availability of NTFP was low a er conflict. This implies that conflicts led to destruc on of NTFPs 
which in turn resulted in the reduc on of products. This is in line with Aluko et al (2013) that 
NTFPs will be reduced when there is displacement and conflict within and around forest reserve.
Table 2: Availablity Level of NTFPs Before and A er Conflict
Before conflict A er conflict
Product Yes No Mean Level Yes No Mean Level




















































Source: Field Survey 2013
Note – Calculated Mean = 4 , therefore < 4 = Low and > 4 = High
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION     
The availability of products was discovered to decrease except wild mango and walnut. The 
dras c reduc on was as a result of conflict in the study area.
Conlfict can have great consequences on both forest products and non-forest products if not 
properly managed by the stakeholders in the forest environment. It is therefore recommended 
that efficient conflict management should be put in place to address the issue of conlict in the 
forest environment so as to reduce or solve completely the problem of conflict. Also, the dwellers 
should form a habit of tolerance with each other to prevent conflict. It is also recommended that 
proper policies should be put in place to discourage people from plan ng food crop in forest 
reserves but rather focus on NTFPs planta ons.
Finally, government should provide funds for researchers to engage in the domes ca on of 
NTFPs in large quan ty which in turn will be passed across the NTFPs farmers. This will reduce 
the pressure on the NTPFs in the wild.
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ABSTRACT
World oil price is a momentous determinant of global economic performance. In most cases, when 
oil prices skyrockets, it leads to a transfer of income from impor ng countries to expor ng countries 
through trade shi s. The link between oil and infla on is mostly seen as being correla onal. The 
direct rela onship between oil and infla on was evident in the 1970’s nevertheless this rela onship 
started to deteriorate a er the 1980’s. Quite a cornucopia of researchers have made relentless 
inquiry on the macroeconomics impact of world oil price shocks and hikes on economic growth 
and consumer price infla on on impor ng countries. Also, an infinitesimal analyses have tackled 
the impact of the world oil price on infla on. For many developing countries, oil price hikes 
over the last few years has warranted the need for structural reforms of the domes c petroleum 
pricing system. The role of economic policy in a enua ng the poten al adverse economic and 
social impact of world oil prices in Ghana cannot be overemphasized. The causes of inla on in 
Ghana has precipitated vehement canvassing among policy makers. Some analysts have ascribed 
that the causes of infla on emanate from the consumer goods market, with others repudia ng 
the consumer goods market argument, ascribing it as namby-pamby and sta ng that infla on in 
Ghana is rather more from the money market. Another group of scholars maintain that infla on in 
Ghana is imputed to be from the exogenous variable (world oil price). The debate lingers on and 
in Ghana the shocks to prices are mixed and dynamic. This paper, through quan ta ve review 
and analysis a empts to determine the impact of world oil price on Ghana’s infla on, expound 
on the factors that drive Ghana’s infla on and suggest perpetual remedies to Ghana’s infla on. 
This paper employed mul ple OLS regression, correla on matrix and linear regression model 
and found that world oil price is correla onal to Ghana’s infla on. Other factors like interest rates 
(Bank of Ghana policy rate) and exchange rates also strongly proved to drive Ghana’ s inla on.
THE IMPACT OF THE PRICE OF OIL ON GHANA’S INFLATION
Infla on occurs when the quan ty of money rises appreciably, more rapidly than output. Milton 
Friedman propounded that “infla on is everywhere, a monetary phenomenon”. The causes of 
infla on can be ascribed to numerous factors which precipitate temporary fluctua ons in the rate 
of infla on but tend to have perpetual effects only if they affect the money growth. Inla on in 
Ghana is not banal and has caused a lot of quagmire for policy makers. More o en, poli cians 
and some policy analysts canvass on whether the cause of infla on can be imputed to the prices 
of oil on the world market. The frui on of the prices of oil on the world market does have 
quizzical impacts on the economies of countries. With oil prices skyrocke ng, the quan ty of 
goods and services that tend to be available for people to choose from tend to be limited because 
an economy will have to export more abroad to pay for prices of oil. Again, the 1973 oil shocks 
buffeted many countries and distorted their economies. When the 1974 oil price embargo was 
increased from $3 per barrel to $12 globally, it caused an upsurge of prices in countries like 
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America, Germany, Japan, and UK among other countries. Furthermore, In the 1970's, the cost 
of oil rose from a nominal price of $3 before the 1973 oil crisis to close $40 during the 1979 oil 
crisis. Is there a direct rela onship between world market oil prices and domes c inla on in 
countries?
In Ghana, the impacts of the price of oil on infla on has engendered ambivalent debates. An 
overview of informa on from the Energy Informa on Administra on (appendix fig.1) on world 
oil prices and infla on rates (CPI) of Ghana from 1990 to 2013 shows how oil prices luctuated 
with its corresponding infla on rates. Upon analysis (by looking at figure 1), it is conspicuous 
from the graph that the lowest oil price recorded was $23.59 in 1993 corresponding to a higher 
infla on rate (CPI) of 3.51% in Ghana. The highest oil prices were recorded in 2007 at $106.73 
which matches a higher infla on rate (CPI) of 65.07%. In addi on, Ghana commenced its irst 
oil export in commercial quan  es by the first quarter of 2010. During this auspicious epoch, 
about 60,000 barrels of oil were expected to be exported a day at the ini al stage. One could 
expect that when the produc on of oil started in 2010 and was augmented in the subsequent 
period, infla on in Ghana would dwindle especially as the world oil prices plummeted sharply. 
However the table sta s cs indicate that from 2009 to 2010 as world oil price increased from 
$81.58 to $96.34, infla on rate (CPI) upsurged from 100% to 108.73%. A more careful overview 
of the data shows that from 2013 to 2015 as world oil price dropped, infla on (CPI) con nued to 
increase incessantly. The impact of world oil price on Ghana’s infla on brouhaha has triggered 
unremi ng agita ons raising the key issues concerning whether the exogenous factor (world oil 
price) is correlated or uncorrelated to Ghana’s infla on. This research is momentous in the sense 
that it will help policy makers and government determine the true effect of world price of oil on 
Ghana’s infla on to assist in cogent evalua on of polices. Also, it will assist individuals to plan 
efficiently and effec vely on the lethal canker of infla on. Moreover this research will add to 
knowledge in academia. This paper will therefore a empt to determine the impact of the price of 
oil on Ghana’s infla on using empirical analysis to accomplish the following objec ves:
i. To explain whether world oil price correlated or uncorrelated to Ghana’s infla on.
ii. To explain whether oil price changes generate infla on.
iii. To determine other factors that drive Ghana’s infla on.
iv. To suggest an appropriate remedy for infla on in Ghana.
This paper is arranged to encompass part A which explains theories on infla on, part B, which 
expounds on literature review, part C highligh ng methodology, part D which dilates on data 
analysis and tests and finally the necessary sugges ons and conclusion.
   
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
Infla on is a lethal disease which is perilous and if not checked, can destroy society. There are 
major theories that have been postulated to explain the concept of infla on. The quan ty theory 
of money is a seminal theory of infla on. It asserts that there is a direct rela onship between 
money supply and general price level of the economy. The quan ty theory of money formed the 
core of the 19th century classical monetary analysis and this further provided a concrete pla orm 
to preserve the gold standard. In sum, the quan ty theory of money is spelled out as MV = PT 
where M is the money stock, V is the velocity of money, P is the general price level and T is the 
number of transac ons. This further explain that, the aggregate money expenditure on goods 
and services (MV) is held equal to the monetary value of goods and service that are produced in 
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the given period. Moreover, the monetary theory of infla on is also much desired. According to 
Milton Friedman (1912 - 2006) who maintained that “only money ma ers” monetary policy is 
a more per nent tool than fiscal policy in economic stabiliza on. He dilates that money supply 
is the determinant of both the level of output and prices in the short run and the level of it is not 
influenced by the money supply. Milton Friedman further emphasized that “infla on is always 
and everywhere a monetary phenomenon” that arises from a more rapid expansion in the quality 
of money than total output.
Also, demand pull theory is another effec ve theory to elaborate. John Menard Keynes (1883 - 
1946) postulated that increase in aggregate demand which encompasses consump on, investment 
and government expenditure militates for demand pull infla on. He explained that when increase 
in the value of aggregate demand exceed the value of aggregate supply at full employment level, 
the infla onary gap upsurges. Also, policies that cause decrease in the components of aggregate 
demand are effec ve in the reduc on of demand and infla on. Cost push theory is another 
theory that explains that infla on is caused by wage increase enforced by unions and increase 
in employers' profits. This type of infla on was witnessed during the medieval period and was 
reviewed in the 1950's and the 1970's, later christened as the “New infla on”. The simple case of 
cost push infla on is the rise in money wages more rapidly than labour output. This may further 
be exacerbated by upward adjustment of wages to compensate for rise in cost of living. Another 
cost of cost push infla on is profit-push infla on. Oligopolists and monopolists firms raise the 
price of their products to offset the rise in labour and cost of produc on to earn higher profits. 
Since these markets structures have imperfect compe  ons, they dictate prices for their products 
which can precipitate infla on.
Structural infla on theory also tends to propagate de facto statements in the cause of infla on. 
They expound that infla on arises due to unstable and slower growth rate of export in the 
economy which is inadequate to support the required rate of the economy. A uniform rate of 
growth of money wages throughout the economy must lead to permanent cost pressures in the 
service sector which is assured to have the lower produc vity growth. This in effect results 
from supply inelas city leading to rise in agricultural prices and costs. Structural analysis of 
infla on therefore a empts to recognize how economic phenomena (the effect of structures on 
infla on) and finding the root cause of infla on can further explain its rela onship. Moreover, 
the ra onal expecta ons revolu on led by Lucas, Mc Callum, Sargent and Hansen also known as 
the first genera on of classical macroeconomists, argued that people do not consistently make the 
same forecas ng errors as recommended in the adap ve expecta ons idea. The economic agents 
formed their macroeconomic expecta ons “ra onally” based on all past and current relevant 
informa on available and not on past informa on as in the case of backward-looking or adap ve, 
price expecta ons.
In addi on to this, the neoclassical synthesis led by Paul Samuelson explains that monetary 
demand factors are key determinants of business cycles because of the incorporated new Keynesian 
assump on of price s ckiness in the short run. At the same  me however, the neoclassical 
synthesis assigns a poten al large func on to supply shocks in explaining real economic ac vity. 
The highly complex model of the new neoclassical synthesis allows the Keynesian and real 
business cycle mechanisms to operate through somewhat different channels. The Neoclassical 
synthesis, postulated IS-LM-Philips curve version which views price level as an endogenous 
variable. The Neoclassical synthesis also views expecta ons as cri cal to the infla on process 
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and also accepts expecta ons as amenable to management by a monetary policy rule. The IS 
curve relates expected output growth to the real interest rate which is a central implica on of 
the modern theory of consump on. The aggregate supply and Philips curve components of the 
model relates infla on today to expected future infla on and output gap. New poli cal theories 
of infla on also assert that poli cal forces not the social planner choose economic policy in the 
real world. Economic policy is the result of a decision process that balances conlic ng interests 
so that a collec ve choice may emerge. The new poli cal economy, literature provides fresh 
perspec ves on the rela onship between  ming of elec ons, performance of policy makers, 
poli cal instability, policy credibility and reputa on and infla on process itself.
LITERATURE REVIEW  
      
To further expound on the impact of the price of oil on Ghana’s infla on, an exis ng literature 
was reviewed to analyze and discuss the work of various authors. There are several analyses made 
by scholars on the impact of the price of oil on domes c infla on of countries. Numerous groups 
of empirical research have confirmed that oil price hikes have strong and nega ve inluences for 
the real economy (Hamilton, 1983; Burbidge and Harrison, 1984; Gisser and Goodwin, 1986; 
and Cuñado and Pérez de Gracia, 2003). When oil prices plummeted in 1986, the established 
model was cri cally challenged. Also, there was li le evidence to suggest that oil price decrease 
improves economic ac vi es, in the same way that oil price increase suppresses economic 
ac vi es. Several authors therefore re-examined the oil price-macroeconomic rela onship, using 
instead, asymmetric or nonlinear methods (Mork, 1989; Mork et al., 1994; Lee et al., 1995; 
Hamilton, 1996; Hamilton, 2003; and Cuñado and Pérez de Gracia, 2005). They found that the 
nega ve linkage between oil price increases and economic ac vity s ll held. Consequently, it 
may be reasonable to par  on oil price changes into oil price increases and decreases for the 
analysis of the related issue. Although a considerable amount of research has found that oil 
price shocks have affected the real output, only a few emphasize the effects of inla on. Quite 
recently, Blanchard and Galí (2007) examined the effects of the recent oil shock on output and 
infla on and a empted to answer why the current shocks (as in the 2000s) have had smaller 
effects on output and infla on than that in the 1970s. De Gregorio et al. (2007) provided a variety 
of es mates of the degree of transmission from oil prices to infla on over  me for a large set 
of countries. Moreover, using a structural cofintegrated VAR model for G-7 countries, Cologini 
and Manera (2008) found that for all countries except Japan and U.K., changes in oil prices did 
influence the infla on rates. 
In addi on, some researchers suggested that oil price shocks on real GDP growth or CPI were 
compara vely small on average, but that they did ma er in the par cular  me period. For example, 
Bernanke et al. (1997) es mated their model over the whole sample and over each of the three 
decades (1966 - 75, 1976 - 85, and 1986 - 1995); Kilian (2008) focused on ive specific oil shock 
episodes: 1973 / 74, 1978, 1980, 1990 / 91, and 2002 / 03, respec vely. However, some problems 
may arise from these two studies. In the paper by Bernanke et al., the division of ten years as a 
sub-sample is arbitrary. In the Kilian paper, on the other hand, the es mates may be sensi ve to 
the 6 choices of sample and as such may lead to poten al bias due to inadequate observa ons.
METHODOLOGY
In analyzing this paper, the method used to complete this assignment is per nent. The major 
objec ve of this paper is to assess whether a correla on between oil price and domes c inla on 
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(CPI) of Ghana exist. This research employs quan ta ve data in its analysis. In this empirical 
analysis of mul ple regression, annual  me series data for consumer price index, exchange rates, 
interest rates (Bank of Ghana policy rate), and oil prices from the period of 1987 to 2015 were 
employed. The data on consumer price index were selected from the World Bank, while oil prices 
were collated from World Texas Intermediate oil prices. Also, exchange rates and interest rates 
were assembled from the Bank of Ghana. For this empirical study, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
is employed to accomplish the researcher’s objec ve of determining the correla on between the 
world market oil price and domes c infla on of Ghana. Furthermore, a hypothesis is formulated 
to test the rela onship between the regressor and the regressand variables. In this analysis, 
obtaining data for real interest rate was fruitless and hence the Bank of Ghana’s policy rate were 
used as a proxy for interest rates. This is per nent since this research is focused on validity, 
measurement and objec vity in explaining the variable of interest. A major tool employed by 
countries to control infla on is monetary policy. Central banks may tend to (a significant extent)
control infla on through targe ng interest rates. Research papers have found that interest rate was 
an important factor in the discussion of the rela onship between the price of oil on GDP such as 
Huang et al (2005) and Huang (2008). Based on this, interest rate was employed in the controlled 
model. Also, exchange rate has been largely omi ed from the related literature and hence the 
inclusion of this variable tends to be per nent because it plays a major role on monetary policy 
in the interna onal economy as established by Krugman (1983) and Rogoff(1991). In effect, 
exchange rate becomes significant in this regard. Official exchange rate used in this analysis 
is defined as to the exchange rate determined by na onal authori es or the rate determined in 
the legally sanc oned exchange market. It is calculated as an annual average based on monthly 
averages (local currency units rela ve to the U.S. dollar). Also, the correla on coefficient will 
be calculated to determine the rela onship between the dependent and independent variables of 
interest.
SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL
The model to be used for the analysis is summarized as follows:
CPI = β
0
























 + μ ……………… equ(2)
 
In the specified model above, CPI
i
 which is the dependent variable represents the Consumer Price 
Index, which reflects changes in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods 
and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly with 2010 as base 
year. OILP
i
 as an explanatory variable, denotes oil prices on the world market. Moreover, other 




 which represent foreign exchange rates in 
currency units per U.S. dollar and real interest rates respec vely. μ
i 
in the equa on is known as 
the disturbance term which encompasses other variables that could affect CPI
i
 but are not listed 
in the equa on. Also, β
0
 in the equa on, is the constant of the equa on which represents CPI 
when OILP, EXR and INT are equal to zero.
This research is hypothesized as:
H
0
 : = 0   -  There is no correla on between prices of oil and domes c infla on.
H
1 
: = 1   -  There is a correla on between prices of oil and domes c infla on.
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ANALYSIS
The price of oil and infla on is o en seen as a causal rela onship. Also, the conven onal 
wisdom of economics is that, as oil prices change, infla on moves in similar direc on. The 
direct rela onship between oil and infla on was experienced in the 1970’s when the cost of oil 
upsurged from a normal price of $3 preceding the 1973 oil crisis to around $40 during the 1979 oil 
crisis. The oil crisis canker precipitated the consumer price index to double from 41.2 during the 
incep on of 1972 to 86.3 by the end of 1980. Irrespec ve of the findings of the direct rela onship 
between oil price and infla on, the rela onship between oil and infla on started to deteriorate 
a er the 1980s and the detachment was more lucid during the oil price run-up from 1999 to 2005 
when the annual average nominal price of oil rose from $16.56 to $50.04 during which CPI 
increased from 164.3 in January 1999 to 196.8 in December 2005. Again, various scholars have 
accentuated that the link between oil and infla on has significantly been debilitated. Blanchard 
and Gali (2007) directed their research on prices, wage infla on, output and employment to oil 
shocks. They concluded that the responses of all these variables to oil shock have become muted 
since the mid 1980’s. Also, Hooker (2000) maintained that the structural wearing between oil 
and infla on cessated by the end of 1980. What then is the rela onship between oil and infla on 
in Ghana? 
In this quan ta ve analysis, the frui on of the regression analysis connotes that:
In(CPI) = 1.051953125 + In(-0.232035205) OILP
i
 + In 0.960250032 EXR
i
 + In 0.000306063 
INT
i
The R square recorded 85% from 24 observa on. The analysis of this research explains that the 
results obtained are in disparate direc on with the research by Blanchard and Gali (2007) that 
maintained that oil price shocks have li le or no effect on infla on. In the cri cal analysis of the 
data, it was unequivocal that the data overview is rather in tandem with the research conducted by 
Hamilton, 1983, Burbidge and Hanison 1984, Gisser and Goodwin 1986 and Cunado and Perez 
de Gracia, 2003). An overview of table 4 in the appendix elucidates that the R square of 0.9847 
illustrates that 98.47% of the varia on in the infla on (CPI) is explained by the independent 
variables (World Texas oil price, exchange rate and interest rates). This further presupposes that 
a significant aspect of the varia on is captured by the model with 1.53% accounted for as error. 
Moreover, it is per nent to expand on the overall significance of the mul ple regression model. 
The tool of significance F is used, which Wilcox (2010) asserted that for the correla on in the 
regression model to be meaningful, its significance F must be less than 0.1 (10%). In this analysis, 
the mul ple linear regression model read 0.00000000000000000264 and hence the model is thus 
very significant in that regard. The further significa on between the overall rela onship of the 
independent and dependent variables is sta s cally significant. Also, the coefficient of OILP
i
, 
the independent variable of interest, is shown to have a posi ve and sta s cally significant 
rela onship with (CPI
i




) is significant since the p-value 
(0.049685) of the coefficient of OILP
i
 is lesser than the significant level of 5%. The p-value of 
each variable tests the null hypothesis whether the respec ve coefficients are equal to zero. When 
a low p-value is obtained (lesser than the significance level (5%), the null hypothesis is rejected 
because the p-value signifies that the variable is likely to be meaningful in the model hence 
sta s cally significant (Fenton & Neil, 2012). The posi ve coefficient of 0.273692 (27.37%) 
of OILP
i
 indicates that a percentage increase in OILP
i
 will lead to n 27.27% increase in CPI
i
 
.In a nutshell, an increase in OILP
i
 which precipitates an increase in CPI tends to generally 
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conform to the major research argument by various scholars that world oil price is correlated 
with infla on. This research further repudiates what researchers like Hooker (2002) suggested 
that a structural break in the rela onship between infla on and oil prices occurred at the end of 
1980s. Direc ng the analysis to the other independent variables of interest, the regression output, 




. The coefficient of 0.908044 EXR
i
 explains 
that, a percentage increase in EXRi will engender an increment 0.908044 (90.8%) in CPI. When 
exchange rates are high, this causes a deprecia on of the domes c currency and this tends to 
upsurge CPI
i
 as es mated in the regression model. Moreover, the coefficient of the INT
i
 was 
nevertheless insignificant since its p-value is 0.797581 higher than the significance level of 5%. 
Furthermore, the interest rates, INT
i
, showed a posi ve and insignificant rela onship with CPI
i 
in 
the es mated model. Its coefficient and p-value were 0.046257 and 0.797581 respec vely. The 




 increases by an insigniicant margin 
of 4.6%. This explains that a major factor that tends to influence infla on is interest rate and it 
is per nent to formulate policies that will keep the interest rate low. Also, the Bank of Ghana 
(monetary policy) tends to correlate posi vely with Ghana’s infla on (CPI) and as such it  will be 
discreet to adjust the monetary policy as and when needed to engender low infla on.
A further tes ng on the results of the hypothesis given the already established statements:
H
0 
: =  0  -  There is no correla on between prices of oil and domes c infla on; and 
H
1 
: =  1  -  There is a correla on between prices of oil and domes c infla on.
By employing the linear regression tool which was used in tes ng the hypothesis, the rela onship 
between the dependent and the independent variable is significant since the slope was greater 
than zero. According to the data on table 2 which established a rela onship between the prices of 
oil and infla on (CPI), using a significance value of 5%, the calcula ons produced a p-value of 
0.0000000472. Since the p-value is lesser than the significance level, the H
0
 is rejected meaning 
that the slope of the regression is not equal to 0. Hence there exists a significant rela onship 
between prices of oil and infla on. Also, this results further corroborates the outcome of the 
mul ple linear regression that the world oil price is correlated with the domes c infla on of 
Ghana. Moreover, from table 2 at the appendix, it is witnessed that, the correla on between 
oil prices and infla on (CPI) is 0.8655 (86.55%), which is posi ve. This shows that there is a 
posi ve linear rela onship between the world oil price and infla on (CPI). Given the correla on 
of 86.55 % the two variables are said to be highly correlated. 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Oil price is a momentous determinant of global economic performance. In most cases, when 
oil prices tends to be creeping high, it leads to a transfer of income from impor ng countries 
to expor ng countries through shi s in terms of trade. The link between oil and infla on is 
mostly seen as being correla onal. The direct rela onship between oil and inla on was 
evident in 1970’s, nevertheless, this rela onship started to deteriorate a er the 1980’s. Quite a 
cornucopia of researchers have made relentless inquiry on the macroeconomics impacts of oil 
price shocks and hikes on economic growth and consumer price infla on on impor ng countries. 
Also, an infinitesimal analyses have tackled the research ques on about the impact on the oil 
price on infla on. For many developing countries, oil price hikes over the last few years has 
warranted the need for structural reforms of the domes c petroleum pricing system. Numerous 
governments across the world have been reluctant to pass on upsurging prices to consumers due 
to its ramifica ons of exacerba ng the quandary of the have-nots in their respec ve countries. 
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Irrespec ve of being solicitous about ci zens, governments are obliged to cut social spending if 
they do not pass on higher prices to consumers since there is a higher tendency for governments 
to experience fiscal burdens if they fail to pass on higher prices to consumers. The adverse 
effects of oil price shocks tend to jeopardize economic growth since businesses, consumers and 
government budgets are bedeviled with fiscal pressures. In Ghana, the debate on whether prices 
correlates with domes c infla on lingers on. The debate has created major polariza on among 
policy makers and analysts with some analysts subscribing to the fact that the world oil prices 
are correlated to Ghana’s infla on, while on the other hand another group of people repudiate 
the correla onal effect of world oil on Ghana’s infla on. This paper therefore quan ta vely 
examined the rela onship between the world prices of oil on Ghana’s infla on. To expound the 
analysis to gain a be er insight, a mul ple OLS regression was employed with annual  me series 
data on the consumer price index, exchange rates, interest rates (Bank of Ghana policy rate) from 
1987 to 2015. Moreover, a hypothesis was formulated and tested to determine the rela onship 
between world oil price and infla on. To tell the rela onship, linear regression was established 
in conjunc on with correla on matrix. In this analysis, the findings revealed that the research is 
analogous with scholarly work done by Hamilton, 1983; Burbidge and Harrison, 1984; Gisser 
and Goodwin, 1986; and Cuñado and Pérez de Gracia, 2003. It was found that, world oil prices 
have a posi ve and sta s cally significant rela onship with infla on (CPI). Focusing on the 
linear regression, it was found that, there exists a significant rela onship between world price 
and infla on (CPI)  and the correla on matrix showed 86.55% correla on of the variables which 
corroborates the high rela onship between the variables thereby rejec ng the null hypothesis. 
In sum, this research concluded that oil price is correla onal with Ghana's infla on and hence 
findings by Blanchard and Galí (2007) and De Gregorio et al. (2007). This paper has taken cri cal 
turn to review Gregario et al ( 2007) that the relentless deteriora on of the rela on between oil 
prices and infla on which has become more evident in the last ten years does not apply to a 
developing na on like Ghana.
Inlfa on in Ghana has beso ed the economy with some ravages, crippling policies and budgets. 
This horrendous effects of infla on has made many folks congregate and fulminate against 
government in recent  mes. In this empirical analysis, the research findings maintain that, world 
price of oil is correlated with Ghana’s infla on. The causes of infla on can be ascribed to be 
from the goods market or money market. The money market has to be parallel to that of the 
goods market and whenever the cause of infla on emanates from the goods market, government 
fiscal policies can be employed to tame infla on. On the other hand, infla on from the money 
market can be subdued with sagacious monetary policies. The research found that there is a 
posi ve correla onal effect of world oil prices and infla on. Many countries also depend on 
imported oil and yet they are frui ul in manipula on policies to keep infla on low. For instance, 
Germany and Japan depend 100% on imported oil, yet these na ons have a enuated infla on to 
the lowest levels. What then happened to Ghana that also imports oil? Many phenomena (like 
the price of oil can have ephemeral fluctua ons in infla ons but they do not have perpetual effect 
so far as they do not affect monetary growth. World oil price is a factor that tends to influence 
infla on in Ghana but the main cause of Ghana’s infla on is macroeconomic indiscipline by 
policy makers. It is significant in this regard that government orchestrate efficient policies to 
cushion the economy from the adverse effects of oil price shocks. The government of Ghana can 
employ policies like fully passing on price increases and subsidies of end-user prices. Mostly in a 
completely deregulated market, prices are passed on to consumers fully when oil prices increases. 
In Ghana, the government could adjust the pricing formula to reflect oil price shocks. Also, 
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the government should set up petroleum product price stabiliza on funds to manage revenue 
shor alls when there are abrupt oil price shocks. The government can also acquire and store 
more oil at a cheaper price to be released when there are supply shortages in the world market. 
Subsidies may also be used by governments to address the oil price shocks. Since petroleum 
products are used by the wider popula on in Ghana, the government may decide to subsidize 
interna onal price increases of petroleum products par ally or fully. Moreover, the government 
should pass policies to reduce the cost of supply of petroleum products. These policies could be 
in the form of establishing bulk purchasing agencies or agreement between companies so that 
economies of scale can be achieved to help reduce cost passed on to consumers and end-users. 
Government can also encourage private sector hedging of oil products. By so doing, commercial 
companies will hedge purchases of petroleum products to lower the average price paid. Also, 
there needs to be transparent formula on and implementa on of policies by government during 
oil price hikes to prevent fulmina ons and relentless agita ons from ci zens.
In addi on to this, the government of Ghana can diversify into non-petroleum sources of energy 
to help cater for the adverse effects of oil price shocks. The government can switch to alterna ve 
sources of energy such as natural gas and renewable sources of electricity such as hydro, 
geothermal, solar and wind power. There is also the need to increase the domes c supply of oil. 
In Ghana, the government should increase the reining capacity of crude oil to enhance security 
of oil supply. The government should increase the reining capacity of crude oil to enhance 
security of supply to meet needs in the event of oil shocks. The impact of world oil price on 
Ghana infla on is direct. It is therefore indispensable that government policies should be geared 
at mi ga ng the adverse effects of oil on the economy of Ghana.
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Source: World Texas oil prices and World Bank
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ANOVA
         Significance  
   df SS        MS         F           F   
Regression 1 25992.21 25992.21058    65.73648     4.72E-08 
Residual 22 8698.802 395.4000   9 17 
Total  23 34691.01          
M u  l  ple   R                        0.865591773 
         R   Square                                    0.749249118
Adjusted R Square  0.73785135
Sta n  dard   E   r r  o  r                19.88466976
Observa ons                             24
Regression Sta s cs
Table 2: Summary Output
  coeficients Standard t-stat p-value Lower Upper Lower Upper
 Error 95% 95% 95% 95%
Intercept 19.42929051 8.585298 -2.26308854 0.033841 -37.2341 -1.62447 -37.2341 -1.62447
World oil  1.150036696 0.141843 8.107803705 4.72E-08 0.855872 1.444201 0.855872 1.444201
price
Table 3: Correla on Matrix
   World Texas  Infla on  Exchange Interest
   oil prices   rate   rate   rate 
World Texas oil price         1     
Infla on rate (CPI) 0.865591773      1   
Exchange rate  0.847926627 0.979717024       1 
            




M u l ple   R                           0.992305
R Square    0.984669
Adjusted R Square  0.982369
Standard Error    0.174583
Observa ons        24
Regression Sta s cs
         Significance
   df SS     MS        F       F    
Regression  3 39.15166     13.05055 42 8.1772 2.64E-18 
Residual  20 0.609587     0.030479      
Total  23 39.76125
ANOVA
  coeficients Standard t-stat p-value Lower Upper Lower Upper
 Error 95% 95% 95% 95%
Intercept 2.777994 1.003512 2.768272 0.011859 0.684704 4.871284 0.684704 4.871284
World Texas 0.273692 0.13591 2.013773     0.049685 -0.00981 0.557195     -0.00981     0.557195
Intermediate
oil price ($)
Exchange rate 0.908044 0.039414 23.03863 7.14E-16 0.825828 0.99026 0.825828 0.99026
Interes  t  rate 0.046257 0.177967    0.259921 0.797581      -0.32498 0.41749 -0.32498      0.41749
(BOG policy rate)  
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Table 4: Macroeconomics data
World Texas 




Exchange rate Interest rate 
(BOG Policy 
rate)
1990 42.13 2.16 0.03 30
1991 34.87 2.55 0.04 20
1992 32.43 2.81 0.04 30
1993 23.59 3.51 0.06 35
1994 27.18 4.38 0.1 33
1995 29.42 6.99 0.12 45
1996 37.96 10.24 0.16 45
1997 26.93 13.09 0.2 45
1998 16.32 15.01 0.23 37
1999 36.75 16.87 0.27 27
2000 38.79 21.12 0.54 27
2001 25.94 28.07 0.72 27
2002 38.57 32.23 0.79 24.5
2003 41.38 40.82 0.87 21.5
2004 53.99 45.98 0.9 18.5
2005 71.61 52.93 0.91 15.5
2006 72.89 58.71 0.92 12.5
2007 106.73 65.01 0.94 13.5
2008 46.27 75.75 1.06 17
2009 81.58 90.33 1.41 18
2010 96.34 75.75 1.43 13.5
2011 104.73 90.33 1.51 12.5
2012 93.8 118.69 1.8 15
2013 99.84 132.46 1.95 16
Data Source: World Texas oil prices, World Bank, Bank of Ghana
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THE STATE OF AFRICAN ECONOMY AND A WAY 
FORWARD 
Florian Cyril Mshanga  
Founder Member and Na onal Coordinator I – YALF Tanzania,
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
PREAMBLE 
Emerging market economies have been an engine of global growth during the 2000s, especially 
a er the 2007-  2008 global financial crises. However,  mes are changing. Growth rates in several 
emerging market economies have been declining since 2010.
A further decelera on of ac vi es in key emerging and developing economies overshadowed a 
modest recovery in major high-income countries in 2015. This decelera on was accompanied by 
further decline in commodity prices and now global growth con nues to disappoint with 2.4% in 
2015, 0.4 % point below June 2015. Going forward, global growth is projected to edge up, but 
at a slower pace than envisioned in the June 2015 forecast, reaching 2.9 % in 2016 and 3.1 % 
2017 - 18. (Figure 1.0). 
Figure 1.0: Global Commodity prices for Energy, Agricultural raw materials and Metals
 Source: World Bank
Again in January 2016, oil prices fell to their lowest levels in more than a decade. China, the 
world’s second-largest economy, is experiencing sluggish growth than other emerging markets. 
This slowdown in China could result in weakening commodity prices as well as African 
economies more than most, because China and other emerging markets have not only been 
primary consumers of African commodi es, but also have been development  financier for the 
major infrastructure and other development projects that are essen al to Africa’s future economic 
growth. This could cause China to delay further or lead to a cancella on of planned investments 
in resource sectors. 
Despite challenges in growth projec ons and op mism across the African con nent, it is possible 
Florian Cyril Mshanga  
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to project which countries will emerge undamaged or be er off and which countries will or must 
act quickly to change their nega ve economic situa on a er the emerging markets downturn.
North Africa is expected to grow at a steady rate over the next ive years, and countries like 
Morocco will move well, while for others, like Libya, given the general poli cal instability and 
insecurity in the country, the future is less promising. East African countries Kenya, Ethiopia, 
Rwanda, and Tanzania will also perform well overall, each expected to grow at more than 6.5 % 
in 2016, a full 3 percent over the con nental average. The forecast for West Africa is a mixed one, 
as Nigeria struggles with falling oil prices and terror groups, while Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal 
are widely considered some of the best prospects for inves ng in Africa, reflected by increased 
public infrastructure investment, the boost for the private sector, improved agricultural ac vi es 
and an improved business environment. In southern Africa, growth is expected to remain weak 
due to inadequate power supply, droughts in some parts and weak business confidence; but South 
Africa will con nue to hold down the region’s overall economic outlook. 
FUTURE OF AFRICAN ECONOMY
Sub-Saharan Africa faces a challenging near-term outlook. Commodity prices are expected to 
stabilize but remain low through 2017 (Figure 2.0). The normaliza on of U.S. monetary policy 
is expected to  ghten global financial condi ons. Although, governments are taking steps to 
resolve power issues, electricity supply bo lenecks are expected to persist. These factors point to 
a somewhat weaker recovery in 2016 than previously an cipated. A er slowing to 3.4 % in 2015, 
ac vity is expected to pick up to 4.2 % in 2016 and to 4.7 percent in 2017 - 18.
Figure 2.0: Commodity Prices Outlook
Source: World Bank. 
Note: Shaded area denotes an es mated or 
forecast value.
This projec on assumes that commodity prices stabilize and electricity constraints ease (table 
1.0). There are, however, considerable varia ons within the region.
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World Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new informa on and changing (global) 
circumstances. Consequently, projec ons presented here may differ from those contained in 
other Bank documents, even if basic assessments of countries’ prospects do not differ at any 
given moment in  me. 
a.  GDP at market prices and expenditure components are measured in constant 2010 U.S. 



















b.  Sub-region aggregate excludes Liberia, Somalia, Central African Republic, São Tomé 
and Principe, and South Sudan, for which data limita ons prevent the forecas ng of GDP 
components. 
c.  The sudden surge in private consump on in the region in 2013 is driven by the revised and 
rebased NIA data of Nigeria in 2014. 
d.  Exports and imports of goods and non-factor services (GNFS).
 
e.  Includes developing SSA and the following high-income countries: Equatorial Guinea and 
Seychelles.
f.  Includes Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Gabon, Nigeria, Sudan, Chad and Democra c 
Republic of Congo.
g.  Includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, 
Democra c Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Chad and 
Togo.
Consump on dynamics will con nue to differ for oil exporters and importers. Private consump on 
growth is expected to remain weak in oil exporter countries as the removal of subsidies to 
alleviate pressure on budgets results in higher fuel costs and as currency deprecia on weighs 
on consumers’ purchasing power. By contrast, lower infla on in oil importers, owing in part 
to lower fuel prices, should help boost consumer spending. The price level impact of currency 
deprecia on combined with interest rate increases could, however, moderate these effects.
Investment dynamics will also differ among Sub-Saharan African commodity exporters. 
The slowdown in major emerging markets, low commodity prices, and deteriora ng growth 
prospects in many commodity exporters, are expected to result in lower FDI lows. Explora on 
and development ac vity is expected to be curtailed in oil and gas.
Con nuing fiscal consolida on in oil-expor ng countries is expected to result in further capital 
expenditure cuts, as governments seek to limit cuts in public-sector wages and protect social 
spending. However, in a number of low-income, non-oil commodity exporters, governments are 
expected to con nue to invest heavily in energy and transport infrastructure in a bid to improve 
the opera onal environment for growth, drawing in part, on the proceeds from previous bond 
issuances (Ethiopia), public-private partnerships (Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania), donor aid 
(Rwanda) and, in some cases, financing from Chinese en  es (Ethiopia, Tanzania). Although 
debt levels may rise, they remain manageable in most low-income countries as growth has been 
robust.
The fiscal policy stance in commodity exporters is expected to ease gradually as commodity 
prices stabilize. In Nigeria, ongoing efforts to ra onalize the management and opera on of the 
Nigerian Na onal Petroleum Corpora on (NNPC) should also help enhance revenue mobiliza on. 
However, with oil prices projected to remain below their recent peaks, fiscal revenues are expected 
to remain low in Angola and Nigeria. As a result, fiscal deficits are likely to increase in these 
countries, despite efforts to restrain spending. Fiscal deficits are also expected to remain elevated 
in oil importer na ons, as spending on goods and services, wages, and physical infrastructure 
con nues to expand.
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Net exports are expected to make a nega ve contribu on to real GDP growth in the near 
term, despite currency deprecia ons. S ll-low commodity prices will depress export receipts, 
especially among oil exporters, even as export volumes rise. The pull from advanced economies 
is expected to stay modest, given their moderate prospects for medium-term growth. Among oil 
importers, current account balances are expected to deteriorate in many countries on account of 
strong import growth, driven by capital goods imports for infrastructure projects.
In this context:
• Ac vity is expected to remain subdued in the region’s three largest economies. In Nigeria, 
power and fuel shortages and fiscal consolida on, which weighed on ac vity in 2015, 
are expected to diminish gradually. Growth is expected to remain weak in South Africa, 
as inadequate power supply, weak business confidence, difficult labor rela ons and policy 
 ghtening slow down ac vity. In Angola, government spending remains constrained and 
elevated infla on has weakened consumer spending.
• Among the region’s fron er markets, rising oil produc on and diminishing fiscal and current 
account imbalances are expected to help li  growth in Ghana. However, in Zambia, low 
copper prices, compounded by regulatory uncertainty and electricity shortages, will curtail 
copper produc on, export and investment. Meanwhile, despite pressure on the shilling, Kenya 
and Tanzania are expected to grow at a robust pace, supported by large-scale infrastructure 
projects, including the expansion of the railway system, which should help boost domes c 
trade, and a new port.
•  The region’s low-income countries are expected to con nue to sustain high GDP growth. 
Many of these countries have limited exposure to the commodi es that are experiencing 
the most severe decline in prices. Meanwhile, large-scale investment projects in energy and 
transport are ongoing, consumer spending remains robust, boosted by lower fuel prices, 
and despite low minerals prices, mining output is set to rise in several countries. Public 
investment, consumer spending, and mining produc on will help Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, Rwanda and Tanzania sustain rapid growth in 2016 and beyond. Several low-
income countries in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) region are 
expected to see steady growth, helped in part by the stable currency peg to the euro. 
HOMEGROWN PROBLEMS
The Chinese slowed down and falling commodity prices does not explain all of economic 
problems facing African Con nent, but there are some internal problems in Africa which are also 
the reasons for its economic shaking.
Poli cal Upheavals, Insecurity and Conflicts
The existence of domes c instability could deter domes c and foreign investments in some 
countries, weigh on tourism and add to fiscal pressures. Fragmented poli cal situa ons could 
also undermine the ability of governments to undertake and implement needed policies. So 
on the domes c front, poli cal upheavals and conflicts in Burundi, Burkina Faso, and South 
Sudan suggest that poli cal risks associated with the electoral process will remain a key issue 
for the region in 2016 - 2017. Security risks  ed to Boko Haram insurgencies are significant 
for Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria; while terrorist threats remain a concern for Kenya 
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and Mali. These events could generate greater poli cal instability for the region if they were to 
escalate, hur ng growth. Ethiopia’s escala ng protests have resulted in violence in various parts 
of the country; and the Democra c Republic of Congo faces a fraught elec on cycle that could 
easily put the country, or the region, back into conflict.
Corrup on and Mismanagement
In Africa, corrup on has been key barrier for economic growth. Misuse of public resources 
by senior ranked leaders, government official and public servants have been like a norm. This 
occurred especially in priva za on of the sectors of economy like industrial sectors, mining 
sectors, agricultural sectors, oil sector, infrastructure projects and others. From experience, Sub-
Saharan oil resourced countries on average score lower PIM, reflec ng weak administra ve 
capacity and low transparency in the use of public resources, than others, especially at the project 
appraisal and evalua on stages of the PIM process. In Nigeria, for example, President Buhari 
inherited a scandal concerning $20 billion in missing oil revenues. Similarly South African 
President Jacob Zuma, where he agreed to repay $24 million of public funds he used to repair his 
private house.
Heavy Debt Load
Fiscal risks are elevated in some countries, rela ng to large infrastructure projects, public-private 
partnerships, and con ngent liabili es. Governments’ debts have risen rapidly in recent years, for 
countries like Uganda, Ghana, Gambia and Mozambique to finance large infrastructure projects. 
Uganda funds mining infrastructure and may ind it harder to service debt if produc on start dates 
for oil projects are delayed further. Inconsistent and poor macroeconomic management has been 
accompanied by sizeable fiscal slippages in the Gambia. As a result of growing fiscal pressures 
from the drop in commodity prices and con ngent liabili es in state-owned enterprises, which 
required government support in 2015, considerable risks remain in Mozambique and have led it 
into nego a ons with the IMF for a fiscal support program (IMF, 2015). Ghana has also engaged 
with IMF to bring debt relief and expand collec on of revenue by the implementa on of a special 
petroleum tax, restraining the wage bill and other primary expenditures, while making space for 
priority spending and for clearing all domes c arrears.
WHAT CAN BE DONE BY AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO BOOST ITS ECONOMY?
Strong Tourism Investments Ini a ves
Africa’s tourism must be set to boost economic growth, create new jobs, and outpace other areas 
for new tourism investment. If Sub-Saharan Africa’s tourism industry is be er set, it will help to 
spur more economic growth for the con nent and directly employ 6.7 million people by 2021, 
according to World Bank report, 2013. If the tourism sector is developed effec vely and managed 
efficiently, over  me, tourism has the poten al to accelerate Africa’s economic growth as well as 
create jobs. It can also help accelerate the reforms needed to improve airline and road transport as 
well as other key infrastructure, besides raising the incomes of young men and women, who form 
a high percentage of the job holders in the sector. Also African countries must know that adding 
high VAT rate to tourism business will cause the business to drop resul ng in li le contribu ons 
to na onal revenue.
African economies are narrowly focused on agriculture, mining, and more recently, 
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telecommunica ons. Export diversifica on is a key concern. In 1980, agricultural products 
represented 54% of Mauri us’s exports. As a result of the growth in tourism, agriculture now 
accounts for just 16% of total exports while tex les account for 25% and tourism accounts 
for 25%. In Rwanda, between 1995 and 1998, coffee and tea accounted for almost half of all 
exports. Now travel and tourism provide 36% of exports while reliance on coffee and tea is 
down to 20%. In Tanzania, the tourism sector, with a growth rate of 12 % for the last four years 
is one of the fastest growing sectors, contribu ng about 17.2% of the GDP and 41.7% of foreign 
exchange earnings in the last ive years. Many diversifica ons make economies less vulnerable to 
fluctua ons in demand, more dynamic and more agile in the face of change. By bringing foreign 
consumers to a des na on, tourism also provides an ideal opportunity for market - tes ng new 
products and diversifying exports.
Emphasis on Digital Technology Investment  
Africa should put emphasis on digital technology investment. Why? Because of the advantage 
of rapid technological changes that are now making the world more prosperous and inclusive. 
Also in Africa, development challenges are preven ng the digital revolu on from fulilling its 
transforma ve poten al. Challenges include cyber-crimes, poor technological infrastructures, 
poor policies, fewer availability of human capital and others. For many people, today’s increase 
in access to digital technologies brings more choice and greater convenience. Through inclusion, 
efficiency and innova on access, opportuni es are provided that were previously out of the reach 
of the poor and disadvantaged. In Kenya, for example, the cost of sending remi ances dropped 
by up to 90 % a er the introduc on of M-Pesa, a digital payment system. New technologies 
allow women and youth to par cipate more easily in the labour market — as e-commerce 
entrepreneurs in online work, or in business process outsourcing. All these will help to boost the 
African economy.
The 2016 World Development Report shows that while the digital revolu on has forged ahead, 
its “analog complements”— the regula ons that promote entry and compe  on, the skills 
that enable workers to access and then leverage the new economy, and the ins tu ons that are 
accountable to ci zens — have not kept pace. And when these analog complements to digital 
investments are absent, the development impact can be disappoin ng.
Strengthening Regional Integra ons and Trade Liberaliza on
Although the process of trade liberaliza on has advanced throughout the regions, trade regimes are 
s ll significantly more complex and restric ve than elsewhere. Import tariff rates remain too high 
and too dispersed, in part because governments are very dependent on this source of budgetary 
revenue but also because of the prevalence of statutory and piecemeal exemp ons. Elimina ng 
these exemp ons, preferably in the context of medium term tax reform programs would allow 
tariffs to be reduced more rapidly. At the same  me, export taxes could be substan ally reduced, 
if not eliminated.
Efficient regional integra on would allow many countries to surmount the obstacles posed by 
their rela vely small sizes, permit them to realise greater economies of scale, and increase their 
ability to trade on a global basis, thus, further enhancing growth. In addi on, trade liberaliza on 
would also help improve the quality of governance because complex and discre onary tax 
regimes are prone to abuse and create opportuni es for corrup on.
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Inspiring examples from East African countries – Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, South 
Sudan and Burundi – have demonstrated that to a ack inefficiencies is not only possible but 
yields rapid returns. Construc on of interna onal standard gauge railway to connect Tanzania 
and Rwanda, also Northern Circuit Corridor project to connect Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya and 
South Sudan will remove barrier to movement of goods, people and capital.
Intensify Diversifica on Efforts
Weak global growth and China's economic crisis have forced African economies to increase 
diversifica on effort. African countries that have been able to diversify their products and trade 
partners will suffer less during the current crises compared to those who depend highly on one or 
two products or partners.
A good example is drawn from East African countries. Apart from East Africa, there is Cote 
d'Ivoire which is also an interes ng example. One of the leading sources of cocoa for the world's 
markets, the country looked at how to move from expor ng raw cocoa to manufacturing chocolate, 
so that chocolate is now manufactured in the same place where its raw materials are sourced. 
This has helped in making the country more resilient and is also helping it build an industrial 
base. This is an encouraging story.
In Senegal there is the president's plan "Emergence" – a plan to invest in cri cal infrastructure in 
order to allow Senegal to emerge and have a more robust economy. 
Ethiopia has undertaken a local strategy of providing agricultural inputs and technical skills to 
farmers; and as a result, doubled its maize produc on over a twenty-year period, now making it 
the second largest maize producer in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Strong Emphasis on Conflict Resolu ons, Peace and Security
When state ins tu ons do not adequately protect ci zens’ legal and social rights, they do not 
adhere to na onal cons tu ons; they do not guard against corrup on; and do not provide access 
to jus ce. When markets do not provide job opportuni es, there is the occurrence of tribal and 
religious conflicts and when communi es have lost social cohesion, the likelihood of violent 
conflict increases.
The horn of Africa, which includes Sudan and Somalia contains today, nearly all the problems 
that are on the world’s agenda: ethnic, religious and border conflicts, civil war, high military 
expenditure, migra on and refugees, famine and the break-up of states. It is a region where the 
Cold War played itself out, and s ll deserves a lot of world a en on.  
West Africa also is a region that is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental 
and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real “strategic danger.” Like Issues 
of Boko Haram in Nigeria.
North African countries like Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Egypt s ll grapple with Islamic 
fundamentalism. Although there are fundamentalist movements and trends in Israel, USA and 
India, that of North Africa, par cularly Algeria, tends to defy any solu on as events there have 
proved since 1992.
East and Central Africa are alike as the level of peace and instability is not stable. In countries 
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like Kenya, there have been threats of terrorism like the West Gate Mall and Garrisa University 
students’ a acks. Burundi has seen a lot of chaos following the president's announcement for third 
term presiden al bid. There is the possibility of a similar thing playing out in the Democra c 
Republic of Congo DRC.
For African economic prosperity, major stakeholders must work together to ensure peace and 
security - star ng with state ins tu ons, regional integra ons like EAC, African Union (AU), 
the Commonwealth as well as United Na ons (UN). All of these need collec ve bargaining to 
combat the problem, but there are major structural gaps in our collec ve capabili es to support 
these areas star ng from na onal level to Interna onal level. United Na ons Security Council 
needs to be reformed. As a ma er of principle, there should at least be one representa ve from 
the African con nent on the Security Council, along with representa ves from the other regions 
of the world and some of the other powers that have emerged. So, inves ng in ci zen security, 
jus ce, good governance, democracy and jobs crea on in Africa is essen al for reducing violence 
as well as boos ng produc vity.
Strong Focus on Value Addi on
It has been observed that African countries export raw materials only to buy them back in the 
form of finished products. It is high  me African countries focused their efforts on building up 
industries, skills and technologies so they can produce their own high quality products, crea ng 
much-needed jobs and income for their people. For many African countries that have been heavily 
dependent on the export of raw commodi es, there is growing recogni on that the next stages of 
economic growth will require much greater a en on to the work of ‘adding value’ to raw products 
and commodi es as a means of accelera ng job crea on and promo ng higher profit margins 
and returns on investment. Also African governments must open the door to partnerships on this 
issue par cularly Public Private Partnership. They must also collaborate and engage development 
stakeholders like African Development Bank (AFDB). In Zambia, following challenges posed 
by low copper prices, AFDB President, Akinwumi Adesina stated that Zambia needs to embrace 
agriculture and increase value addi on through food processing, thereby reducing shocks as a 
result of low copper prices. The AFDB is ready to work with Zambia on that issue.
CONCLUSION
The current emerging market downturn in economic powerhouses like China, has already 
nega vely affected African economic growth. For resource-rich countries, it is a chance to 
improve their public investment management (PIM) system, which could help boost growth; 
although from experience drawn, Sub-Saharan oil resourced countries on average score lower in 
PIM, reflec ng weak administra ve capacity and low transparency in the use of public resources, 
especially at the project appraisal and evalua on stages of the PIM process.   
Countries that have successfully diversified their economies will suffer less than those that have 
not and they will enjoy less stress than countries depending on expor ng one or two commodi es 
for their economic growth. Some East African countries and countries like Morocco, Senegal and 
Côte d’Ivoire are among countries that are harves ng the fruits of diversifying their economy and 
facing less economic shock. It is hoped that this will be a lesson for others to learn from.
God bless Africa. Together for African prosperity!!!
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YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS FORUM (YALF) 
DEVELOPMENTAL PROJECTS
The Young African Leaders Forum is ac vely engaged in developmental projects that would 
see a sustainable Africa in the near future. The young leaders have commi ed themselves to 
undertaking specific projects in their countries. These projects keenly focus on playing a major 
role in the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals and the African Union’s Agenda 2063.
YALF passionately undertakes these developmental projects because we believe that Africa has 
the enormous poten al to empower her people and ensure her challenges are solved in an amicable 
manner. The youth leaders have dedicated themselves to serving voluntarily in their communi es 
and this has invoked a sense of patrio sm in the leaders. This is because YALF believes that 
it is only through volunteerism that persis ng problems can be fully tackled. Bearing this in 
mind, YALF has ini ated the following projects as a pathway to Africa’s long-term development 
trajectory:
• WOMEN EMPOWERMENT INITIATIVE (WEI)
An annual project which empowers several African women and creates a society of equality. This 
is to support women in our communi es to mobilize resources and invest in ini a ves that are 
sustainable and also to equip women with the requisite knowledge that will be u lized to improve 
their livelihoods. For example, training on leadership, and other new ini a ves such as basic 
technology. We believe in equality for all.
• CHILDREN FOUNDATION
The children founda on is the branch of YALF which a ends to the needs of children and creates 
the next genera on of mentors and youth leaders all over the con nent. This is done through 
suppor ng the educa onal needs of the OVC (orphan and vulnerable children) and mentoring 
them. Our main focus with children is educa on, where YALF ensures that children are taken 
to school and supported fully. Mentorship also plays a key role. Youth are empowered on 
entrepreneurship and on leadership roles. 
• WAYLS (WEST AFRICA YOUNG LEADERS SUMMIT)  
A yearly training program which sensi zes and empowers millions of West African youths yearly. 
So far, two summits have been held successfully.
• YALJOD
Young African Leaders Journal of Development (YALJOD) is a biennial publica on which 
hosts scholarly analysis and compe ng viewpoints about the development of Africa. YALJOD 
accepts papers from varied disciplinary areas including Social Sciences, Physical Sciences and 
Humani es, that show direct relevance to the development of Africa. It publishes researches 
understood as the social, economic, poli cal, cultural and technological processes of change in 
Africa. YALJOD indepthly explains the various challenges facing Africa and sheds more light 
on their solu ons. It provides an insight for policy makers to implement policies that would 
ensure change in all spheres of development. The maiden edi on of YALJOD will be launched 
in October at the African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
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• INFONO
This is a pan-African network system and marke ng tool which promotes technology in Africa – 
connec ng Africans and their businesses.
• YALF UNSC-CAMPAIGN
An ac on plan to create awareness and eventually secure a permanent seat for Africa on the 
United Na ons Security Council. YALF has spearheaded this campaign on all social media 
pla orms using the hashtag #Africa4UNSecurityCouncil
• PAN AFRICAN SPORTS SCHOOL (PASS)
A sports world which would create high quality African athletes and raise sports standard in the 
con nent.
• TUBERCULOSIS CAMPAIGN
Following the health target of the SDGs and the death of our hero, Evance Mtsukwa, YALF 
launched a campaign that seeks to create awareness against Tuberculosis. For 2016, it has 
partnered with the Federal Ministry of Health, Ethiopia to ensure the success of this campaign, 
which will take place during the 2016 YALF Annual Summit from 19 – 21 of October, 2016.
• COMPUTER SUPPORT PROGRAM (CSP)
A special project targeted at improving the values and skills of African youths as it relates to 
Informa on and Communica on Technology (ICT). 
With these projects, we at YALF are calling on interested individuals and corporate bodies to 
partner with us in execu ng these mandates and ensuring all round success. Your par cipa on is 
highly appreciated.
Teresa Abila,
Vice President I, YALF
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ABOUT YALF (REG. No.: 157-631 NPO)
The Young African Leaders Forum (YALF) is an independent pan-African organisa on whose 
major objec ve is to effectuate sustainable development in every African na on. We achieve 
this by tracing Africa’s development problems to their root causes, researching and proffering 
workable solu ons to them as well as implemen ng strategic solu ons. We also work to empower 
young African people to par cipate ac vely in the society so that they can improve their own 
lives by represen ng and solving their needs whilst advoca ng for those of others. 
YALF is incorporated and headquartered in South Africa with the offices and ac ve representa ons 
in 26 African na ons, USA and Canada. We own a pan-African network system tool called 
iNFONO and our ini a ve is to move Africa to the First World Status in record  me. 
HEADQUARTERS:
Address: 54, Worraker Street, Newton Park, Port Elizabeth, South Africa
PO Box 488, Hunters Retreat, Port Elizabeth, 6017
Website: www.yalf-africa.org 
Email: info@yalf-africa.org; p.ifoh@yalf-africa.org 
Phone: +27 79 785 4282, +27 79 662 7444
NATIONAL OFFICES & CONTACT DETAILS:  
YALF Nigeria
Address: Block DC4, Abia State Polytechnic, Aba, Abia State, Nigeria. 
Email: nigeria@yalf-africa.org 
Phone: +234 8064293023 / +234 8130422347
YALF Kenya
Address: 402, Blue Bells, Beijing Road, Nairobi, Kenya. 
Email: kenya@yalf-africa.org 
Phone: +254 722 168538
YALF Ghana
Address: 100, New Weija Broadcas ng, Accra, Ghana.
Email: ghana@yalf-africa.org 
Phone: +233 246802099 / +233 54 7019934
YALF Cameroon
PO Box: BP 5007 Douala-Akwa, Cameroon
Email: cameroon@yalf-africa.org 
Phone: +237 67 569 1857, +237 7989 4477
YALF Zambia
Email: zambia@yalf-africa.org 
Phone: +260 9539 30950 
YALF Ethiopia
Address: 12, Alert Hospital Street, Zenebwork, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
Email: ethiopia@yalf-africa.org 
Phone: +251 91 1799356, +251 91 347 2144
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YALF Zimbabwe
Address: 2805, Jerusalem High ield, Harare, Zimbabwe.
Email: zimbabwe@yalf-africa.org 
Phone: +263 7730 92979 / +263 772 118783
YALF Benin
Address: LIC/YALF Training Centre, Carrefour Y, Porto Novo, Benin (PO Box 1044 P/N).
Email: benin@yalf-africa.org 
Phone: +229 9763 8321 / +229 9614 2102
YALF Malawi
Address: 471, Kanzeja Street, Blantyre, Malawi. 
Email: malawi@yalf-africa.org 
Phone: +265 999 22 8518, +265 993 57 9732
YALF Sierra Leone
Email: sierraleone@yalf-africa.org 
Phone: +232 7679 2403
YALF Rwanda  
Email: rwanda@yalf-africa.org 
Phone: +250 783 056302
YALF Swaziland
Address: FLAS/YALF Ofice, Lidlabe Street, Mbabane, Swaziland. 
Email: Swaziland@yalf-africa.org 
Phone: +268 7644 1361, +268 78 61 2970
YALF Guinea
Email: guinea@yalf-africa.org 
Phone: +224 62 267 7506
YALF DR Congo
Email: drc@yalf-africa.org 
Phone: +243 8153 13675 / +243 99 5886580
YALF Tanzania
PO Box 7491 Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Email: tanzania@yalf-africa.org 
Phone: +255 71701 1015
YALF Cote d’Ivoire
Email: ivorycoast@yalf-africa.org 
Phone: +225 0734 8550
YALF Uganda
Email: uganda@yalf-africa.org 
Phone: +256 702 585565 / +256 775 464917
YALF Burundi  
Address: 74, Gishurushuru Street, Carama, Bujumbura city, Burundi. 
Email: burundi@yalf-africa.org 







Phone: +231 777 929 099
YALF Togo
Email: togo@yalf-africa.org 






Phone: +20 114 8226947
YALF Namibia
Email: namibia@yalf-africa.org 
Phone: 264 81 1276505 / +264 81 4328464
YALF Morocco
Email: morocco@yalf-africa.org 
Phone: +212 659 211238 
YALF Sudan
Email: sudan@yalf-africa.org 
Phone: +249 92642 339
DIASPORA – CANADA & USA OFFICES:
YALF Canada,




YALF, United States of America (USA)
700 Grove, Grove Street,
Apartment 2D, Jersey City, New Jersey, USA.
Pin Number 07310
Email: usa@yalf-africa.org 









WALTER RODNEY FOUNDATION POSITIVE RUNAWAY
JUSTINE MUTALE FOUNDATION ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES
FEDERAL MINISTRY 
OF HEALTH
ADDIS ABABA CITY 
ADMINISTRATION 
HEALTH BUREAU
Young African
Leaders Forum
